Inquiry nails Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe for busting of secret army hideout
A Sri Lankan Presidential Commission, which inquired into the busting of a key hideout of the Army’s top-secret Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) in 2002, has blamed Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, the recently sacked ministers, and several police officers for the act, which it described as a “great betrayal”. Commissioner, retired Judge D Jayawickreme, fixed direct responsibility on Assistant Superintendent of Police, Kulasiri Udugampola, who, he said, behaved like a “Supreme Commander above the law.” But the Prime Minister, the ministers concerned, and two successive IGPs were also responsible, albeit indirectly, he said. ” They were simply powerless to prevent the illegal action of ASP Udugampola, even after they were apprised of the facts of this safe house and the activities of its personnel,” Jayawickreme said.
(Hindustan Times).
The politically motivated Mellenium City raid the compromised HEROs of our time.
Presidential Commission of Inquiry to inquire into the disclosure of the existence of and the raid on the safe house operated by the Sri Lanka Army at Athurugiriya
The police are to be blamed
Report
D. Jayawickrema (Commissioner)
Retired Judge of the Court of Appeal
S. M. J. Senaratne
Secretary to the Commission}Bandaranaike Memorial International Conference Hall, Colombo 7
November, 2003
CHAPTER I
Matters of Record
Your Excellency was pleased to appoint this Commission in terms of Section 2 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act No. 17 of 1948, as amended by Nos. 8 of 1950, 40 of 1953; 8 of 1955 and 29 of 1955, to inquire and report on the matters relating to the disclosure of the existence of and the raid on 2nd January 2002, of the Safe House operated by the Sri Lanka Army at Athurugiriya as stated in the Warrant dated 16th August, 2002 (Annexe A).
This Commission was required to conclude the Inquiry and transmit the Report within three months from the date of the Warrant. However, having regard to the complexity of the matters required to be investigated and having considered the parties involved, i.e., the Sri Lanka Army and the Police and also the noncooperation of the Government agencies, specially the Police, Your Excellency was pleased to extend the time for the rendering of the final Report of this Commission on three occasions. Thus, the time for the rendering of the final Report of the Commission was enlarged up to 15th May 2003 on the first occasion and thereafter up to 15th August 2003 and 15th November 2003.
According to the Warrant dated 16th August 2002, this Commission was required to inquire into and report on the following matters:
a) Whether there was any information given by any personnel of the Armed Forces disclosing the existence of a Safe House at Athurugiriya;
b) If so, by whom, under what circumstances and to whom such disclosures were made;
c) Were there any compelling reasons for the Police to raid the Safe House and take action in the manner they did in taking into custody several Army personnel;
d) Have the Police Officers who raided the Safe House obtained directions from the Inspector General of Police or any other higher Authority before such steps were taken;
e) Has the Commander of the Army or any other senior officer on his behalf been consulted or informed about the said raid and whether the Commander or any such Authority has indicated the dangers in such a situation and whether the Commander has warned the Police having assured of any information that could be required to ascertain the circumstances in which the unit existed;
f) Have the Police Offcers acted arbitrarily in acting in the manner they did, jeopardized the security of the State and the Military strategy of the Armed Forces and exposed the personnel engaged in the duties entrusted to them by the Army;
g) Has this action in any manner induced/assisted in neutralizing the Military strategy of the Army in combating terrorism in the Northern and Eastern Provinces;
h) Have the Defence authorities and the Police
Department taken appropriate disciplinary action under the Police Ordinance or other existing Laws of the country against any officer/officers responsible for any illegal acts or violation of any Police Departmental Orderst Regulations and if so, is it considered sufficient in the circumstances;
i) Recommendations that can be made to prevent interference by any officials or authorities in the Military strategies of the Armed Forces duly operated on the orders of Commanders of the Armed Forces;
j) Any other recommendations considered relevant by the Commission on its findings in terms of this Warrant.
The Warrant also empowered the Commission to hold such inquiries and make all other investigations into the aforesaid matters as may appear necessary.
Mr. Edmund Jayasuriya, Senior Assistant Secretary attached to the Presidential Secretariat, a former officer of the Sri Lanka Administrative Service, was appointed as Secretary to the Commission on 3rd September 2002. Mr. Jayasuriya, however, functioned as the Secretary only for a brief period of time and resigned on 31st of October 2002 on health grounds. Thereafter on 1st November 2002, Mr. S. M. J. Senaratna, a former officer of the Sri Lanka Administrative Service who has held high government posts such as the Director-General of Customs and Secretary to the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications and Media was appointed Secretary of this Commission. He functioned as the Secretary to the Commission till the conclusion of this Commission with the aid of a staff whose names appear in Annexe B.
Although the Commission was appointed on 16th of August 2002, accommodation for the Commission was obtained on 6th of September 2002, at the Bandaranaike Memorial International Conference Hall (BMICH) and the Secretariat was opened on the same day.
On the request of this Commission, Mr. Riyaz Hamza, State Counsel, was nominated to. Assist the Commission by the Hon. Attorney General, Mr. K. C. Kamalasabeysan on 8.10.2002. Mr. Hamza very ably assisted the Commission till its conclusion, notwithstanding the fact that he had also to perform other official and professional duties in the Attorney General’s Department, which also required his urgent attention. He alone conducted the examination of all the witnesses and summarized the evidence for the benefit of the Commission, which he did with great devotion.
Mr. A. J. T. Iddamalgoda, a former Senior Deputy Inspector General of Police, was appointed as the Leader of the Investigation Team on 1st October 2002. He functioned alone, as the Inspector General of Police in spite of many requests by this Commission and a directive by Her Excellency the President, failed to appoint the required Police Officers to assist the Commission to carry out the necessary investigations. Mr. Iddamalgoda had the disadvantage of not being a ‘Peace Officer’ as he ceased to be a Peace Officer since his retirement. Thus, he was handicapped in making the necessary investigations legally.
In spite of this fact Mr. Iddamalgoda assisted the Commission and the State Counsel in collating evidence and placing them before the Commission, with the assistance of the Secretary to the Commission.
Repeated requests were made by letters dated 19th September 2002; 8th November, 2002; 27th November, 2002 to the Inspector General of Police to release Police Officers to assist the Commission.
Her Excellency the President by her letter dated 7th January 2003, directed the Inspector General of Police, T. E. Anandarajah to take immediate action to release the necessary Police personnel requested by this Commission. But up to the time of writing of this report there had been no response or even acknowledgments to the above letters.
On 31st October 2002 and 13th February 2003, the Secretary to this Commission addressed two letters to the Chairman of the National Police Commission regarding the conduct of the Inspector General of Police in not replying the letters and to assist the Commission by releasing the required Police personnel. Although the National Police Commission was situated in the same building, i.e. the BMICH, up to the time of writing this Report there had been no response, not even an acknowledgement of the above letters. Although there was no response to the letters sent to the Inspector General of Police, on 10th March 2003, 1 Sub-Inspector and 2 Police Constables were released to this Commission and on 1.4.2003 another Inspector of Police was released to this Commission. On 7th May 2003, the Secretary to the Commission requested the Inspector General of Police to release a vehicle to the use of the Police Officers attached to this Commission, but the Inspector General of Police did not comply with that request.
A request made to Sathosa on 25th September 2002, to obtain stationery on credit was also refused.
Office equipment was received on 19th September 2002, and 27th September 2002 and the stationery on 24th October 2002. Treasury allocation for the necessary expenditure was released on 24th September 2002 and a computer was released on 3rd October, 2002.
On 29th October 2002 the Commission visited the Athurugiriya Safe House and inspected the situation and surroundings of this Safe House. The Commission also visited the Kandy and Katugastota Police Stations on 9th April 2003, where the suspects were kept in order to ascertain the suitability of the cells where they were detained.
The Commission caused notifications to be published in the daily newspapers in Sinhala, Tamil and English inviting representations for information from persons or organizations of the public on matters relevant to the Terms of Reference (copies of the press notices are at Annexes C, Cl and C2).
There was no response to these notifications, not even anonymously. Therefore the Commission initially summoned the DMI. Brig. Hendawitharana and those who were arrested by the Police from the Safe House at Athurugiriya and thereafter several other senior Army Officers including the Army Commander. Their statements were recorded and subsequently their evidence was led before the Commission.
A Commission appointed under the provisions of the Commissions of Inquiry Act is vested with limited powers. Persons who had to be examined by the Commission could be summoned only as witnesses. The Commission also summoned as witnesses persons implicated or concerned in the matters under inquiry. The witnesses were informed that in terms of Section 16 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act they were entitled to be represented by Attorneys-at-Law.
When Kulasiri Udugampola, the Assistant Superintendent of Police (Superintendent of Police at the time) who raided the Safe House was summoned to give evidence, he appeared on his own for three days and from the fourth day of his evidence Attorneys-at-Law Mr. Sujeewa Senasingha and Mr. M. R. Sudasingha, appeared as his Counsel representing his interests. Mr. Upul Jayasuriya and Mr. T. Tennekoon Attorneys-at-Law appeared as Counsel for the Editor of the “Silumina” Sunday newspaper. These Counsel were permitted to put questions to the said witnesses, since they appeared to look after the interests of their respective witnesses.
Persons summoned to give evidence were informed by the Commission at the end of their testimony, that they may add to or clarify what they have stated in their evidence. Whatever the witnesses have so stated has been recorded.
Public Sittings of the Commission commenced on 9th December 2002, and the Commission had Public Sittings on 54 occasions. 69 persons appeared before the Commission on summons and their evidence was recorded at public sittings except where the witnesses opted to give evidence in camera. As per the Warrant, witnesses were explained that they had the discretion to give evidence in camera or in Public Sittings. Most of the witnesses from the Army opted to give evidence in camera and the Commission permitted them to do so.
147 items of documents and productions were produced and marked through these witnesses (Annexe D).
The names of the witnesses are set out in Annexe E and the specimen of summons is at Annexe F. The sittings of the Commission were held in Committee Rooms ‘E’, ‘F’ and Room No.2-102 of the BMICH. Members of the public and the media had free and unimpeded access to attend the proceedings on days on which the sittings were held in public. But strangely, except on one or two occasions, the media or the public did not make use of this opportunity for reasons not known to the Commission.
The main Secretariat of the Commission was situated in Room No.2-104 of the BMICH. The Commissioner’s Chamber was in Room No. 2-102, the Secretary’s Office was in Room No.2-103, the Investigator’s Office was in Room No.2-105 and the State Counsel’s Office was in Room No. 2-106. The witnesses were initially questioned and their statements were recorded in Room No.2-103.
The Secretariat was very efficiently and ably managed by its energetic Administrative Officer, Mr. S. M. N. B. Samaratunga assisted by Chief Clerk. Mr. G. A. Gunawardena and the staff.
The Commission wishes to record its appreciation of Mrs. Shanti Fernando for typing the entire report in addition to recording the evidence. The Commission expresses its gratitude to the staff for their able and efficient assistance in its task.
The proceedings were recorded on audiotape and simultaneously taken down in shorthand and subsequently prepared into typed proceedings. These proceedings run into 3,261 pages contained in 12 volumes.
They are submitted herewith along with the copies of marked documents and statements of all persons recorded by the Investigator.
The Commission wishes to place on record that, in arriving at inferences and findings the Commission considered the evidence led and all the reliable and relevant material placed before the Commission, including the statements, reliable reports filed before this Commission by governmental agencies and other information pertaining to important issues.
CHAPTER II
Comment & Observations
i. Appointment of Commissions and its relevance
On 2nd January 2002, Assistant Superintendent of Police, Kulasiri Udugampola, Superintendent of Police at that time, raided a house at Athurugiriya on a purported Court Order on the pretext of arresting Chanuka Ratwatte, the son of former Deputy Minister of Defence, Anuruddha Ratwatte, who was said to be a suspect in the Udathalawinna murder case which was pending in the Teldeniya Magistrate’s Court.
The media both print and electronic gave the widest publicity to this exposure as if it was the greatest news of the decade. But ASP Udugampola’s raid ended in failure as far as the whereabouts of Chanuka Ratwatte were concerned. When he raided this house ASP Udugampola did not have a Court Order or a Search Warrant to do so legally. But during the course of this raid he was able to discover some weapons and explosives from this house at Athurugiriya. This discovery was again great news for the media. The VIPs, including the Minister of Interior and the Secretary to the Ministry of Mass Communication, did their best to give the widest publicity to this event and moved to do so in the night of the raid itself by contacting various institutions and personnel.
The publicity stunt which started with a bang, ended in a whimper when later it was discovered that the house at No. 844, Millennium City, Athurugirya, was a house which was rented out to the Army and the weapons also belonged to the Army. Thereafter the media became mum except for the occasional writing by political correspondents or by way of feature articles. But some media personnel tried their utmost to justify this unwarranted raid on the prejudiced view that this house was maintained for an illegal purpose and the raid was genuine. They suggested that there was a conspiracy to eliminate the then Leader of the Opposition, the present Hon. Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe while he was addressing an election meeting or when he was travelling in a special bus which he was using for electioneering.
Except for veteran journalist, Iqbal Athas who expressed an unbiased view in respect of the raid, most of the other journalists expressed a one-sided view in that to show that Assistant Superintendent of Police, Udugampola, acted legally. These journalists seemed to be biased against the Army and its Commander, Lt. Gen. Balagalle.
Some media personnel clamoured for a detailed investigation. D. B. S. Jeyaraj, in one of his articles in his column “Cross Currents” dated 11th August, 2002 which appeared in “The Sunday Leader” newspaper under the heading “Deep Penetration Hit Squads: Deep Probe Essential” stated that:
“It is very necessary that a detailed investigation be launched into the entire covert action project. When Kumaratunga and cohorts are planning a prime ministerial change the deep penetration hit squads need to be probed deeply in the interest of national security and the nation at large.” – (P1200)
Even then when this Commission was appointed to probe this matter the same media, some Ministers, and MPs persistently criticized the action of Her Excellency the President and clamoured for the repealing of the Commissions of Inquiry Act. But the Hon. Minister of Defence, Tilak Marapana even though belatedly, acted in defusing this trend. According to “The Sunday Times” report dated 27th January 2002, under the heading “Raid on Army Safe House a publicity stunt – Marapana”, the Hon. Minister of Defence is supposed to have stated that:
“The Police raid on the Army Safe House at Athurugiriya was ill conceived and harsh treatment meted out to the officer and men was very bad………….
He told the “Sunday Times” in an exclusive interview that the information Police provided in a bid to further extend the detention of the Army Officer and men was ‘hopelessly inadequate’. I made it very clear to the Police that I don’t want the Prevention of Terrorism Act abused, Mr. Marapana said.
He was commenting on the January 2nd raid by Kulasiri Udugampola, SP, Special Operations (Kandy Division) on a safe house run by the Army’s Directorate of Military Intelligence at the Millennium City in Athurugiriya. By his own admission, Mr. Udugampola carried out the raid without the knowledge of either the Inspector General of Police or the DIG in charge of Kandy Division. He seized an array of weapons, arrested an officer and five soldiers.
It later turned out that the men and material belonged to the Army’s highly successful Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) – a long standing secret which became public together with the identities of the men. The men were detained for three days on a detention order issued by the SSP in charge of Kandy Division under the Prevention of Terrorism Act.
Subsequent detention, which required a Detention Order from the Ministry of Defence, was refused by Mr. Marapana.
The initial raid even if it was justified because they were misinformed about the state of affairs, the Army Commander (Lt. Gen. Balagalle) and the Director of Military Intelligence (Brig. Kapila Hendawitharana), informed the Police that this was an Army location, Mr. Marapana pointed out.
He said: ‘They told Police that the persons who had been arrested are Army personnel and that items that were recovered were Army property. The officer and men have been authorized by the Army to carry out operations using these items. No lesser person than the Army Commander informs of that to the Police and from that point onwards I think the Police are to be blamed.
I can understand if they did not arrest the Army personnel, but they have arrested them, kept them in confinement and from the reports that I got, they have not been treated that well when they were in Police custody. That is why when the Police applied to me for a Detention Order, I kept them in detention for the period that the law authorized them to do so, I refused. I flatly refused because the material they submitted to me to justify the detention was hopelessly inadequate. There is nothing they have unearthed in that investigation which seemed to suggest that these people (the Army personnel) had been acting other than on orders from their superiors in the Army. They were very legitimate orders.
Asked whether the raid and arrest of the Army men led to the disclosure of a ‘Top State secret”, Mr. Marapana replied, well, I would not say this is such a secret. Certainly our enemy would have known of the existence of the LRRP. Nor is the raid on the location. These people used to come and leave their equipment. Nothing else happened there. It was only a so-called Safe House that could have been shifted anywhere.
But as far as the personnel involved, the fact that their identities have been revealed will create a problem not only for them but their families too. More serious than anything else, I feel the harsh treatment that has been meted out to them is very bad. Having done their duty and when they find that they are arrested, detained and ill treated in this way, they are completely demoralized. That is the aspect I am more worried about than anything else.”
Minister has further stated in the same interview:
“Asked whether the wide publicity generated soon after the raid, even before the investigations had commenced, was the beginning of the matter being publicized, Mr. Marapana said, “This is the most objectionable part of the whole episode. They (Police) went with the media to raid this house. This implies that their main target was to get some publicity out of this whole episode.
That is what makes me suspect the bona fides of the Police team to some extent. If they had the national interest at heart and if they really thought that there is a place frequented by Army people with this type of deadly weapons, then one would not have expected them to take the media, go and make a big show of it. They would have in the first place mounted surveillance and gathered information about the house. That is to find out what exactly these people are up to. The raid should have been the last step.
Instead, the moment they received information, they run to the nearest ‘Camera Shop’ and bring all those media personnel. You cannot blame them. This is just a publicity stunt and nothing more than that.”
The above quotation was taken from “The Sunday Times” article which was marked as P103D when it was tendered by Iqbal Athas who was a witness before this Commission.
On the evidence led before this Commission it was absolutely clear that the officer and the men who were arrested by Assistant Superintendent of Police, Udugampola have been authorized by the Army to carry out covert operations against the LTTE using the weapons recovered. No less a person than the Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Balagalle himself informed the Inspector General of Police and Assistant Superintendent of Police, Udugampola on the night of the raid that this house was a legally maintained Safe House by the Army. For whatever action the Police took thereafter, the Police are to be blamed.
According to “The Sunday Leader” report dated 3rd February 2002, the Interior Minister, John Amaratunga has said that he initiated the Police investigation into the Athurugiriya raid, but left the matter in the hands of the Defence Ministry (P86). In the same article the Minister of Interior said that if the Defence Ministry and its Minister, Tilak Marapana, is satisfied that the house at Athurugiriya is a bona fide safe house for the Army, there is nothing more that he nor the Police can do and that is the end of the story. He has further stated that there would be little or no point in telling any Police Officer to proceed in such an instance (P86).
When one considers the initial publicity given by the media to the raid of the house at Athurugiriya and the differences of opinion between two senior Ministers of the same (Cabinet as stated above, Her Excellency the President was well within: her rights in appointing a Commission to resolve this controversy and find out what exactly has happened. She being the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Head of the Cabinet of Ministers, under the provisions of the Constitution, she has acted correctly in this regard.
At this stage it would be appropriate to quote the opinion of the present Speaker of Parliament, Joseph Michael Perera, who was a witness in the Presidential Commission appointed to inquire into the establishment and maintenance of places of unlawful detention and torture chambers at the Batalanda Housing Scheme. Joseph Michael Perera giving evidence as a Member of Parliament at that time, on 5th September 1997, at the end of his evidence when the Commission asked him whether he has anything further to say, he highly commended the appointment of that Commission. In his own words he stated as follows (page Nos. 6719, 6720 and 6721):
The raid should have been the last step
November, 2003
Asked whether the raid and arrest of the Army men led to the disclosure of a ‘Top State secret”, Mr. Marapana replied, well, I would not say this is such a secret. Certainly our enemy would have known of the existence of the LRRP. Nor is the raid on the location. These people used to come and leave their equipment. Nothing else happened there. It was only a so-called Safe House that could have been shifted anywhere.
But as far as the personnel involved, the fact that their identities have been revealed will create a problem not only for them but their families too. More serious than anything else, I feel the harsh treatment that has been meted out to them is very bad. Having done their duty and when they find that they are arrested, detained and ill treated in this way, they are completely demoralized. That is the aspect I am more worried about than anything else.”
Minister has further stated in the same interview:
“Asked whether the wide publicity generated soon after the raid, even before the investigations had commenced, was the beginning of the matter being publicized, Mr. Marapana said, “This is the most objectionable part of the whole episode. They (Police) went with the media to raid this house. This implies that their main target was to get some publicity out of this whole episode.
Bona fides
That is what makes me suspect the bona fides of the Police team to some extent. If they had the national interest at heart and if they really thought that there is a place frequented by Army people with this type of deadly weapons, then one would not have expected them to take the media, go and make a big show of it. They would have in the first place mounted surveillance and gathered information about the house. That is to find out what exactly these people are up to. The raid should have been the last step.
Instead, the moment they received information, they run to the nearest ‘Camera Shop’ and bring all those media personnel. You cannot blame them. This is just a publicity stunt and nothing more than that.”
The above quotation was taken from “The Sunday Times” article which was marked as P103D when it was tendered by Iqbal Athas who was a witness before this Commission.
On the evidence led before this Commission it was absolutely clear that the officer and the men who were arrested by Assistant Superintendent of Police, Udugampola have been authorized by the Army to carry out covert operations against the LTTE using the weapons recovered. No less a person than the Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Balagalle himself informed the Inspector General of Police and Assistant Superintendent of Police, Udugampola on the night of the raid that this house was a legally maintained Safe House by the Army. For whatever action the Police took thereafter, the Police are to be blamed.
According to “The Sunday Leader” report dated 3rd February 2002, the Interior Minister, John Amaratunga has said that he initiated the Police investigation into the Athurugiriya raid, but left the matter in the hands of the Defence Ministry (P86). In the same article the Minister of Interior said that if the Defence Ministry and its Minister, Tilak Marapana, is satisfied that the house at Athurugiriya is a bona fide safe house for the Army, there is nothing more that he nor the Police can do and that is the end of the story. He has further stated that there would be little or no point in telling any Police Officer to proceed in such an instance (P86).
Initial publicity
When one considers the initial publicity given by the media to the raid of the house at Athurugiriya and the differences of opinion between two senior Ministers of the same (Cabinet as stated above, Her Excellency the President was well within: her rights in appointing a Commission to resolve this controversy and find out what exactly has happened. She being the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Head of the Cabinet of Ministers, under the provisions of the Constitution, she has acted correctly in this regard.
At this stage it would be appropriate to quote the opinion of the present Speaker of Parliament, Joseph Michael Perera, who was a witness in the Presidential Commission appointed to inquire into the establishment and maintenance of places of unlawful detention and torture chambers at the Batalanda Housing Scheme. Joseph Michael Perera giving evidence as a Member of Parliament at that time, on 5th September 1997, at the end of his evidence when the Commission asked him whether he has anything further to say, he highly commended the appointment of that Commission. In his own words he stated as follows (page Nos. 6719, 6720 and 6721):
The above is an appropriate reply to the allegations made by Ministers and MPs about appointment of Presidential Commissions and about bias and ‘ “mud, slinging”.
ii. The Law Relating to Commissions.
The Commissions of Inquiry Act was enacted in 1948 and is incorporated as No. 17 of 1948, and is found in Volume I, Chapter 8 in the Legislative Enactments. This Act has been subsequently amended by Acts Nos. 8 of 1950; 40 of 1953; 8 of 1955 and 29 of 1955. This Act therefore is still a part of our Law.
Section 2(1), of the Commissions of Inquiry Act empowers the Commission “to inquire into and report upon such administration, conduct or matter” which the President considers that an inquiry should be held and information obtained.
Such a Commission has powers to summon witnesses to procure and receive all such evidence, written or oral and to examine all such witnesses, as the Commission may think it necessary (Sections 7, 8 and 11).
This kind of thing has never happened in police history’ – A retired police chief
Enormous damage
But the enormous damage to national security, humiliation to officers and men in the Sri Lanka Army, distress in the minds of conscientious policemen and above all, colossal embarrassment to the United Front Government continues.
The anger and bewilderment of the vast majority of Sri Lankans, here and abroad, following this tragi-comedy not only highlighted the disgust it had caused but also underscored the hatred against those who caused it. A host of emails to military Spokesman, veteran infantryman Brig. Sarath Karunaratna summed it up.
If it is ironic that one gazetted officer of the Sri Lanka Police could single handedly cause all this, it is tragic that his conclusions came even before his own inquiries could begin. Superintendent of Police, Kulasiri Udugampola, brought the full glare of the media, both print and electronic, to publicize all his actions, just two hours after the raid on the Safe House at Millennium Park on January 2.
To a wholly unsuspecting media, unaware of the realities, what he executed as startling finds – a cache of weapons including landmines, light anti-tank weapons (LAW), assault rifles and thermobaric shells among others – were an arsenal used by the Sri Lanka Army not to kill tiger guerillas but to be used in a sinister plot to eliminate leaders of the United National Party. The nation and the outside world were told about the great catastrophe portended by a so-called conspiracy.
Deep anger
As the news spread, both in Sri Lanka and abroad officers and men in the Army writhed in deep anger. That wide publicity, repeated locally on TV many times, seemed the beginning of a media trial. Morale reached a low ebb. Conscientious policemen, who were in the know of what was going on, were ashamed at what was happening. ‘This kind of thing has never happened in police history’, declared a retired police chief who wished to remain anonymous.
The Commission wishes to observe at this stage that the media which was so vociferous initially completely ignored the proceedings of this Commission later. For whatever reason the media became mum and did not publish the proceedings of this Commission, even though the media was kept informed of the dates of the public sittings of this Commission.
Kumar Abeysinghe, the Secretary to the Ministry of Mass Communication, a senior bureaucrat giving evidence before this Commission, expressed his helplessness when he stated that “For the news people any crisis is news even if it creates chaos in the country and it is so sad some times.” He stated so in reference to a complaint by the Sirasa TV crew to him on the night of the Athurugiriya raid that the Army is preventing them from filming this incident. Kumar Abeysingha further stated that he immediately contacted Austin Fernando, Defence Secretary, and obtained his permission to film it in the presence of the Army. None of the senior officers took into account the fact that at that stage this type of publicity would affect national security.
“The Sunday Leader” of 13th January 2002, in an article by Amantha Perera, under the heading “Arms Bust – More questions than answers” (marked as P120A), in an inset under the heading “PM stops quizzing of journalists”, reports:
“Last week Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe intervened and prevented Police from questioning a journalist regarding the ongoing investigation into the Athurugiriya discovery. The Police had wanted to question the journalists on an article that appeared last – weekend which had detail information on the arrest made at Athurugiriya and the Army operations that were connected. Police were to question him on how he obtained the details and the theory of the place being a safe house. When Wickremesighe got to know of the development he quickly called police and requested them not to go ahead.”
The Commission wishes to state that although some Ministers and MPs aired their views and theories about the raid on the Athurugiriya house none of them appeared before this Commission to give evidence, although wide publicity was given by publishing notifications in the daily newspapers in all three languages inviting representation and information from persons who wished to do so.
As regards the behaviour of the media as stated above, it would be very appropriate to quote the comments of some of their own tribe. In “The Sunday Leader” dated 21st September 2003, under the heading “Spin-doctors and wild asses”, Amantha Perera reporting from San Francisco states:
“The New York Times’ is the leak bureau for the hardliners. Such a pronouncement would be anathema to a lot of senior scribes in Colombo. The type who would quote off the “New York Times” as if reciting divine words carved in stone.
But these were the exact words by Peter Hayes, an expert on North Korea during a recent talk at the Graduate School of Journalism at the University of California, Berkeley, San Francisco.
What Hayes was arguing was that journalists were being used by hardliners in the Bush administration to propagate a certain view point. In so doing, they make sure that the public image of the North Korean situation is just what they would want to be……..
‘An ass running for a master’
“However Scribes hailing from Colombo should be the last to complain of spin-doctors. Colombo is like a stable for such kinds. So the next time some guy quotes from one of the so-called bibles, take a step back, it just might be an ass running for a master.”
“The Island” newspaper of 3.11.2003 editorially commented:
“That the tragedy of Sri Lankan journalism is that scavengers are a plenty whose priority is garbage and seeking employment over truth.”
Hence the Commission does not wish to add anything more to it other than emphasizing the fact that the role of the media is to divulge the TRUTH for fostering LOVE and PEACE, and not HATE and DISSENSION.
iv. “Slinging Mud”
It was alleged by some that the purpose of the appointment of this Commission was to sling mud at certain politicians and the Government.
“Slinging mud” (Ipsissima Verba) is a trait of our society from time immemorial. This was done in the olden days by means of scurrilous letters kele pattara, caricatures or drawings and exhibiting them at public places. In the present day it is done by means of the media, print as well as electronic and by posters. Some tabloid papers and newspapers do it in a very crude form and the national media do it in a refined form by means of caricatures and gossip columns and cartoons. ..
Even in the Courts of Law, especially in family disputes, members of the same family, husband against wife or vise versa, children against parents, brothers against the other brothers and sisters do their very best to discredit each other by digging up their past and exposing their pedigrees to tarnish their images and to show what a disreputable person the other person is. This is a human weakness without a remedy. That is the reason the Law in its wisdom has laid down procedure to be followed in recording evidence and coming to their conclusions. An experienced Judge will know how to apply the rules and regulations and to sift evidence and allow what is relevant to the matters under investigation and reject what is not relevant.
In the present day it is not only politicians, even judges and religious dignitaries, are being openly criticized and slandered by the media exercising the right of free media.~ Every one is helpless, because the freedom of the media is said to be sacred under a democratic set up.
Grave concern
In recent times, civil rights movements here and abroad have expressed grave concern about such instances of discussing the conduct of (including derogatory comments) judges being made in various fora quite independent of the laid down removal procedure of judges. This is contrary to the convention that the conduct of judges should not be discussed except in a substantive motion at the proper forum for their removal. The most unfortunate aspect of this allegation is that the judges have no way of publicly countering such allegations. Thus the judges who have to decide on human rights and fundamental rights violations of others, have themselves no fora to alleviate the violations of their own human and fundamental rights.
This Commission is quite conscious of the practices, the niceties and the decorum of court procedure and wish to state fiat justitia ruat coelum – let justice be done though the heavens should fall.
The findings and recommendations in this Report are based only on admissible.! evidence which is relevant to the matters in issue according to the terms of the Law.
CHAPTER III
Summary of Evidence
Public Sittings of the Commission commenced on 9th of December 2002, and the Commission had Public Sittings on 54 days. In response to summons by the Commission 69 witnesses presented themselves and testified on oath or affirmation. Several witnesses from the Sri Lanka Army were permitted to give evidence in camera. Assistant Superintendent of Police, Kulasiri Udugampola and Tillekaratne Kuruwita Bandara, Editor of the “Silumina” newspaper, were the only witnesses who were represented by Counsel at the time they testified before Commission.
The first witness before the Commission was Brigadier Kapila Hendawitharana, the Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) of the Sri Lanka Army. He submitted that the Directorate of Military Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Corps (MIC) were established in 1990 with the present Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle being the first DMI.
He outlined his primary functions and responsibilities as follows:
(1) To provide timely and accurate intelligence with regard to the enemy (in this instance the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam or the LTTE) for planning out operations and strategy against them.
(2) To deny such intelligence from reaching the enemy.
(3) He was also responsible for intelligence operations against LTTE with the concurrence of the Army Commander.
He described an Army “Safe House” as: “a location from which we carry out covert intelligence operations. Mainly safe houses are used by the Intelligence community. It can be located either in operational areas or in the other areas depending on the necessity. It is my responsibility to see that Safe Houses are well protected and well located.”
He testified that the Directorate had established several such safe houses also known as “Intelligence Cells” in and around Colombo at different times.
Due to certain administrative difficulties the Colombo Intelligence Cell which had been in operation in Battaramulla, had to be shifted to the Kohuwela Army Camp on or about March 2001. Major Najith Karunaratne was in charge of the said Colombo Cell, as Group Commander. As Major Najith Karunaratne proceeded on an overseas assignment, Capt. S. H. M. Nilam took charge of the Colombo Intelligence Cell as Group Commander.
During this period it was decided to step up operations against the LTTE leadership in the East. As such Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols or LRRP type covert operations were planned to neutralize the LTTE leadership in the Eastern Province.
A special team under the leadership of Capt. Nilam was established on or about June 2001 for this purpose. He described Capt. Nilam as an officer having the Capability to carry out these covert intelligence operations in the East because he had access to these uncleared areas through informants run by him.
In Army parlance the DMI defined an LRRP team as:
“any team that goes into the enemy territory and operates in that area….. any team that goes into operational areas or the uncleared areas or the so called enemy areas. Small teams are capable of carrying out reconnaissance before operations and also capable of doing operations.”
The DMI explained the nature of these LRRP type operations as follows:
“What we do in this type of operations is this. Sometimes these particular groups get prior information about a certain target. Sometimes they do not get prior information. In such cases we have to get information from certain people who know the target area and who are familiar with the ground of operation. So, what Capt. Nilam did was this. In his team he had certain people who were familiar with the ground, who are familiar with the target. In such instances he carried out these operations with the help of this small team. In certain instances they have to find certain details from certain informants who are based in Batticaloa. So, what we did was, we used to meet them in Batticaloa covertly and then plan out operations and then carry them out. In certain areas we penetrated though Army areas. In other areas induction was taken through STF areas.”
Capt. Nilam’s team carried out several successful operations against the enemy as is borne out by file marked P3 before this Commission.
For the purpose of these operations arms, ammunition, explosives and other military equipment had to be drawn and the said items had been drawn adopting proper Army procedure, as is borne out by file marked P1. (For convenience these items of arms, ammunition, explosives and other military equipment will be referred to collectively as “military equipment”).
Another location
However, due to the very serious nature of these operations and also as strict confidentiality of the said operations and security of the persons involved had to be maintained, it was decided to shift Capt. Nilam and his team to another location. Giving further reasons for this decision the DMI has stated as follows:
“…….These people (Capt. Nilam’s team) were successfully carrying out operations in the uncleared areas and we knew that these people were targeted by the LTTE although they could not trace them. I thought it best if we can keep them separately from the main base and locate them elsewhere so that they are not identified by our own people.”
Major Sallay, General Staff Officer II (GSO II) and Capt. Nilam were entrusted with the task of finding out a suitable location. Since all other attempts of finding a location failed it was decided to take on rent a house belonging to Capt. Nilam’s wife, Mrs. M. N. F. Jesmina (tenancy agreement entered into between the said Jesmina and the Army has been marked as P6 and the plan/sketch of the house has been marked as P7). The said house had been acquired by Jesmina as a prize in the Seylan Bank Rewards Plus Scheme (documents marked P9, P10 and P11 proves this fact).
The Army Commander had been informed and he too had given the green light to establish a Safe House at that location. Accordingly Capt. Nilam and his team moved to No. 844, Millennium City Housing Scheme, Oruwela, Athurugiriya, on 7th December 2001.
With the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Government and the LTTE on 24th December 2001, Capt. Nilam who was on an operation in the East at the time, was directed to wind up the said operation and return to Colombo. He had done so on 27th December 2001. He had then begun handing over the military equipment to their respective bases.
On 2nd of January 2002, Major Sallay had contacted the DMI around 7.00 p.m. – 7.30 p.m. and informed that a team of Police Officers had raided the Safe House and taken Capt. Nilam and other personnel who were present there into custody.
The DMI had immediately contacted the Army Commander who had wanted an officer to go to Athurugiriya and look into the matter. Accordingly Brig. Hendawitharana had proceeded to Athurugiriya accompanied by Major Sallay.
On reaching the Safe House at Athurugiriya they were informed by the Officer in Charge (OIC) of the Athurugiriya Police Station that Capt. Nilam and others had been taken to the Military Police Camp in Narahenpita by Superintendent of Police (SP) Udugampola.
It must be noted that at the time of this raid Kulasiri Udugampola was a Superintendent of Police, although later he had to revert back to the rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police. Therefore in this Summary of Evidence, when referring to this raid and the aftermath of this raid, Kulasiri Udugampola is referred to as ‘SP’.
Brig. Hendawitharana and Major Sallay had then proceeded to the Military Police Camp at Narahenpita and had arrived there at 9.15 p.m. There he had seen Capt. Nilam and other officers present. He found out that it was SP Udugampola of the Kandy Kennels Division who had taken them into custody. SP Udugampola had also taken into custody the military equipment as productions.
Brig. Hendawitharana had explained to Udugampola the legal nature of the operations carried out by the team. He explained that this was a legitimate Army Intelligence Unit carrying out covert intelligence operations in the East. He had also stated that all the military equipment taken into custody were property of the Army. He has also cautioned SP Udugampola that since this Unit had carried out very successful operations in the East to refrain from exposing them.
Not concerned
However SP Udugampola was not concerned. He insisted that he was acting on a Court Order, which was never shown to any of the witnesses, and that he had no alternative but to take Capt. Nilam and others and the productions to Kandy.
The DMI had contacted the Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Balagalle over the telephone, who in turn had spoken to SP Udugampola and to the then Inspector General of Police, Lucky Kodituwakku. Even the DMI had spoken to the IGP over the telephone and explained matters, after which the IGP had also spoken to SP Udugampola. However even the IGP had been helpless and could not intervene due to the “Court Order” which SP Udugampola alleged he possessed.
DIG/ STF Nimal Gunatillake, SSP, Colombo South Division, Lionel Gunatillake and Private Secretary to the Hon. Minister of Interior, Lal Ratnayake had also come to the Military Police Camp at the time. However, none of them prevented SP Udugampola from taking the Army personnel and the items of productions to Kandy.
Brig. Hendawitharana categorically states that the Safe House and all operations conducted by Capt. Nilam and his team from the Safe House were legal in nature and that these operations had been carried out with the specific knowledge of the Army Commander. Further he confirms that all arms, ammunition, explosives and other items of military equipment were legally drawn by the team following due procedure.
Capt. Shahul Hameed Mohamed Nilam corroborates Brig. Hendawitharana’s testimony. He states that a special team under his command had been established around June 2001 for the purpose of conducting covert operations against the enemy. The team comprised of persons handpicked by himself. Document marked P121 clearly indicates the members of his team. It has been categorized as those who directly participated and others who assisted the team in numerous ways. (However on the day of the Police raid only Capt. Nilam and five others had been present at the Safe House).
He states that on the day in question (2nd January 2002) he had been in the process of returning some of the military equipment to their respective bases. He had returned these items to the Ordnance Depot at Kadawatha, Ordnance Depot at Maradana, Central Armoury of Army Headquarters and to the Armoury at 1 MIC Camp and returned to the Athurugiriya Safe House around 5.30 p.m. together with Staff Sgt. Udalagama, Lance Corp. Hilmy and Corp. Herath. Staff Sgt. Jayamanne and an operative by the name of Irasirathinam Subashkaran, two other members of his team, had remained at the Safe House and were present at the time SP Udugampola arrived at the Safe House for the purpose of this raid.
Surrounded
When he returned he saw that a team of Police Officers had surrounded the Safe House. He later found that the said team was led by SP Udugampola. The SP had said he had come to inspect the Safe House on a Court Order, but the purported Court Order was not shown to him or to any of the other Army personnel. He had demanded that the room where the balance military equipment were kept be opened. Capt. Nilam who had the key to the said room had complied.
On seeing the military equipment inside SP Udugampola had stated thus …….
(Ah! Here are the goods…. My job is done.)
Capt. Nilam had stated that the said location was being used as an-Army Safe House and that the military equipment had all been duly obtained on legal documentation. But this was to no avail. In fact Capt. Nilam had shown SP Udugampola a file he had in his possession, which confirmed that these items of military equipment were duly obtained using proper procedure. SP Udugampola had taken custody of the file, but had not bothered to peruse it. He had even taken into custody another file from the Safe House. (These two files were later produced by SP Udugampola while giving evidence before this Commission and have been marked as P91 and P9lA).
Thereafter SP Udugampola had demanded that the said items of military equipment be brought to the hall and displayed. There the said items were inventorized by Major Clifford de Soysa of the Military Police, whose services SP Udugampola had obtained for this raid.
Later that evening Capt. Nilam and others had been taken into custody. He says no reasons for the arrest had been informed to him or to the others arrested. Later all persons arrested and the military equipment, which were also taken into custody, had been brought to the Military Police Camp in Narahenpita.
The list of military equipment taken into custody is shown in documents marked P4 and P12 before the Commission. They include amongst other items 3 T56 rifles, several rounds of ammunition, 10 kg. pressure mines, 10 kg. claymore mines, small claymores, detonators and 4 thermobaric weapons
Capt. Nilam states further that although Brig. Hendawitharana and Major Sallay had come over to the said Camp to explain matters to SP Udugampola their efforts had been in vain. SP Udugampola had insisted that the suspects had to be produced in the Kandy Courts along with the productions.
Accordingly Capt. Nilam and others were taken away from Narahenpita around 11.30 p.m. Although he thought that they were being taken to Kandy in fact they were first taken to the Cinnamon Gardens Police Station. There amidst protests from him, all the military equipment had been unloaded and had been video taped by a group of cameramen, who Capt. Nilam believed were from the media.
Later Capt. Nilam and the others had been taken to the Kennels Division in Kandy. While the items of productions had been unloaded there, Capt. Nilam and the others had been produced in the Kandy Police Station in the early hours of the morning of 3rd of January 2002.
Detained
They were detained at the Kandy Police Station until 5th January 2002 and thereafter taken to the Katugastota Police Station where they were detained until 13th January 2002. On the said day all except the Tamil operative, Subashkaran had been handed over to the 2 SR (Sinha Regiment) Camp in Kandy.
Capt. Nilam states that the Kandy Remand Cells were uninhabitable with the conditions being very unclean and unhealthy.
During this period of detention, Capt. Nilam had been taken on several occasions to the Kandy Kennels Division where he had been interrogated by SP Udugampola and his statement recorded. He and the others arrested had been produced in the Chambers of the Acting Magistrate, Kandy, on 7th January 2002, in Case No. B12056/2002. A copy of the case record of MC Kandy, Case No. B12056/2002 has been marked as P78 before this Commission.
The other members of Capt. Nilam’s team who had also been arrested along with him namely, Staff Sgt. Udalagama, Staff Sgt. Jayamanne, Corp. Herath, Lance Corp. Hilmy and Irasirathinam Subashkaran corroborate Capt. Nilam’s evidence in all material particulars.
Irasirathinam Subashkaran, one of Capt. Nilam’s operatives had not been released along with the others on 13th January 2002. He was further detained at the Katugastota Police on a Detention Order obtained in terms of Section 9 (1) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA).
He states that on 14th January 2002, Thai Pongal Day, he had been taken to SP Udugampola’s office at the Kandy Kennels Division. On the SP’s directions he had been treated with some special food in lieu of Thai Pongal. Thereafter he had been taken to a location, which was quite alien to him, and was asked as to whether he recognized the said place. He had stated that he did not recognize the place. Later he had got to know that the said location was where ten Muslim youth had been brutally murdered in Udathalawinna on 5th December 2001 (General Elections Day).
According to Major Tuan Suresh Sallay, who was serving as General Staff Officer II (GSO II) of the DMI, the DMI had entrusted him with the task of finding a suitable location to house Capt. Nilam’s team. As several other locations inspected by him were not found to be suitable for the purpose, Capt. Nilam had informed him of the availability of the house in Millennium City, Athurugiriya, which belonged to his wife.
With the consent of the DMI, it was decided to take this house on rent and accordingly Capt. Nilam and the other members of his team moved into the said house on 7th December 2001.
Consequent to the raid SP Udugampola had informed the DMI that if a written authority is given by the Army Commander regarding the legality of the arms, ammunition and other equipment found at the Safe House, he could release Capt. Nilam and the others taken into custody. Accordingly a letter, certifying the Iegality of the arms, ammunition and other equipment which had been taken into custody, was submitted to SP Udugampola, on the directions of the Army Commander, on 4th January 2002. Major Sallay had personally accompanied the Army Legal Officer, Capt. Saman Kumara and handed over the letter to SP Udugampola at the Kennels Division, Kandy. However, SP Udugampola had paid scant respect to the said letter. A copy of the said letter has been marked before the Commission as P13.
Even the Legal Officer of the Sri Lanka Army, Captain Saman Kumara testifies to the fact that P13 was duly handed over to SP Udugampola. (However, as it would transpire later in this Summary of Evidence SP Udugampola denied the receipt of the letter P13.)
Although the contents of this letter is highly confidential and is marked “TOP SECRET (EYES ONLY)” a copy of this letter had been leaked to the press and was published in “The Sunday Leader” newspaper of 3rd March 2002. The said article has been marked before the Commission as P99.
It has transpired in evidence that the exact location of this Safe House was only known to the DMI, Major Sallay, Capt. Amararatna (who was serving as GSO III), and the six persons who were arrested by the Police team. In addition two others namely, Sgt. Kumara and Private Kadigawa, who were also members of Capt. Nilam’s team, but not at the Safe House at the time of the raid, had been aware of its location. Due to the sensitive nature of these operations no other person knew or had the authority to know or to find out the location of the Safe House.
Therefore, it must be noted that, although document P121 lists a total of 22 persons as members of Capt. Nilam’s team – 10 who directly participated and 12 who assisted in the said operations – only 8 persons named therein and referred to above, knew or had the authority to know the exact location of the Safe House.
Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle justified that he was the first DMI, when the Directorate was established in 1990. He also was the first Commanding Officer of the Military Intelligence Corps (MIC) of the Sri Lanka Army, which was established on 28th June 1990.
The Army Commander stated that the purpose for establishing the DMI and the MIC was as follows:
“……this country has had various threats from time to time ranging from insurgencies to law and order problems and going back to terrorism in late ’70s. All these years we found that we did not have a permanent organization like in other armies to handle intelligence. In fact every time such a threat occurred and these services had to be deployed it was a case of forming an ad hoc organization for that particular instance and thereafter you disperse them and call them back again when there is another threat that develops. Therefore, it was thought that there has to be an organization on a permanent basis which will take on gathering information, analyzing them and fuming them into intelligence in respect of organizations which pose a threat where the military has to be deployed to bring it under control.”
He confirmed that the DMI kept him informed about the operations conducted by Capt. Nilam’s team, as well as the fact that an Army Safe House had been established at Millennium City, Athurugiriya.
The Army Commander defined a “Safe House” in military terms as:
“……safe house is a place where intelligence operatives might occupy for the purpose of meeting up with informants, particularly in Colombo area because when they come from outstation places like Jaffna, Batticaloa, Trincomalee they prefer to meet the informant handlers outside their area rather than meeting them in their own areas for their own safety and to prevent exposure to the LTTE. So you do meet informants in those safe houses.
In addition there may be a requirement to identify in this case the LTTE members who are operating in Colombo district. In such a requirement it is necessary that these informants who are basically Tamils stay in Colombo and help the intelligence operatives to identify them in Colombo. Thereafter, as required to follow them. up and mount surveillance on them to identify what activities they are engaged in. So to do all that there is a necessity for even these informants to come and stay in Colombo and if they don’t have any other places they try to accommodate them in these safe houses. So it is purely all on trust and no other regulations govern that.”
Further he distinguished a Safe House from an Intelligence Cell as follows:
“An Intelligence Cell is something in between the Group Headquarters and the Safe House, because an in-cell can operate more than one safe house depending on the requirement. If I am permitted to explain, you may not want to bring all the informants to a particular safe house. One thing, you will expose one informant to another. In such a scenario it is better to have even 2 or 3 safe houses so that you don’t expose one informant to the other. Then there is that element of danger if one is exposed. Or even through jealousy one might expose for earning more money.”
Lt. General Balagalle stated that he knew Capt. Nilam from the time he was the DMI. He referred to Capt. Nilam as having a special talent of identifying and recruiting good informants. “He had a way of speaking to them that certainly proved a success in getting the right kind of persons as informants. That talent he definitely had and he produced many a good result over a period of time.”
The Army Commander defined the nature of LRRP type operations carried out by the Sri Lanka Army as follows:
“There are two types of Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols. Then you have Long Range Patrols, LRP. You have LRP and LRRP, Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols. LRRPs do only reconnaissance, but in the case of LRPs, they may do reconnaissance and finally take action also on the enemy. In these groups that were operating, there were LRRPs under the commandos of the Army. There were LRRPs operating under the command of the Special Forces. That is Special Forces Groups who are generally confined to jungles and unpopulated areas in the enemy controlled areas. They find it extremely difficult to operate in urban areas. So as the Commander I have to think how best we can tackle our enemy. In doing so I encouraged the Commandos to operate on LRRPs into the jungles and they were given specific areas. Similarly, the Special Forces were tasked on this deep penetration patrols called LRRPs to do reconnaissance and take action by themselves, if they meet up with the enemy or if they meet up with the leader to take him on. It is a combat task given to the Army. There are areas restricted because of the nature of the deployment for the Special Forces and the Commandos. The urban areas in particular, they find it difficult to operate because they get exposed by trying to mingle with the public. Or if the public notices or the LTTE notices them they get exposed and survival is rather impossible. In such a scenario I thought and it worked that it was only the intelligence who can operate in urban areas. They will dress themselves in such a manner that they will be part of the society and they move around as any other member in that location. While doing that they locate the enemy and take them on. It is a much more difficult task than what the Special Forces or the Commandos are doing. I am not trying to demean what the Special Forces or the Commandos are performing, but the fact is they are trained. The atmosphere is such that they go through jungles and get into areas where the movements are taking place and they take on the target. But those leaders and others of the LTTE in particular, when they move about in urban areas they find it extremely difficult to take them on and it was only the intelligence and intelligence operatives who were able to perform that task successfully. And as a result by employing all 3 categories, 2 of them in jungles and intelligence covering the urban areas we were able to make the so called controlled areas of the enemy very unsafe for them and that is what we achieved in this exercise.”
The Army Commander testified that it was the DMI, Brig. Hendawitharana, who first informed him about this raid. This was around 8.00 p.m., on 2nd January 2002. He had directed the DMI to immediately proceed to Athurugiriya and to try and explain matters to the arresting officer.
He had also spoken to the then IGP, the late Lucky Kodituwakku, who after ascertaining details had got back to him and informed that he was helpless in the matter because there had been a Court Order directing the Safe House to be raided and the persons concerned to be taken into custody.
Consequent to this raid on 8th January 2002, the Army Commander convened a Court of Inquiry. This was to look into the recovery of weapons, explosives and other military equipment in the Safe House at Athurugiriya on 2nd January 2002. The said convening order has been marked as P15 before the Commission. The proceedings of the said Court of Inquiry has been marked as PISA, the Opinion and Recommendations of the Court of Inquiry has been marked as P15B, while the Opinion of the Army Commander has been marked as P15C.
It would be pertinent at this stage to emphasize on the Opinion made by Lt. Gen: Balagalle on 21st January 2002, where he unequivocally commends Capt. Nilam and his team. As such the entirety of his opinion in respect of this Court of Inquiry is given below:
Every person whose conduct is the subject matter of inquiry or who is in any way implicated or concened in the matter under inquiry, is entitled to be represented by one or more Attorneys-at-Law at the whole of the inquiry; and any other person who may consider it desirable that he should be so represented may, by leave of the Commission be represented in the manner aforesaid (Section 16).
Unlike Section 16 of the Special Presidential Commissions of Inquiry Law which was enacted in 1978 (Law No. 7 of 1978; Act No.4 of 1978 Chapter 9, Volume 1:, Legislative Enactments), a Commission appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act No. 17 of 1948, has no power to inform such persons who are implicated or concerned in the matter under inquiry.
Under Section 16 of the Special Presidential Commissions of Inquiry Law No. 7 of 1978, every person who is specified in a Warrant issued under this Law as a person whose conduct is the subject of an inquiry under this Law or as a person who in any way implicated or concerned in the matter under inquiry and any person who, in the opinion of the Commission, is a person whose conduct should be the subject matter of inquiry or in the opinion of the Commission is in any way implicated or concerned in the matter under inquiry shall be informed by the Commission and shall, after he is so informed, be entitled to be represented by one or more Attorneys-at-Law at such stage of the inquiry as is relevant thereto,, and any other person who may consider it desirable that he should be so represented may, by leave of the Commission, be represented in the manner aforesaid.
Thus it is very clear that Section 16 of the Special Presidential Commissions of Inquiry Law No. 7 of 1978 is different from Section 16 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act No. 17 of 1948.
On a reading of the above provisions it seems that according to Section 16 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act No. 17 of 1948 a person who is implicated or concerned in, the matter under inquiry if he so wishes as of right is entitled to be represented by Counsel at the inquiry. Any other person could appear only after obtaining leave of the Commission for that purpose. Under this provision a person who is implicated or concerned himself has the discretion to be represented by an Attorney-at-Law. There is no provision for that person to be so informed by the Commission. The Commission has power only to summon and examine as witnesses and not as persons concerned or implicated.
Under Section 16 of the Special Presidential Commissions of Inquiry Law No. 7 of 1978, the duty is cast on the Commission itself to inform such person and the discretion to summon or not is with the Commission.
No power or jurisdiction
A Commission appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act No. 17 of 1948 has no power or jurisdiction to find a person “guilty” of any act or to recommend the imposition of civic disabilities on any person. Such powers given to a Special Presidential Commission under Section 9 of the Special Presidential Commissions of Inquiry Law No. 7 of 1978, are not conferred on a Commission appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act No. 17 of 1948.
In any case the Commissions appointed under the above laws have no punitive powers. The Commissions are empowered only to inquire into and report upon matters referred to in the Warrant of Appointment. Section 7(d) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act empowers the Commission to admit any evidence whether written or oral, which might be inadmissible in civil or criminal proceedings notwithstanding any of the provisions of the Evidence Ordinance.
Thus the comments and criticisms made by the general public and the media that nothing results from the appointment of Commissions is a matter not within the purview or jurisdiction of a Commission. The power of implementing the recommendations of a Commission is somewhere else. The Commissions an therefore not to be blamed for not implementing such recommendations. Once the report of a Commission is published as a Sessional Paper the relevant government agencies should take over and take appropriate action.
Unfortunate
Generally when a Commission is appointed all the government agencies should assist such a Commission to carry out its functions, but it is very unfortunate that in respect of this Commission none of the government agencies readily assisted this Commission even when assistance was requested.
An inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Act being judicial proceedings, assistance of the Police is absolutely necessary. When such assistance was requested by this Commission from the Inspector General of Police and the Chairman of the Police Commission, there was no response at all. There was not even an acknowledgement of the receipt of the letters requesting such assistance. Without responding to the request for assistance the Inspector General of Police has sought legal advice from the Attomey General. To say the least, the behaviour of the Inspector General of Police was very strange in this respect. The Hon. Attorney General has replied to the Inspector General of Police stating that there is no legal impediment in releasing Police Officers to assist the Commission. The Hon. Attorney General has further advised that if the Inspector General of Police has any objection he should make his submissions before the Commission itself in this respect.
The Commissioner of this Commission has earlier been a Member of a Special Presidential Commission and Chairman of two other Presidential Commissions. In the above mentioned Commissions the then Inspector General of Police appointed very senior officers of the Police in the rank of DIGs and SSPs to assist those Commissions. In fact the present Chairman of the Police Commission was the Senior Counsel assisting the Special Presidential Commission appointed to inquire into the assassination of Vijaya Kumaratunga. In that Commission he was assisted in the investigation by a DIG and a SSP. It is regrettable that even the Chairman of the Police Commission has not responded to our request for assistance. Even the Inspector General of Police in spite of the advice of the Hon Attorney General failed to release any Police Officers to assist this Commission until the 10th of March 2003. Even then the officers who were released to this Commission were very junior officers. When the Commission has to investigate the conduct of high ranking Army Officers, Police Officers, Ministers it is absolutely necessary that such investigation should be made by high ranking Police Officers. But for whatever reasons the Inspector General of Police has failed in his duty in not appointing suitable Investigating Officers to this Commission. It may be due to the fact that his own Police Officers were involved in this raid and as the Head of the Police he was not able to prevent it.
The Members of a Commission appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act shall, so long as they are acting as such Members, be deemed to be public servants within the meaning of the Penal Code and every inquiry under this Act shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of that Act (Section 9).
Judicial proceedings mean any proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be legally taken (Section 2, Criminal Procedure Code).
All offences under the Penal Code have to be investigated by the Police, summons have to be served and Warrants have to be executed by the Police under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. Every process issued by a Commission appointed under this Act shall be served and executed by the Fiscal (Section 21). The Fiscal is appointed under Section 52 (1) of the Judicature Act for the purpose of service of process and execution of decrees and other orders enforceable under any written law. Fiscal means a fiscal of a court and includes any person authorized either generally or specially by a Judge to exercise, perform or discharge any powers, duty or functions of the Fiscal under the Criminal Procedure Code (Section 2, Criminal Procedure Code).
Under Section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code Peace Officers are empowered to prevent cognizable offences. Peace Officer includes Police Officers and Grama Seva Niladharis appointed by a Government Agent in writing to perform police duties (Section 2, Criminal Procedure Code).
The summons shall ordinarily be served by the Fiscal provided that where the summons cannot otherwise be served, such summons shall be served by a Police Officer (Section 45(1), Criminal Procedure Code).
Every offence of contempt committed against or in disrespect of the authority of a Commission appointed shall be punishable by the Court of Appeal under Article 105(3) of the Constitution. Every Police Officer is duty bound promptly to obey and execute all orders and warrants lawfully issued and directed to him by any competent authority under Section 56 (f) of the Police Ordinance.
The Inspector General of Police should have been aware of the above provisions as the Head of the Police Department. In view of the above provisions he is legally and morally bound to assist a Presidential Commission when requested for such assistance. The Inspector General of Police, T. E. Anandarajah, in this instance has miserably failed to do so.
iii. Media Behaviour
The raid on the Athurugiriya Safe House was exposed by the media within hours of the raid. Telephone messages were given immediately after the raid by the Minister of Interior to the Secretary of Mass Communication, Secretary to the Ministry of Defence to get their assistance to give the widest publicity as if it was the greatest event of the decade. The unsuspecting media unaware of the reality, gave wide publicity about a plot to eliminate leaders of the United National Front. The nation and the outside world were informed of a heinous conspiracy.
Thereafter the media took over for themselves the investigation and published articles, news reports etc. praising Assistant Superintendent of Police, Udugampola and accusing the Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Balagalle, DMI, Brig Hendawitharana, Capt. Nilam and his team for betraying their trust as Army men and making them almost criminals.
“The Sunday Leader” of 24th February 2002 in an article written by Ms. Frederica Jansz under the heading “A New Twist in the ‘safe house’ controversy” stated:
“An investigation by the “Sunday Leader” has discovered that a group of five soldiers found in a house at Millennium City, Athurugiriya have falsely claimed credit for specialized operations carried out against the LTTE by the Army’s Special Forces teams.
That is not all. Our findings disclose that neither the Defence Ministry including the former Defence Secretary, Chandrananda de Silva, nor the Joint Operations Headquarters (JOH) were aware of such a unit at Athurugiriya….
“The group of soldiers found at Athurugiriya never ever stepped even a kilometre into the jungle territory. In fact, Nilam has been medically categorized by the Army as being unable to perform any form of ex field duties.” – (P98)
“The Sunday Leader” on 14th July 2002, in an article under the heading “New Twist to Athurugiriya Saga” stated:
“Despite a valiant effort to clear the house of an Army officer at Athurugiriya, Millennium City of being an authentic fully fledged “safe house” for the Sri Lanka Army, a continuing Police investigation and court case has proved otherwise… “It has been proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the “Army officers” who were arrested at the Athurugiriya house were never part of the LRRP teams, which constitute of elite fighting units within the Sri Lanka Army.”
The above opinion was expressed by Ms. Frederica Jansz who has written that article and she has given evidence before this Commission and this article has been marked in evidence as P100.
In an article in “The Sunday Leader” dated 10th February 2002 under the heading “Athurugiriya Arsenal – intensive probe necessary” D. B. S. Jeyaraj in his column “Cross Currents” has stated:
“The diligent Superintendent of Police responsible for the arrest has been the target of vicious and vituperative campaign by interested parties as a result of this ………………. While Udugampola was being unjustly crucified in the press over the arrest much was being done to obstruct and stifle the investigation.” – (P120B)
Both Ms. Jansz and D. B. S. Jeyaraj refers to a letter dated 28th January 2002 written by Assistant Superintendent of Police, Udugampola to the Minister of Interior, John Arnaratunga explaining his actions, according to which the said journalists reveals “the mind set and motivation of Udugampola in undertaking this investigation and rationale for consequent action in this connection.”
Ms. Frederica Jansz in an article in “The Sunday Leader” dated 3rd February 2002, under the heading “Fall-out of a safe house” has stated:
“Vilified and humiliated over his raid on this house at Millennium City, Athurugiriya, Udugampola has written a full explanation and complained to Interior Minister John Amaratunga”. – (P86)
But Udugampola giving evidence before this Commission has denied writing such a letter to the Minister of Interior, Minister John Amaratunga giving evidence before this Commission said that he could not remember whether he received such a letter.
Contradicted
When one considers the above articles which appeared in the newspapers it seems, that the media has found the Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Balagalle, DMI, Brig. Hendawitharana, Capt. Nilam and his team guilty of a heinous crime. If one is to accept the views expressed in the media then a court has only to pass sentence and sign their death warrants. But unfortunately for these media personnel their views and opinions have been contradicted by some other media personnel and official witnesses who have given evidence before this Commission.
On 27.4.2003 “The Sunday Leader” in its column “Inside Politics” by Suranimala countering the assertion of Ms. Jansz and D. B. S. Jeyaraj states:
“In fact, at the Hakone peace talks, Balasingham on more than one occasion accused sections of the security forces of trying to sabotage the peace process and made a pointed allegation that Balagalle’s Deep Penetration Unit of the Army involved in the Athurugiriya episode had attempted to assassinate LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran while the peace talks were under way. On that occasion, Defence Secretary, Austin Fernando and Minister Moragoda dismissed the allegation but promised to look into it, but the LTTE delegation was not appeased.”
Austin Fernando, the Defence Secretary, giving evidence before this Commission admitted that such a statement was made by Balasingham.
This clearly shows that whatever the media tried to say about the legality of the Army team who was operating from the Safe House in Athurugiriya, even Balasingham the spokesman for the LTTE has accepted the position of the DMI that this house at Athurugiriya which was raided by Udugampola was legally maintained as a safe house for covert operations against the LTTE.
D. B. S. Jeyaraj contradicting himself on what he expressed in his earlier articles in his column “Cross Currents” in “The Sunday Leader” dated 11th August 2002, under the heading “Deep penetration hit squads: deep probe essential” clearly accepts that:
“The LRRP was a top secret project launched covertly by military intelligence. But Defence Ministry circles say that Lionel Balagalle was personally supervising the programme from its inception. Specially trained Commandos and from the Special Forces were deployed. Also inducted were Tamil and Muslim exmilitants from the North-East. They brought in the intelligence input and knowledge of terrain required……………
The discovery of an arms cache, thermobaric weapons at Athurugiriya along with 66 LTTE uniforms and cyanide capsules was a further revelation and confirmation of the LRRP phenomenon… The LRRP was not put to much use as the December 5 elections saw Ranil Wickremesinghe becoming Premier, leading to a transfommation of the political climate.” – (P120C)
Thus the trial by the media of the persons arrested from the Athurugiriya Safe House was ended by accepting the position of the DMI that the Athurugiriya house was a Safe House maintained by the Army for the purpose of covert operations against the LTTE.
In this respect it would be very appropriate to quote at length the views expressed by Iqbal Athas who is a veteran journalist who gave evidence before this Commission. In the course of his evidence he tendered some of his articles which were also marked in evidence. In his “Situation Report” published in “The Sunday Times” on 20th January 2002, under the heading “The Great Betrayal” (marked P103C), he expressed his views regarding this matter in the following terms:
“The saga of the Army’s Athurugiriya Safe House, and the humiliating ordeal of an officer and five soldiers – national heroes who were treated as traitors – has at last ended.
Enormous damage
But the enormous damage to national security, humiliation to officers and men in the Sri Lanka Army, distress in the minds of conscientious policemen and above all, colossal embarrassment to the United Front Government continues.
The anger and bewilderment of the vast majority of Sri Lankans, here and abroad, following this tragi-comedy not only highlighted the disgust it had caused but also underscored the hatred against those who caused it. A host of emails to military Spokesman, veteran infantryman Brig. Sarath Karunaratna summed it up.
If it is ironic that one gazetted officer of the Sri Lanka Police could single handedly cause all this, it is tragic that his conclusions came even before his own inquiries could begin. Superintendent of Police, Kulasiri Udugampola, brought the full glare of the media, both print and electronic, to publicize all his actions, just two hours after the raid on the Safe House at Millennium Park on January 2.
To a wholly unsuspecting media, unaware of the realities, what he executed as startling finds- a cache of weapons including landmines, light anti-tank weapons (LAW), assault rifles and thermobaric shells among others – were an arsenal used by the Sri Lanka Army not to kill tiger guerillas but to be used in a sinister plot to eliminate leaders of the United National Party. The nation and the outside world were told about the great catastrophe portended by a so-called conspiracy.
As the news spread, both in Sri Lanka and abroad officers and men in the Army writhed in deep anger. That wide publicity, repeated locally on TV many times, seemed the beginning of a media trial. Morale reached a low ebb. Conscientious policemen, who were in the know of what was going on, were ashamed at what was happening. ‘This kind of thing has never happened in police history’, declared a retired police chief who wished to remain anonymous.
The Commission wishes to observe at this stage that the media which was so vociferous initially completely ignored the proceedings of this Commission later. For whatever reason the media became mum and did not publish the proceedings of this Commission, even though the media was kept informed of the dates of the public sittings of this Commission.
Kumar Abeysinghe, the Secretary to the Ministry of Mass Communication, a senior bureaucrat giving evidence before this Commission, expressed his helplessness when he stated that “For the news people any crisis is news even if it creates chaos in the country and it is so sad some times.” He stated so in reference to a complaint by the Sirasa TV crew to him on the night of the Athurugiriya raid that the Army is preventing them from filming this incident. Kumar Abeysingha further stated that he immediately contacted Austin Fernando, Defence Secretary, and obtained his permission to film it in the presence of the Army. None of the senior officers took into account the fact that at that stage this type of publicity would affect national security.
“The Sunday Leader” of 13th January 2002, in an article by Amantha Perera, under the heading “Arms Bust – More questions than answers” (marked as P120A), in an inset under the heading “PM stops quizzing of journalists”, reports:
“Last week Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe intervened and prevented Police from questioning a journalist regarding the ongoing investigation into the Athurugiriya discovery. The Police had wanted to question the journalists on an article that appeared last – weekend which had detail information on the arrest made at Athurugiriya and the Army operations that were connected. Police were to question him on how he obtained the details and the theory of the place being a safe house. When Wickremesighe got to know of the development he quickly called police and requested them not to go ahead.”
The Commission wishes to state that although some Ministers and MPs aired their views and theories about the raid on the Athurugiriya house none of them appeared before this Commission to give evidence, although wide publicity was given by publishing notifications in the daily newspapers in all three languages inviting representation and information from persons who wished to do so.
As regards the behaviour of the media as stated above, it would be very appropriate to quote the comments of some of their own tribe. In “The Sunday Leader” dated 21st September 2003, under the heading “Spin-doctors and wild asses”, Amantha Perera reporting from San Francisco states:
“The New York Times’ is the leak bureau for the hardliners. Such a pronouncement would be anathema to a lot of senior scribes in Colombo. The type who would quote off the “New York Times” as if reciting divine words carved in stone.
But these were the exact words by Peter Hayes, an expert on North Korea during a recent talk at the Graduate School of Journalism at the University of California, Berkeley, San Francisco.
What Hayes was arguing was that journalists were being used by hardliners in the Bush administration to propagate a certain view point. In so doing, they make sure that the public image of the North Korean situation is just what they would want to be……..
“However Scribes hailing from Colombo should be the last to complain of spin-doctors. Colombo is like a stable for such kinds. So the next time some guy quotes from one of the so-called bibles, take a step back, it just might be an ass running for a master.”
“The Island” newspaper of 3.11.2003 editorially commented:
“That the tragedy of Sri Lankan journalism is that scavengers are a plenty whose priority is garbage and seeking employment over truth.”
Hence the Commission does not wish to add anything more to it other than emphasizing the fact that the role of the media is to divulge the TRUTH for. fostering LOVE and PEACE, and not HATE and DISSENSION.
iv. “Slinging Mud”
It was alleged by some that the purpose of the appointment of this Commission was to sling mud at certain politicians and the Government.
“Slinging mud” (Ipsissima Verba) is a trait of our society from time immemorial. This was done in the olden days by means of scurrilous letters kele pattara, caricatures or drawings and exhibiting them at public places. In the present day it is done by means of the media, print as well as electronic and by posters. Some tabloid papers and newspapers do it in a very crude form and the national media do it in a refined form by means of caricatures and gossip columns and cartoons. ..
Even in the Courts of Law, specially in family disputes, members of the same family, husband against wife or vise versa, children against parents, brothers against the other brothers and sisters do their very best to discredit each other by digging up their past and exposing their pedigrees to tarnish their images and to show what a disreputable person the other person is. This is a human weakness without a remedy. That is the reason the Law in its wisdom has laid down procedure to be followed in recording evidence and coming to their conclusions. An experienced Judge will know how to apply the rules and regulations and to sift evidence and allow what is relevant to the matters under investigation and reject what is not relevant.
In the present day it is not only politicians, even judges and religious dignitaries, are being openly criticized and slandered by the media exercising the right of free media.~ Every one is helpless, because the freedom of the media is said to be sacred under a democratic set up.
In recent times, civil rights movements here and abroad have expressed grave concern about such instances of discussing the conduct of (including derogatory comments) judges being made in various fora quite independent of the laid down removal procedure of judges. This is contrary to the convention that the conduct of judges should not be discussed except in a substantive motion at the proper forum for their removal. The most unfortunate aspect of this allegation is that the judges have no way of publicly countering such allegations. Thus the judges who have to decide on human rights and fundamental rights violations of others, have themselves no fora to alleviate the violations of their own human and fundamental rights.
This Commission is quite conscious of the practices, the niceties and the decorum of court procedure and wish to state fiat justitia ruat coelum – let justice be done though the heavens should fall.
The findings and recommendations in this Report are based only on admissible.! evidence which is relevant to the matters in issue according to the terms of the Law.
‘IGP was helpless due to the court order’
Irasirathinam Subashkaran, one of Capt. Nilam’s operatives had not been released along with the others on 13th January 2002. He was further detained at the Katugastota Police on a Detention Order obtained in terms of Section 9 (1) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA).
He states that on 14th January 2002, Thai Pongal Day, he had been taken to SP Udugampola’s office at the Kandy Kennels Division. On the SP’s directions he had been treated with some special food in lieu of Thai Pongal. Thereafter he had been taken to a location, which was quite alien to him, and was asked as to whether he recognized the said place. He had stated that he did not recognize the place. Later he had got to know that the said location was where ten Muslim youth had been brutally murdered in Udathalawinna on 5th December 2001 (General Elections Day).
According to Major Tuan Suresh Sallay, who was serving as General Staff Officer II (GSO II) of the DMI, the DMI had entrusted him with the task of finding a suitable location to house Capt. Nilam’s team. As several other locations inspected by him were not found to be suitable for the purpose, Capt. Nilam had informed him of the availability of the house in Millennium City, Athurugiriya, which belonged to his wife.
With the consent of the DMI, it was decided to take this house on rent and accordingly Capt. Nilam and the other members of his team moved into the said house on 7th December 2001.
Consequent to the raid SP Udugampola had informed the DMI that if a written authority is given by the Army Commander regarding the legality of the arms, ammunition and other equipment found at the Safe House, he could release Capt. Nilam and the others taken into custody. Accordingly a letter, certifying the Iegality of the arms, ammunition and other equipment which had been taken into custody, was submitted to SP Udugampola, on the directions of the Army Commander, on 4th January 2002. Major Sallay had personally accompanied the Army Legal Officer, Capt. Saman Kumara and handed over the letter to SP Udugampola at the Kennels Division, Kandy. However, SP Udugampola had paid scant respect to the said letter. A copy of the said letter has been marked before the Commission as P13.
Denied
Even the Legal Officer of the Sri Lanka Army, Captain Saman Kumara testifies to the fact that P13 was duly handed over to SP Udugampola. (However, as it would transpire later in this Summary of Evidence SP Udugampola denied the receipt of the letter P13.)
Although the contents of this letter is highly confidential and is marked “TOP SECRET (EYES ONLY)” a copy of this letter had been leaked to the press and was published in “The Sunday Leader” newspaper of 3rd March 2002. The said article has been marked before the Commission as P99.
It has transpired in evidence that the exact location of this Safe House was only known to the DMI, Major Sallay, Capt. Amararatna (who was serving as GSO III), and the six persons who were arrested by the Police team. In addition two others namely, Sgt. Kumara and Private Kadigawa, who were also members of Capt. Nilam’s team, but not at the Safe House at the time of the raid, had been aware of its location. Due to the sensitive nature of these operations no other person knew or had the authority to know or to find out the location of the Safe House.
Therefore, it must be noted that, although document P121 lists a total of 22 persons as members of Capt. Nilam’s team – 10 who directly participated and 12 who assisted in the said operations – only 8 persons named therein and referred to above, knew or had the authority to know the exact location of the Safe House.
Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle justified that he was the first DMI, when the Directorate was established in 1990. He also was the first Commanding Officer of the Military Intelligence Corps (MIC) of the Sri Lanka Army, which was established on 28th June 1990.
The Army Commander stated that the purpose for establishing the DMI and the MIC was as follows:
“……this country has had various threats from time to time ranging from insurgencies to law and order problems and going back to terrorism in late ’70s. All these years we found that we did not have a permanent organization like in other armies to handle intelligence. In fact every time such a threat occurred and these services had to be deployed it was a case of forming an ad hoc organization for that particular instance and thereafter you disperse them and call them back again when there is another threat that develops. Therefore, it was thought that there has to be an organization on a permanent basis which will take on gathering information, analyzing them and fuming them into intelligence in respect of organizations which pose a threat where the military has to be deployed to bring it under control.”
Kept informed
He confirmed that the DMI kept him informed about the operations conducted by Capt. Nilam’s team, as well as the fact that an Army Safe House had been established at Millennium City, Athurugiriya.
The Army Commander defined a “Safe House” in military terms as:
“……safe house is a place where intelligence operatives might occupy for the purpose of meeting up with informants, particularly in Colombo area because when they come from outstation places like Jaffna, Batticaloa, Trincomalee they prefer to meet the informant handlers outside their area rather than meeting them in their own areas for their own safety and to prevent exposure to the LTTE. So you do meet informants in those safe houses.
In addition there may be a requirement to identify in this case the LTTE members who are operating in Colombo district. In such a requirement it is necessary that these informants who are basically Tamils stay in Colombo and help the intelligence operatives to identify them in Colombo. Thereafter, as required to follow them. up and mount surveillance on them to identify what activities they are engaged in. So to do all that there is a necessity for even these informants to come and stay in Colombo and if they don’t have any other places they try to accommodate them in these safe houses. So it is purely all on trust and no other regulations govern that.”
Further he distinguished a Safe House from an Intelligence Cell as follows:
“An Intelligence Cell is something in between the Group Headquarters and the Safe House, because an in-cell can operate more than one safe house depending on the requirement. If I am permitted to explain, you may not want to bring all the informants to a particular safe house. One thing, you will expose one informant to another. In such a scenario it is better to have even 2 or 3 safe houses so that you don’t expose one informant to the other. Then there is that element of danger if one is exposed. Or even through jealousy one might expose for earning more money.”
Lt. General Balagalle stated that he knew Capt. Nilam from the time he was the DMI. He referred to Capt. Nilam as having a special talent of identifying and recruiting good informants. “He had a way of speaking to them that certainly proved a success in getting the right kind of persons as informants. That talent he definitely had and he produced many a good result over a period of time.”
Two types of LRRPs
The Army Commander defined the nature of LRRP type operations carried out by the Sri Lanka Army as follows:
“There are two types of Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols. Then you have Long Range Patrols, LRP. You have LRP and LRRP, Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols. LRRPs do only reconnaissance, but in the case of LRPs, they may do reconnaissance and finally take action also on the enemy. In these groups that were operating, there were LRRPs under the commandos of the Army. There were LRRPs operating under the command of the Special Forces. That is Special Forces Groups who are generally confined to jungles and unpopulated areas in the enemy controlled areas. They find it extremely difficult to operate in urban areas. So as the Commander I have to think how best we can tackle our enemy. In doing so I encouraged the Commandos to operate on LRRPs into the jungles and they were given specific areas. Similarly, the Special Forces were tasked on this deep penetration patrols called LRRPs to do reconnaissance and take action by themselves, if they meet up with the enemy or if they meet up with the leader to take him on. It is a combat task given to the Army. There are areas restricted because of the nature of the deployment for the Special Forces and the Commandos. The urban areas in particular, they find it difficult to operate because they get exposed by trying to mingle with the public. Or if the public notices or the LTTE notices them they get exposed and survival is rather impossible. In such a scenario I thought and it worked that it was only the intelligence who can operate in urban areas. They will dress themselves in such a manner that they will be part of the society and they move around as any other member in that location. While doing that they locate the enemy and take them on. It is a much more difficult task than what the Special Forces or the Commandos are doing. I am not trying to demean what the Special Forces or the Commandos are performing, but the fact is they are trained. The atmosphere is such that they go through jungles and get into areas where the movements are taking place and they take on the target. But those leaders and others of the LTTE in particular, when they move about in urban areas they find it extremely difficult to take them on and it was only the intelligence and intelligence operatives who were able to perform that task successfully. And as a result by employing all 3 categories, 2 of them in jungles and intelligence covering the urban areas we were able to make the so called controlled areas of the enemy very unsafe for them and that is what we achieved in this exercise.”
The Army Commander testified that it was the DMI, Brig. Hendawitharana, who first informed him about this raid. This was around 8.00 p.m., on 2nd January 2002. He had directed the DMI to immediately proceed to Athurugiriya and to try and explain matters to the arresting officer.
He had also spoken to the then IGP, the late Lucky Kodituwakku, who after ascertaining details had got back to him and informed that he was helpless in the matter because there had been a Court Order directing the Safe House to be raided and the persons concerned to be taken into custody.
Consequent to this raid on 8th January 2002, the Army Commander convened a Court of Inquiry. This was to look into the recovery of weapons, explosives and other military equipment in the Safe House at Athurugiriya on 2nd January 2002. The said convening order has been marked as P15 before the Commission. The proceedings of the said Court of Inquiry has been marked as PISA, the Opinion and Recommendations of the Court of Inquiry has been marked as P15B, while the Opinion of the Army Commander has been marked as P15C.
It would be pertinent at this stage to emphasize on the Opinion made by Lt. Gen: Balagalle on 21st January 2002, where he unequivocally commends Capt. Nilam and his team. As such the entirety of his opinion in respect of this Court of Inquiry is given below:
(The Island)
Damning report on raid – By Poorna Rodrigo
Presidential commission accuses ASP Udugampola of acting like supreme commander in Athurugiriya raid; UNF government and then police chief held responsible for exposing military secrets
A Presidential Commission which probed the controversial police raid on the Athuruguirya military safe house last year has accused ASP Kulasiri Udugampola of behaving like a “supreme commander” and acting “above the law”, thus jeopardising the security and the military strategy of the armed forces.
“If one is to accept the totality of the evidence led before the commission, it seems that ASP Udugampola was immune to any supervisory procedure and he has behaved as a supreme commander who was above the law,” Commissioner D. Jayawickreme said in his report.
Mr. Jayawickreme, a retired Court of Appeal judge, in a report handed over to President Chandrika Kamaratunga, said he would hold the Prime Minister and the ministers concerned, the then IGP Lucky Kodithuwakku and his successor T.E. Anandarajah and all other senior police officers, responsible for the illegal act of ASP Udugampola.
“They were simply powerless to prevent the illegal action of ASP Udugampola even after they were apprised of the facts of this safe house and the activities of its personnel.”
The report warned that if such “ill conceived police actions” as it happened in the case of the safe house were allowed to continue it would be “suicidal” to the safety of the nation.
It said the Athurugiriya raid had resulted in neutralising the military strategy of the Army in combating terrorism in the North East.
The commission said the unfortunate exposure by the media of highly successful LRRP (Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol) operations undertaken by the Directorate of the Military Intelligence had resulted in the LTTE acquiring the well-guarded secrets and led to a situation where the LTTE was able to liquidate those who had double crossed the group.
Stressing the need to take remedial action forthwith and punish those responsible for what the commission sees as a “great betrayal”, the report recommended that steps be taken to de-politicise the Army and the Police and place them in the hands of capable young men to infuse professionalism and prepare the men for battle whenever the government wanted one.
It also recommended that military strategies of the LRRP and similar groups be known only to the Commander-in-Chief, the Commander of the Army and other Commanders and called for more punitive measures to punish people who abuse the system.
According to the report, the saga of the Army’s Athurugiriya safe house began two months prior to the raid, when the then UNP Chairman Charitha Ratwatta and Vice Chairman Daya Pelpola, in a letter dated November 10, 2001, complained to the Army Commander Lionel Balagalla regarding the safe house seeing it as a bid to use explosives on meetings of the UNP leadership and the leader’s campaign bus.
“The UNP Chairman warned the Army Commander that they would hold him responsible in the event of any such unfortunate incident.”
“Mr. Ratwatta also has said to the commission that the information in the letter that the Directorate of the Military Intelligence was coordinating an attempt to use thermobaric explosives on the meetings held by the UNP was divulged by late Gamini Athukorala, the Deputy Leader of the UNP and unfortunately as dead men cannot speak, the Commission had no way of verifying the truth of this statement.”
The report said that it was highly probable that certain officers in the Army along with ASP Udugampola, manipulated the story with the expectation that it would affect the results of the elections in favour of the UNP, and that in the event of UNP coming into power they would be adequately compensated.
However, the Army Commander convinced Mr. Ratwatte that there was “no substance in the information set out in the letter and Mr. Ratwatte was satisfied with the reply.
The matter however did not end there.
“If it was so, the matter should have ended then and there, but it did not. After the election results of December 5, 2001, the UNF came into power and within a month the Athurugiriya safe house was raided by ASP Udugampola from the Kandy Kennels Division under the guise of looking for suspects in the Udathalawinna murder case causing the greatest damage to the Army’s LRRP operations which were extremely successful in countering and arresting terrorism,” the report said.
Condemning the manner in which Mr. Udugampola took into custody several army personnel as illegal, immoral and in violation of all the rules and regulations of the police, the report said that it proved he had acted “arbitrarily and capriciously”.
Saying that it is “unfortunate” that the new government could not prevent or control the actions of ASP Udugampola, despite the party chairman being convinced that there was no danger, the commission said that Mr. Udugampola proceeded with his illegal raid and investigations disregarding the orders from his own Inspector General of Police, Senior Police officers and even the advice of the Attorney General.
“The UNF Government’s continued silence, in the wake of the obvious embarrassment, made matters worse in the case of the Athurugiriya safe house fiasco.”
The report said Interior Minister John Amaratunga had himself admitted that the raid was “ill-conceived and harsh treatment was meted out to the officers. But the belated action by the Minister in refusing to issue Detention Orders on the arrest of armed personnel could by no means “rectify the damage” already caused to the Army’s successful covert operations.
Minister Amaratunga had sent his own private secretary to assist ASP Udugampola in respect of the raid on the safe house and to give wide publicity to it, notwithstanding the fact he accepted it was “improper and unethical” for a Minister to interfere in police investigations, it said.
The commission said there was evidence that Lt. Col. Padmasiri Udugampola, SLCMP, brother of ASP Kulasiri Udugampola, Major General Ivan Dassanayake and Colonel K.H.N.S.S. Dharmaratna, Major A.C.A. de Soysa, SLCMP, Major B.M.A.N.S.K. Karunaratne, MIC, Corp, J.H.A.P. de Silva, JHAT-MIC and Corp. M.P.A. Pieris, JHAT-MIC, were all aware of the impending raid and had directly and indirectly assisted ASP Udugampola in raiding the safe house.
The report said that if these officers had any doubts about the safe house they should have brought it to the notice of the Army Commander and moved the military police to investigate.
“But those officers, without doing so, have conspired with Kulasiri Udugampola to raid this safe house for their own personal benefits. Moreover, none of these officers had informed the Army Commander or the Director, DMI, about it before the raid,” the report said.
Kulasiri Udugampola – A traitor of the nation and the state
“A total betrayal and absolute treachery to the nation”
Raid of the Army Safe House
on January 02, 2002, a police team led by a pro-UNP police officer named Kulasiri Udugampola raided a Army safe house at No. 844, Kaduwela road, Athurugiriya without a court order to search the place. The safe house was used by Army intelligence personnel (Directorate of Military Intelligence) for covert action to infiltrate LTTE cadres and eliminate some of the LTTE leadership.
Udugampola seized a booty of military hardware – Light anti tank weapons, anti tank mines, land mines, assault rifles, claymore mines, thermo baric weapons and green stripe uniforms. He arrested a Captain and four regular soldiers of the Army’s Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI). Also arrested was a former Tiger guerrilla cadre who surrendered and was helping the Army.
The goods and the men were brought to Cinnamon Gardens Police Station.
Whilst the men were detained in a room, the media were allowed to view and photograph all the military items displayed inside the Police Station. Thereafter the Army men and their helper were driven in a vehicle to Kandy guarded by two armed policemen. In the wee hours of the morning, they were thrust into remand cells where common criminals were kept. Detention Orders to hold them in custody were issued under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA).
Inviting electronic and other media Udugampola showed the whole country the weapons of the army unit and published the names of the military operatives and informants attached to the unit. Further he wrongly alleged it was part of a conspiracy to kill the newly elected Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe. It was made out that premises No 844 at the Millennium City was a secret hide out from where military men had planned to carry out assassinations on United National Front (UNF) Government leaders. The Police raid had busted their plans, or so it seemed.
The Safe House fiasco was a colossal blunder. In fact, the arrested men, far from being suspected terrorists, were those hunting them down during top secret operations.
The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) team
The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) team, housed at the Kohuwala Army Camp and was relocated to Athurugiriya in December 2001. When the safe House was raided the LRRP team led by Captain Nilam had conducted a number of Deep Penetration operations in the North and had accounted for nine LTTE high rankers including Mano and Ganesh. They have also killed another 10 regional level leaders.
Just before the raid, the LRRP team’s most accomplished task was the assassination of Thambirasa Kuhashanthan alias Nizam, guerrilla Military Intelligence leader for Batticaloa. It was Nizam who had been directing all suicide and other attacks in the City at that time. One of his prize targets then was former Cabinet Minister, C.V. Gooneratne.
The Presidential Commission of Inquiry
A Presidential Commission of Inquiry to inquire into the disclosure of the existence of and the raid on the safe house operated by the Sri Lanka Army found that “the action taken by ASP Udugampola in the manner he did in taking into custody several Army personnel was illegal, immoral and in violation of all the rules and regulations of the police”.
The Commission to probe into the incident was appointed in August 16, 2002 by President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. The Commission sat from August 2002 to November 2003 and heard 69 witnesses. The report was released to the media by the President’s Office in December 2003.
The one member Commission chaired by retired Supreme Court judge D. Jayawickreme in his report had said that the ASP had rejected the statement of the Army Commander about the safe house functioning under his approval and had proceeded on a non-existent Court Order.
It further says every one including the Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and the Minister of Interior, the Inspector General of Police and the Senior Police Officers seem to have been impotent or have purposely avoided preventing Udugampola proceeding further in respect of this raid. Therefore, the Commission concludes that to this extent “the Government, the Prime Minister and the Ministers concerned, the then Inspector General of Police Lucky Kodituwakku, his successor T.E. Anandarajah and all other senior Police officers responsible for the illegal act of ASP Udugampola.”
“The evidence before this Commission further discloses the fact that Lt. Col. Padmasiri Udugampola, SLCMP, brother of ASP Kulasiri Udugampola, Major General Ivan Dissanayake and Colonel K.H.N. S.S. Dharmaratna, Major A.C.A. de Soysa, SLCMP, Major A.S.P. Podiralahamy, SLCMP, Major K.U. Jayanetti, SLCMP, Major B.M.A.N.S.K. Karunaratne, MIC, Corp, J.H.A.P de Silva, JHAT-MIC, Corp. M.P.A. Pieris, JHAT-MIC, were all aware of the impending raid and have directly and indirectly assisted ASP Kulasiri Udugampola in raiding the Safe House.
“If these officers had any doubts about the Safe House they should have brought it to the notice of the Army Commander and moved the Military Police to investigate. But these officers, without doing so, have conspired with Kulasiri Udugampola to raid this Safe House for their own personal benefits. Moreover, none of these officers have informed Army Commander (Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle) or the Director, DMI (Brigadier Kapila Hendavithana) about the raid before the raid.”
The Commission also notes that the presence of Retired Deputy Inspector of Defence Lal Ratnayake, Private Secretary to Interior Minister John Amaratunga at the Military Police on the night of the raid on the instructions of the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Interior contacting the Secretary to the Ministry of Mass Communications and the Secretary to the Defence Ministry and ASP Udugampola contacting the Minister of Interior on the telephone leads to the conclusion that due to political patronage ASP Udugampola has behaved as if he was above the law and that he can act the way he wanted to.
The arbitrary action of the police has jeopardized the security of the estate and the Military strategy of the Armed Forces and exposed the personnel engaged in the duties entrusted to them by the Army, concludes the Commission.
“Since this raid 23 operatives and informants have been killed and some have been seriously injures,” observed the Commission.
The Solicitor General on behalf of the Attorney General had directed the IGP to take disciplinary action against him. The Commission has also made several recommendations to prevent interference by officials or authorities in the military strategies of the Armed Forces.
Foremost among the Commissions recommendations is a call to depoliticalise the Police and the Army and placing them in the hands of capable men. The Presidential Commission Report also said that the arbitrary action of the police had jeopardized the security of the State and neutralised the Military strategy.
Statement of Elle Gunawansa Thera
In a strongly worded statement to the press the Venerable Elle Gunawansa Thera said, the betrayal of the country’s national army by the Ranil Wickremesinghe government was one of the biggest betrayals of the nation’s history. He said those responsible including Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe should be brought to justice according to the country’s laws. He said the former Minister John Ameratunga and both Udugampola brothers who were at the bottom of it and all other police and army officers connected to it should be punished irrespective of the positions they held.
The Supreme Court Judgement
On 30th of January 2004, The Supreme Court declared the fundamental rights of five officers of the Sri Lanka Army, who were arrested and detained by Superintendent of Police, Kandy K. Udugampola and four of his subordinates, had been violated when the police raided the Army Safe House at Athurugiriya, on January 2, 2002.
The petitioners were S. H. M. Nilam, P. Ananda Udalagama, H. M. Nissanka Herath, I. Edirisinghe Jayamanne and H. Mohamed Hilmy.
The judgement said they had been subjected to inhuman, arbitrary treatment, illegal arrest and illegal detention by Udugampola and his subordinates. The state was directed to pay each petitioner a sum of rupees seven hundred and fifty thousand (Rs. 750,000) as compensation and costs. The first respondent Udugampola, to pay each petitioner, personally a sum of Rs. 50,000/- as compensation. Each petitioner would be entitled to a sum of rupees eight hundred thousand (Rs. 80,000) as compensation and costs. The amount was to be paid within three months.
Udugampola’s subordinates were R. A. P. Dharmaratne, Sub-Inspector of Police, Kandy, M. A. E. Mahendra, Head Quarters Inspector Kandy, Ashoka Ratnaweera, S. S. P. Kandy, M. M. M. B. J. Mohottigedera, OIC Katugastota.
The judgement said that the counsel for the petitioners had submitted that as a result of the conduct of Udugampola, and his subordinates, several patriotic intelligence operators had already been murdered. The covert operation that was being conducted by the petitioners, was exposed, and their lives and those of their families were exposed to the greatest of risk. It was therefore submitted that the petitioners, are entitled to very substantial compensation. The predicament of the petitioners, and the deaths of so many intelligence operators, resulting in irreparable damage to national security, was due to the conduct of Udugampola, and he should be personally responsible for what had taken place, counsel for the petitioners had submitted.
The judgement was delivered by Justice Dr. Shirani Bandaranayake, with the Chief Justice Sarath N. Silva and Justice P. Edussuriya agreeing.
Justice Edussuriya had said, the manner in which Udugampola had acted, without paying any heed to Brigadier Hendawitharna, the Director of Military Inte-lligence and Major Sally, without taking the trouble to ascertain the truth of what they said from their superior, exposing the petitioners to the press and, his subsequent conduct, with utter disregard to the rights of the petitioners, it was apparent that he acted so with some ulterior motive whilst being engaged in this despicable exercise, and his conduct must be condemned in the strongest possible manner.
To put it mildly, it was deplorable Justice P. Edussuriya further said that, in the alternative that is, if he did not act with any ulterior motive then, he has acted like an over enthusiastic blundering schoolboy, and has thereby displayed his incompetence.
The registrar of the court was directed to send a copy of the judgement to the IGP.
Kulasiri Udugampola on compulsory leave
The Police Commission headed by President’s Counsel Ranjit Abeysuriya on 10th February 2004 approved the request made by IGP Indra de Silva to send ASP Kulasiri Udugampola on compulsory leave until the completion of the ongoing investigation into the Athurugiriya Millennium City Army safe house raid.
The IGP empahised that if ASP Udugampola was found guilty, he would be charged under the normal law of the land, he would be interdicted and action would be taken according to the law.
The IGP earlier declared that the Army and police personnel found guilty by the Presidential Commission in the Athurugiriya millennium city Army safe house raid would be prosecuted. The IGP said he would be consulting the Attorney General before instituting legal proceedings against the offenders. He said a special police team headed by a Senior Police Officer, had been assigned to commence investigations based on the report released by the Presidential Secretariat.
Arrest of Kulasiri Udugampola
On 23rd of March 2005 Kulasiri Udugampola was arrested by a special police investigation team in Kandy.
Udugampola was on compulsory leave. The Attorney General will indict Udugampola on 20 counts including instituting false charges against former Army Commander Lt. General Lionel Balagalle and several Army officers and wrongful confinement of Army personnel in police custody.
He was taken into custody on the IGP’s orders on investigations of Senior SP Asoka Wijetilake who probed the Police raid on the Army safe house at Athurugiriya on January 2, 2002.
The special investigation team commenced investigations eight months ago. They were concluded in December 2004. The Attorney General will file indictment in the High Court of Kandy charging Udugampola for offenses under Section 26(1) of the Official Secrets Act and instituting false charges against Army personnel.
Following his arrest, Udugampola was produced before Kandy Magistrate Harsh Setunga and released on surety bail in a sum of Rs 500,000. He was directed to surrender his passport and ordered not to leave the country without Court permission.
He was also directed to appear before the OIC Kandy Police every Sunday and to appear before the High Court of Kandy on March 29.
The prosecution had listed 70 prosecution witness including the IGP, Army and police officials both in service and those retired.
Killing of operatives and informants of the LRRP unit by LTTE
Subsequent to the exposure of the safe house in Athurugiriya, a special unit was created by the LTTE to hunt down and kill Army informants. Allegations were made that, exposing the activities carried out from the safe house, have exposed covert intelligence operations and operators enabling the LTTE to identify the informants.
Several informants were killed in Batticaloa, Trincomalee and even at Dehiwala, Pepiliyana and Mount Lavinia.
There was one man who was mainly responsible for all LRRP team actions in Batticaloa and Amparai districts. His name was a closely guarded secret. Only the head of the LRRP team, Captain S.H. Mohamed Nilam dealt with him. He knew the man only as Mike. It was Mike who in turn liaised with a network of operatives as well as informants, including one time guerrilla cadres, in the Batticaloa and Amparai districts.
On January 16, 2002 guerrilla intelligence cadres launched a secret operation in the Batticaloa town. They abducted V. Vidyarathan. He was taken to a hideout in the guerrilla dominated Kokkadicholai area. He was subjected to torture and intense interrogation for four days. The man cracked under heavy pressure and pain. He confessed he was Mike and had been helping Captain Nilam and his LRRP team. He was shot dead on January 20.
It saw the beginning of a campaign of arrest, interrogate and kill. On February 10, Lance Corporal “Clarry” was abducted in a secret operation in Chenkalady in Batticaloa. Soon, details of how agent Mike worked with Captain Nilam began to unfold. LTTE Intelligence cadres and pistol gangs fanned out from Batticaloa to mount surveillance on the names of the operatives and informants that had emerged. Similar exercises were also carried out in Batticaloa and Amparai districts.
By July, 2002, Tiger guerrillas had obtained a fuller picture of the LRRP operations and how they were conducted with the help of Mike. On July 3, 2002 guerrilla cadres abducted Lance Corporal Saundrarajan, a key operative who had taken part in an abortive attack on “Jim Kelly,” an LTTE cadre. He had also taken part in the attack on guerrilla area leader Babu on September 17, 2001 and the abortive attempt on Karikalan. He had also later taken part in the ambush and attack on two other guerrillas, Swarnaseelan and Devadas on November 26, 2001.
By December, 2002, LTTE intelligence cadres had tracked down some of those assisting the LRRP and were moved from the East to Colombo. On December 11, 2002, the first informant, Ganesha Moorthy alias Thilakaraj was shot dead by a pistol group. This was followed by the murder on January 3, 2003, of Lance Corporal Pulendrarasa. He was an operative who had worked closely with Mike. Another close associate of Mike, Kadirgamathamby Ragupathi alias Ragu was shot dead on March 18, 2003.
Neither the Security Forces nor the Police were able to launch any cordon and search operations to track down the Tiger guerrilla intelligence operatives or the pistol gangs. They had not only infiltrated the City but were operating with impunity. The UNF Government did not to want to order any crackdown on their activity for fear that the Ceasefire Agreement with the LTTE would be affected.
The LTTE continued their witch hunt. On April 2, 2003, Sinnathambi Ranjan alias Varadan, who worked closely with Mike was shot dead. On April 26 of the same year, Lance Corporal Devarasa, an operative who took part in LRRP operations and worked closely with Mike was shot dead. He had left a military camp where he was living for reasons of security to visit his family in Dehiwala when the incident occurred.
A guerrilla pistol gang, who had conducted surveillance and kept following Lance Corporal Paramanthan Ravindrakumar trapped him at a City intersection. They poured six bullets into his body on July 15, 2003, wounding him seriously. He survived after surgery and was moved to a safe location thereafter.
The LRRP men who paid the ultimate price
The Sunday Times ( February 01, 2004 ) reveald details of intelligence operatives and civilian informants who were closely associated with LRRP operatives by the Directorate of Military Intelligence. They were all tracked down and assassinated by Tiger guerrillas after the existence of the Safe House became public.
January 20, 2002
V. Vidyarnthan alias Vidya alias Nidhi –
Informant – Abducted on January 16, 2002 and killed on January 20, 2002.
February 09, 2002
Clary alias Gadaffi
Ex- guerrilla cadre – abducted from Chenkallady town and killed.
July 22, 2002
Saundarajah A alias Arinjan
Ex-guerrilla cadre – abducted from Batticaloa town on July 3 and killed at Vakarai.
December 11, 2002
Ganeshmoorthy alias Thilakarajah Samithambi
Informant – killed by LTTE gun-men in Colombo.
January 03, 2003
Pulendrarasa alias Cashier
Ex-guerrilla cadre – abducted in Kallady and killed.
March 18, 2003
Kadiragamthambi Ragupathi alias Ragu
Informant – killed by the LTTE gun-men in Colombo.
April 13, 2003
Sinnathambi Rajan alias Varadan
Informant – to be enlisted to the Army shot dead by the LTTE pistol group in Colombo.
April 26, 2003
Devarajha L. alias Ashok
Ex- LTTE cadre – killed in Colombo.
May 21, 2003
Kumar Perumal Perimban alias Master
Ex-PLOTE cadre – killed in Batticaloa town.
Besides the above, among intelligence operatives, soldiers, para military troops who were not connected to LRRP operations but were killed after the Safe House activities came to be known were:
August 14, 2002
Kanapathipillai Devadas
Tamil soldier – abducted and killed.
December 02, 2002
Aseesh SM
Soldier – abducted and killed.
April 23, 2003
Sidambarapilai Yashodaran
Tamil soldier – abducted and killed.
May 19, 2003
Sooriyan K
Tamil soldier – killed in Batticaloa.
August 03, 2003
LT Rilvan
Police Sergeant – abducted and killed in Trincomalee.
August 08, 2003
Vivekanada Sammugarasa SP
Tamil soldier – abducted and killed.
September 14, 2003
Saundanayagam Sabarathnam
Tamil soldier – killed in Palameenmadu.
Among civilian informants (not connected with LRRP operations) but killed after activities of the Safe House came to be known were:
March 11, 2002
Pulendrarajha – abducted and killed in Muttur.
July 06, 2002
Thangarajha Premadasa alias Varuman – killed with his mistress in Welikanda.
March 20, 2003
Nagoorkanee Ashish – abducted and killed.
April 13, 2003
Subramaniyam Jayadewan – killed in Batticaloa.
April 23, 2003
Sellaiya Puvendrarasa – killed in Thunnalai.
May 16, 2003
Ariyanandan Hemachandran – Killed in Jaffna.
July 17, 2003
Abdul Bahir Fauzi – Killed in Uppuveli.
August 30, 2003
Sebamalai Vimalkumaran – killed in Vavuniya.
Erambamurthi Sabanayagam – Abducted in Matale and killed in Batticaloa.
Kandiah Yogarasa better known as PLOTE Mohan joined the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) in 1983, left the group in 1994. He emerged as a key anti-LTTE operative and was closely linked to the military’s Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRPs).
PLOTE Mohan was shot dead by LTTE in the heart of Colombo city on 31st of July 2004. Mohan (41) was gunned down with a 9 mm pistol around 11.20 a.m. local time on the normally busy Duplication Road, in the heart of the city.
(LankaLibrary )
The all time betrayal…
Here are some excerpts from the The Presidential Commission to inquire into and report on the raid on an Army Safe-House at Millennium City, Athugiriya
Udugampola`s action illegal and immoral
The Presidential Commission to inquire into and report on the raid on an Army Safe-House at Millennium City, Athugiriya had said that ASP Kulasiri Udugampola had sinister motives to raid the place.
Mr. D. Jayawickrema, retired Judge of the Court of Appeal was the Commissioner while S.M.J. Senaratne was the Secretary to the Commission.
CHAPTER IV
Findings
The findings on the Terms of Reference, as contained in the Warrant of this Commission are listed below. The summary of the evidence and material placed before the Commission, which was taken into consideration, in arriving at these findings appear in the preceding Chapter.
a) Whether there was any information given by any personnel of the Armed Forces disclosing the existence of a Safe House at Athurugiriya
The existence of the Safe House operated by the Sri Lanka Army at No.844, Millennium City, Athurugiriya is beyond any doubt. Except a retired Lieutenant Colonel, Jayavi Fernando, all other witnesses including the Army Commander and other officers, the Inspector General of Police and the other senior Police Officers who gave evidence as witnesses before this Commission accepted that this was a legally maintained Safe House by the Sri Lanka Army. Even Jayavi Fernando expressed the view that there was an Army sub-unit at this house and that it was not a safe house. There is strong evidence that Col. D.P. Dissanayake, USP psc, made attempts to obtain the address of this Safe House before the 2001 129 December General Election, and also just a few days before the raid through Major M.B. de S. Jayatillake , RSP MIC -GSO I DMI, and Corp. M.P. Anura Pieris, MPA MIC. The evidence of these officers themselves proves this fact. Knowing Capt. Nilam very well there was no necessity for Col. D.P. Dissanayake to find out the address and the whereabouts of Nilam through his junior officers. If he wanted he could have directly contacted Capt. Nilam and got whatever information he wanted. Col. Dissanayake`s explanation was that he wanted to contact Capt. Nilam to get his assistance in respect of the house Col. Dissanayake was building at Malabe.
The evidence before this Commission further discloses the fact that Lt. Col. Padmasiri Udugampola, SLCMP , brother of ASP Kulasiri Udugampola, Major General Ivan Dassanayake and Colonel K. H. N. S. S. Dharmaratna, Major A.C. A. de Soysa, SLCMP , Major A.S.P . Podiralahamy, SLCMP, Major K.U. Jayanetti, SLCMP, Major B.M.A.N.S.K. Karunaratne, MIC, Corpl, J.H.A.P. de Silva, JHAT- MIC, Corpl. M.P.A. Pieris, JHAT-MIC, were all aware of the impending raid and have directly and indirectly assisted ASP Kulasiri Udugampola in raiding this Safe House. If these officers had any doubts about the Safe House they should have brought it to the notice of the Army Commander and moved the Military Police to investigate. But these officers, without doing so, have conspired with Kulasiri Udugampola to raid this Safe House for their own personal benefits. Moreover, none of these officers have informed the Army Commander or the Director, DMI, about the raid before the raid.
b) If so, by whom, under what circumstances and to whom such disclosures were made
The complicity of Col. D.P. Dissanayake and Col. Padmasiri Udugampola in disclosing certain activities of the DMI to the United National Party hierarchy at Siri Kotha before the General Elections of December 2001 is evident. Charitha Ratwatte who was the then Chairman of the United National Party, giving evidence before this Commission, stated that the late Gamini Athukorale brought to the notice of the United National Party that the DMI was coordinating an attempt to use thermobaric explosives on the meetings held by the United National Party leadership and the leader`s campaign bus. As it was on the eve of a general election, it was highly probable that the officers in the Army above named, along with ASP Kulasiri Udugampola, manipulated this story with the expectation that it would affect the results of the Election in favour of the United National Party, and that in the event of the United National Party coming into power they would be adequately compensated.
c) Were there any compelling reasons for the Police to raid the Safe House and take action in the manner they did in taking into custody several Army personnel
The raid itself cannot be faulted if it was conducted on the basis of searching for a suspect in the Udathalawinna murder case, namely, Chanuka Ratwatte, son of Anuruddha Ratwatte, former Minister and Deputy Minister of Defence in the previous government who himself is a suspect in the Udathalawinna murder case. But the evidence led before this Commission suggests that this was only a cover up. ASP Kulasiri Udugampola has not noted down the information he received regarding a murder suspect hiding or visiting the Safe House nor has he made any surveillance before the raid. In fact ASP Udugampola admitted in his evidence that one of the reasons he had in his mind when he decided to raid this Army Safe House, was the information and publicity given in the media before the Elections that a DMI unit was being trained to attack the United National Party leadership and their campaign bus by using thermobaric weapons.
The IGP, DIGs, and SSP in the Kandy region giving evidence faulted ASP Udugampola for not recording the information said to have been received by him about Chanuka Ratwatte, and also for not making surveillance prior to the raid. Although this Commission tried to trace the whereabouts of this so-called informant whose name was disclosed by ASP Udugampola, it was unsuccessful. The informant namely Morasus Mathoj Nilanga, has filed an affidavit in the Supreme Court on behalf of Kulasiri Udugampola in a fundamental rights case filed against him. But the Investigation Officers of this Commission were not able to find the informant in the given address or anywhere else. Nilanga`s informant Ajith was reported to be dead. According to the evidence of the Inspector General of Police and the other senior Police Officers, ASP Kulasiri Udugampola has violated all the Police rules and regulations in conducting this raid, although Kulasiri Udugampola stated in his evidence that as a Superintendent of Police at that time he was not required to note down any information, and that he can use his discretion to carry out this type of investigation and raid without the permission of his superiors, and challenged his superior officers to point out any rules and regulations if there are any. The Inspector General of Police while giving evidence before this Commission has produced the necessary circulars.
The action taken by ASP Udugampola in the manner he did in taking into custody several Army personnel was illegal, immoral and in violation of all the rules and regulations of the Police. The evidence clearly proves that ASP Kulasiri Udugampola has acted arbitrarily and capriciously. On the night of 2nd January 2002, when he arrested the Army personnel and brought them to the Narahenpita Military Police, all the officers who came there, senior Army and Police officers, informed the Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Balagalle, and the then Inspector General of Police, the late Lucky Kodituwakku about the raid and they in turn informed Kulasiri Udugampola that the arrested Army personnel who were in the Safe House were performing Army duties with the approval of the Army Commander. Further proceedings in respect of this raid should have ended then and there. But ASP Kulasiri Udugampola refused to accept that position on the basis of a non-existent Court Order to raid this house. It is very unfortunate that no Police Officer from the Inspector General of Police downwards could prevent ASP Udugampola proceeding further in this illegal act. From the evidence led before this Commission, every one including the Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and the Minister of Interior, the Inspector General of Police and the senior Police Officers seem to have been impotent or have purposely avoided preventing ASP Udugampola proceeding further in respect of this raid. If one is to accept the totality of the evidence led before this Commission, it seems that ASP Kulasiri Udugampola was immune to any supervisory procedure and he has behaved as a supreme commander who was above the law. To this extent, therefore, the Government, the Prime Minister and the Ministers concerned, the then Inspector General of Police, Lucky Kodituwakku, his successor T. E. Anandarajah and all other senior Police Officers are responsible for the illegal act of ASP Udugampola. For whatever reasons the then Inspector General of Police, Lucky Kodituwakku and his successor T. E. Anandarajah and other senior Police Officers were powerless to prevent the illegal action of ASP Udugampola, even after they were appraised of the true facts of this Safe House and the activities of its personnel.
Therefore on the totality of the evidence, this Commission finds that there were no compelling reasons whatever for ASP Kulasiri Udugampola to raid the Safe House at Millennium City, Athurugiriya or to take further action in the manner he did in taking into custody of the Army personnel.
d) Have the Police Officers who raided the Safe House obtained directions from the IGP or any higher authority before such steps were taken
ASP Kulasiri Udugampola admitted in his evidence that he did not obtain directions from the Inspector General of Police or any higher authority before such steps were taken. He said that he did not inform any higher officer as there was no necessity to do so as he was appointed by the then Inspector General of Police to assist Deputy Inspector General of Police, Mediwaka, in conducting investigatio…
Source(s)
DM archives…as original report was classified and does not exist even in the national archives due to the sensitive information in contained and on.
(Lanka Newspapers)
Safe house: SC awards lakhs to LRRP men, Udugampola also to pay
The Supreme Court ruled yesterday that the fundamental rights of under-cover operation known as ‘Long range reconnaissance patrols’ team members led by Captain S.H.M. Nilam were violated by executive and administrative actions linked to the raid on the safe house at Millennium City housing scheme in Arthugiriya.
Justice Shirani A. Bandaranayake with Chief Justice Sarath N. Silva and Justice P. Edussuriya agreeing in her judgement held that the fundamental rights – freedom from torture, right to equality, freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention – of the petitioners Capt. Nilam, H.M. Nissanka Herath, I.E. Jayamanne and H.M. Hilmy (members of LRRP team) were violated.
The Court awarded Rs. 800,000 to each petitioner as compensation and costs. Of this Rs 750,000 will be payable by the State and Rs 50,000 to each petitioner payable by Kandy Police Superintendent K. Udugampola who led the raid on the safe house.
These amounts should be paid within three months. Yesterday’s Supreme Court ruling added a new dimension to the legal and political controversy over the raid on the Athurugiriya safe house. A Commission appointed by President Chandrika Kumaratunga has in a report reprimanded UNF government leaders and called for disciplinary action against Military and Police officers involved in the raid. The UNF government had rejected the report and moved in parliamenrt for the appointment of a select committee to probe the incident.
Capt. Nilam was the leader of the LRRP team in certain areas of the Eastern Province. He and other petitioners said the team had gone to Batticaloa on an operation on December 21, 2001 and returned to the safe house on December 26, 2001 consequent to the ceasefire agreement between the government and the LTTE.
They were directed by the Directorate of the Military Intelligence to return all arms, ammunitions, explosives, etc which were in their possession to the relevant army camps. The petitioners said they prepared the requisite documentation for the returning of these arms except to the army camps at Kadawatha and Maradana.
They returned to the safe house on January 2, 2002 intending to return the balance weapons to these two camps on the following day. Before they returned to the safe house, they alleged that a party of armed and uniformed police officers raided that safe house.
They alleged that before they were brought to Cinnamon Gardens Police they were taken to the Kandy police station to expose them to the media as well as for SP Udugampola to gain publicity.
They complained that the treatment meted out to them while in police custody constituted torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment.
SP Udugampola contended that the initial arrest of petitioners was made on the order of the DIG, Kandy. He had only carried out the instruction given by the DIG and he had no discretion on the matter as he was duty bound to comply with such orders. He further submitted that Teldeniya Magistrate had made an order to facilitate the inquiries carried out at Athurugiriya.
He was given direct instructions by the IGP to investigate ‘Udathalawnna Massacre’ which occurred during the General Election in 2001. According to him, Chanuka Ratwatte and Lohan Ratwatte were considered prime suspects in the said incident..
He stated that on 31.12. 2001, he received a telephone call from an informant that Chanuka was seen visiting a house owned by a Muslim army officer in the Millennium Park City.
S.L.Gunasekara with Manohara de Silva, Dilshan Jayasooriya and Prasanna Gunasena appeared for the petitioners. President’s Counsel Shibly Aziz with Faizer Musthapha and Rohan Deshapriya appeared for SP Udugampola. Senior State Counsel Shavindra
Fernando with State Counsel Viveka Siriwardane de Silva appeared for IGP and the Attorney General. Upul Jayasooriya and Kolitha Dharmawardane with Sampath Soyza appeared for the other respondents.
(Dailymirror)
Udugampola allowed bail in Rs. 500,000
Assistant Superintendent of Police Kulasiri Udugampola, was yesterday (23) allowed surety bail in Rs. 500,000 by the Chief Magistrate of Kandy Harsha Sethunge.
Udugampola was arrested by aspecial police team yesterday and produced in Court in connection with a raid he conducted on an army safe house in the Athurugiriya Millenium City in the year 2002.
Udugampola, who was on compulsory leave, was arrested at his official police quarters in Kandy.
The Magistrate also ordered Udugampola to appear in the High Court of Kandy on March 29 and to report the Kandy Police Headquarters on every Sunday between 9 a.m. and 12 noon.
Udugampola, who was also ordered by the Magistrate to surrender his passport to Court,
is being charged with preparing false evidence and papers, filing a criminal case against a group of persons, without adequate evidence and keeping five persons for eight days in detention without reason.
SP Nevil Guruge of the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) Police Headquarters with IP W. M. Karunarathna produced Udugampola in Court.
(The Island)
Millennium City raid — Betrayal most foul
‘The Island’ lead news story of 24th Marc revealed the arrest of ASP Kulasiri Udugampola, in connection with his raid on the Army safe house in Aturugiriya Millennium City in the year 2002. ‘Udugampola is charged with preparing false evidence and papers, filing a criminal case against a group of persons without adequate evidence, and keeping them for eight days in detention without reason’, the report added.
The Army unit at the Aturugiriya safe house, apart from other units under Commandos and Special Forces, were in the process of eliminating LTTE terrorist leadership in the N/E. ASP Udugampola is reported to have arrested a Captain and four regular soldiers of the Army’s Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) unit along with a former Tiger guerilla, who was helping the Army, on the night of January 2, 2002. This illegal arrest was carried out despite the fact that, the IGP had informed Udugampola that the arrested persons were performing their duties with the approval of the Army Commander.
The raid was carried out barely one month after the former UNF government was sworn in. It was made out that Millenium City was a secret hide out from where military men had planned to carry out assassinations against UNF government leaders.
In fact, this Army Military Intelligence unit along with the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRPs) was engaged in infiltrating Tiger controlled areas in the east to attack targets. After the Millenium City raid, the LTTE launched a vicious campaign against LRRP operatives and informants. About 50 intelligence operatives, policemen, civilian informants and members of Tamil political parties were systematically eliminated by Tiger pistol gangs.
The Presidential Commission appointed to probe the Millenium City raid had described it as a total betrayal and absolute treachery to the nation. ‘The country’s national security interests were compromised by this raid, and has neutralized the military strategy of the Army in combating terrorism in the N/E,’ the Commission Report had determined. (Dec. 12, 2003 ‘The Island’). Iqbal Athas in his analysis of this betrayal of national security, in the Dec 14 Sunday Times, had captioned his Situation Report as, ‘Military secret sacrificed on the altar of politics’.
During earlier UNP regimes too, similar incidents of ‘compromising national security interests’ played into the hands of terrorists. In the Black July holocaust, during President JRJ’s regime, massacre of innocent Tamil civilians, intended to be a ‘deterrent’ to Tiger terrorism, back-fired on the majority community. Sri Lanka was labeled as a nation that harassed minority communities.
Former President Ranasinghe Premadasa, not only supplied truck loads of arms and cement to build Tiger bunkers and money to LTTE, but also ordered the surrender of police stations in the N/E, that led to the LTTE’s brutal massacre of 700 policemen, entrusted with the maintenance of law and order in the region.
Former Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s UNP regime too followed a similar pattern of playing into the hands of the LTTE terrorists. The so called Ceasefire Agreement signed with the LTTE is an example. The Tigers have flouted it more than 5000 times,conscripting children for war, extorting ransom money, killing civilians and political opponents. Not a single crime has been brought before the law of the land.
the Commission Report on the Millenium City raid observes, ‘ASP Udugampola, backed up with political patronage, stopped the Army in combating terrorism in the N/E and betrayed this gallant unit, paving the way for the LTTE to go on a killing spree. The (former UNF) government, Prime Minister, ministers concerned, IGP and all other senior police officers are responsible for the illegal act of ASP Kulasiri Udugampola’.
Hence, it is pertinent that, not only the ‘executor’, but also the ‘back up team’ as identified in the Commission Report, be called upon to explain their role in this heinous crime, committed on the nation and the people.
Stanley Weerasinghe
Pannipitiya
(The Island)
LTTE resumes attacks on intelligence operatives
Police yesterday said that the LTTE had resumed targetting intelligence men attached to the Police and security forces.
The latest attack was launched at Modera on Monday. Suspected Tiger cadres opened fire on an intelligence operative of the Army and Police at St. James Street according to police.
The victim had visited the nearby grocery to buy cigarettes when the assailants opened fire wounding him in the stomach. He is undergoing treatment in hospital.
The LTTE has so far killed 23 members of the intelligence units.
The office of the President alleged that the killing spree of intelligence men commenced following a raid conducted on an intelligence safe house at Millennium City, Athurugiriya by the UNF government.
A Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the raid at Athurugiriya has held the Prime Minister, former Defence Minister and former Interior Minister responsible for the raid.
Yesterday, members of the National Patriotic Movement held a protest march in Colombo and handed over a petition to President Chandrika Kumaratunga urging her to arrest those responsible for the raid on the Millennium City Intelligence Unit, which they said had exposed the identity of many intelligence operatives.
The 23rd intelligence member who was gunned down was Inspector Nimal Thabrew of the Intelligence Unit at the Dehiwala Police. The EPDP led by Douglas Devananda recently alleged that the LTTE had ordered its cadres to recommence killing of political rivals and intelligence men.
(The Island)
Dark day in the history of the Sri Lanka police
IGP should resign after humiliation by Supreme Court
The week that went by will long be remembered for two events, one which caused much rejoicing among millions of people, and one which saw law and order in Sri Lanka plunged to its darkest depths.
On Monday, a 3-judge bench of the Supreme Court ordered the Attorney General to investigate whether unfair actions by the Inspector General of Police constituted corruption, and to take action against IGP Lucky Kodithuwakku. The AG must also submit a report to the Supreme Court on this by the 30th of April.
It was indeed a damning judgement against the highest-ranking police officer in the land, and is a clear and unequivocal indictment on the conduct of the entire police force. The IGP has not so far responded, either personally or through his lawyers. However, if he has ounce of integrity left in him, he should resign immediately, whether the allegations against him are correct or not. For this is not merely an allegation that is damaging to him. It is the clearest and strongest condemnation that any person or body could give which would erode the confidence of the public in the 30,000 strong police force. The judgement was in a fundamental rights case which was filed by 46 Assistant Superintendents of Police (ASPs) against the promotions of 34 of their colleagues to the rank of Superintendents of Police (SPs). The court quashed the promotions, and ordered that the Public Service Commission (PSC) hold fresh interviews for the promotions.
Justice Mark Fernando, arguably one of the most respected Supreme Court judges that this country has ever seen, who is also the most senior judge of the Supreme Court, in his judgement barred the IGP from sitting on the interview panel of the PSC for the promotions. The IGP was ordered to personally pay damages amounting to 50,000 rupees to the petitioners. Other members of the bench, who were involved in the unanimous judgement, wete Justices D. P. S. Gunasekera and Hector Yapa, again two very senior judges of the Supreme Court.
The IGP was one of five respondents who were found to be at fault in this case. All of them are or were very senior public officials. The highest is then Secretary of Defence Chandananda de Silva, who is a former Commissioner of Elections. The others are Secretary to the Ministry of Cultural and Religious Affairs R. A. A. Ranaweera, Secretary of the Ministry of Posts, Telecommunications and Media M. J. Senaratne, and the Additional Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Romesh Jayasinghe.
The case once again spotlights the parlous situation that law and order has fallen into in this country during the tenure of Kodithuwakku.
In another such case, President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga this week personally intervened, using her capacity of commander in chief of the armed forces, and ordered Interior Minister John Amaratunga to investigate the actions of police who raided the Sri Lanka Army’s elite unit’s unofficial base at Athurugiriya. This was announced at a special press conference. The President has questioned why the police have not admitted that they were at fault.
The President’s own security chief, the Director of the Presidential Security Division SP Nihal Karunaratne, appeared in the dock on Tuesday at the Kandy Magistrate’s Court, after a warrant was issued against him as a suspect in an election violence case. He was released on bail. Five policemen of the PSD are among the other suspects in this case, where supporters of Minister S. B. Dissanayake were attacked, allegedly by the PSD Karunaratne is facing a charge by the OIC of the Hanguranketha Police Station that he threatened the OIC’s life.
Nowadays it almost seems as though the police are the criminals instead of catching criminals. Police have still not arrested the two sons of former Deputy Minister of Defence Anuruddha Ratwatte, two and a half months after the massacre of ten members of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress at Udathalawinna on election day. It is now quite obvious that many senior police officers are protecting the Ratwatte family, since it is ludicrous that two such well-known persons could continue to evade arrest. The CID once again raided the Ratwatte home in Kandy on Tuesday, which is a ridiculous gesture, since it is very silly to assume that the two suspects would be hiding there.
In another case which has done irreparable damage to the image of the country, police arrested a four man gang of Special Forces deserters who gangraped a British tourist in Polonnaruwa, in front of her husband. Once again, it is not possible to believe that such a gang, together with their weapons, could have been loitering around Polonnaruwa, which is a heavily guarded region being in the vicinity of a number of vital bases, without being discovered. In fact the ease with which police forced the gang after the shameful incident speaks volumes.
On Friday, the government and the LTTE opened two new routes to the Tiger-controlled areas of the Wanni, allowing free travel to and fro to pedestrians. The roads, one the Kandy-Jaffna highway, and the other the Uilankulam-Mannar road, will soon be opened to vehicle traffic as well. The Jaffna road is not open all the way, but only up to Kilinochchi.
Both sides have said that they will soon open the northern end of the A9 highway as well, thus allowing civilians in Jaffna to travel by road to the rest of the country. This would be an even more significant event, when it happens, since the land route to Jaffna has not been open since 1995, and even then there were restrictions on movements. The last time that the entire A9 was completely free of obstacles was before June 1990, during the peace talks between President Ranasinghe Premadasa and the LTTE.
Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, who has worked hard towards executing his plan to bring peace to the country, but done so in an unobtrusive manner with little fanfare, stayed out of the limelight on this occasion as well. Many might have expected him to even be at Omanthai to take credit for reopening the road and easing the hardships of civilians in the north. But instead, the PM was in Singapore, leading a high-level delegation which was negotiating a vital trade agreement between Singapore, India and Sri Lanka.
Apart from the economic benefits of this move, the PM is clearly making sure that his government’s relationship with India is kept as close as possible, ensuring that India will continue to support his peace moves with the Tigers. It is vital that the Indian government not stand in the way of the peace process, as one of the main problems for the long term is the fact that LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran is wanted for the murder of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi at Sriperumbudur in Tamil Nadu in 1991. Gandhi, under whom the Indian Peacekeeping Force fought an unsuccessful campaign against the Tigers in 1989, was blasted by a female LTTE suicide bomber during an election rally which he was expected to win and regain power.
Parliamentary Select Committee to investigate Athurugiriya Safe House raid – by Deepal Warnakulasuriya
The Government last week countered the damning Presidential Commission report on the Athurugiriya Millennium City Safe House details with a statement that a Parliamentary Select Committee would be appointed to investigate the same incident. The Select Committee will be appointed next month through a resolution passed in Parliament and will comprise no more than 12 members, Cabinet Spokesman G. L. Pieris revealed last week.
A team of police directed by ASP Udugampola raided the Army safe house at No. 844, Kaduwela road, Athurugiriya on January 02, 2002 without a court order to search the place. The safe house was used by Army intelligence personnel (Directorate of Military Intelligence) for covert action to infiltrate LTTE cadres and eliminate some of the LTTE leadership.
However, the police team subsequent to the raid, revealed the media that a number of weapons, explosives, and other military equipment which were in the house, claiming them to be illegal and unsafe.
They also had later confessed that they raided the place with a tip off of an assassination attempt on former Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe.
The Presidential Commission report revealed last week deemed the raid on the safe house by ASP Kulasiri Udugampola and several others as illegal.
The one member Commission chaired by retired Supreme Court judge D. Jayawickreme in his report had said that the ASP had rejected the statement of the Army Commander about the safe house functioning under his approval and had proceeded on the legal course of action. Therefore, the Commission Report said that ‘The action taken by ASP Udugampola in the manner he did in taking into custody several Army personnel was illegal, immoral and in violation of all the rules and regulations of the police’.
The Commission had also said that “the Government, the Prime Minister and the ministers concerned, the then Inspector General of Police L. Kodituwakku, his successor T. E. Anandarajah and all other senior officers should be held responsible for the illegal act of ASP Udugampola”.
The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) team, housed at the Kohuwala Army Camp and was relocated to Athurugiriya in December 2001. When the safe House was raided the LRRP team led by Captain Nilam had conducted a number of Deep Penetration operations in the North and had accounted for nine LTTE high rankers including Mano and Ganesh. They have also killed another 10 regional level leaders.
The Commission to probe into the incident was appointed in August 16, 2002 by President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. However, the requested equipment had been provided the Commission in September.
A government lawyer had been released in October after several requests and enough police officers had not been provided by the government till March this year.
Subsequent to the exposure of the safe house in Athurugiriya, a pistol gang was created by the LTTE to hunt down and kill Army informants. Allegations were made that, exposing the activities carried out from the safe house, would have also exposed covert intelligence operations and operators enabling the LTTE to identify the informants.
Several informants were killed in Batticaloa, Trincomalee and even at Dehiwala, Pepiliyana and Mount Lavinia. One informant, Pulendrarasa was killed on January 03 in Batticaloa and Vidayakaran and Nimalan were killed in Batticaloa on January 16 and 21 respectively by the LTTE pistol gang. Raghupathi Kadiragamnathan and Devarasa Lingasamai were killed in Colombo in April.
The Presidential Commission Report also said that the arbitrary action of the police had jeopardized the security of the State and neutralised the Military strategy. It also said that since, the raid more than 23 informants and civilians had been killed by the LTTE and a number of persons had been seriously injured.
Five army officers complain to SC of illegal arrest by police
Five officers of the Sri Lanka Army who took part in the team that carried out intelligence operations in the Eastern province, in regions occupied by the LTTE, have complained to the Supreme Court about an alleged illegal arrest, illegal detention and torture by police officers subsequent to the raid of the Millennium City at Athurugiriya on the night of January 2, 2002, by K. Udugampola, SP and some other police officers.
The petitions said that the house in Millennium City belonged to the Directorate of the Army Intelligence Services and had housed certain licensed weapons belonging to the Army. The party that raided had taken away the weapons against the wishes of the petitioners and arrested the petitioners without giving a reason for the arrest.
The petitioners are captain Nilam, the head of the Investigative team, and other army officers, I. E. Jayamanne (Staff Sergeant), Udalagama (Sergeant), H. M. N. Herath and H. M. Hilmy (both Lance Corporals).
The petitions had cited K. Udugampola Superintendent of Police, Kandy, as the first respondent. K. Udugampola, is alleged to have ordered the raid of this army safe house in the Millennium City and further ordered the alleged illegal arrest of the members of the investigative team.
The petitions said that the petitioners were illegally detained at the police stations of Kandy and Katugastota from January 2 to January 5 at the instance of R. A. P. Dharmaratne, Sub-Inspector of Police, Kandy Division.
The petitions explained that the petitioners were subjected to cruel inhuman treatment when they were taken from Kandy to Katugastota police station, the orders for the alleged cruel treatment having been made by Udugampola and Dharmaratne.
The petitions requested the court to grant leave to proceed and declare the violation of fundamental rights by the respondent police officers.
The five petitions will be supported in court, shortly.
(Island)
Another Army informant killed
The five LTTE suspects wanted in connection with the recent killing of two government informants have been remanded till May 27 after they were produced before the Magistrate by the Criminal Investigation Department (CID). All suspects who hailed from Batticaloa were arrested while they were residing in lodges and flats in Colombo, Moratuwa, Wellawatte and Bambalapitiya.
The suspects were arrested within one month.
Two of the suspects were identified as Soori and Neelan. The former is a member of the LTTE intelligence unit and the second had been identified as the assailant of government informant Lingasamy Devarasa alias Ashok who was killed at Dehiwala on April 26. Police also recovered the motor bike used in the killing.
The main suspect, wanted in connection with the killing of the other government informant namely K. T. Ragupathi at Mt. Lavinia on March 18, is still evading arrest. He has been identified as Sivakumar from Batticaloa.
After signing the Memorandum of Understanding by the Sri Lanka government and LTTE on February 22 last year, the LTTE had assassinated nearly 27 Intelligence Unit Members (IUM) attached to the armed forces.
Army DMI operative shot dead
A soldier of the Army’s Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) was gunned down on Saturday afternoon at Kohuwela by an unidentified gunman Ashok alias Lingasamy Devarasa, a former LTTE cadre turned army informant was shot dead when he went to a nearby boutique with his wife and the young son.
Ashok was an operative of the Army’s deep penetration unit and was provided special security following the recent murders of four other members of the DMI.
Police said the gunman had escaped in a three-wheeler after shooting Ashok at point-blank range.
Army DMI operative shot dead
Another operative of the Army’s Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), who helped in operations of Long Range Reconnaisance Patrols (LRRPs) in the east, was shot dead by a suspected Tiger guerrilla hit squad in Kohuwala last night, Police said.
Ashok alias Lingasamy Devarasa, a former LTTE member turned Army informant, who later became an operative involved in deep penetration attacks on guerrilla targets in the Batticaloa district, was on his way to a boutique near Pepiliyana Road when the incident occurred. He was with his wife and young son.
Police said the gunmen shot him at point blank range and escaped in a three-wheeler. He was dead on admission to the Kalubowila hospital. A by-stander also sustained injuries.
An Army source told The Sunday Times last night Ashok made a tremendous contribution to DMI’s deep penetration operations by LRRPs in the east. His contributions were recognized and he was recruited as a soldier in the Sri Lanka National Guard. He was serving there in a regular capacity when the incident occurred.
Police found six gun shots, which they say, were hallmarks of Tiger guerrilla assassination squads. Ashok’s murder comes barely a month after guerrillas gunned down Kadirgamanathan Ragupathi alias Ragu, another DMI informant, who helped in LRRP operations. He was shot dead near Peiris Mawatha at Mount Lavinia.
Last night’s killing brings to five the number of DMI informants and operatives in the east killed by Tiger guerrilla hit squads since the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement on February 22, last year. This is in addition to over 15 other Army informants who have been murdered in the same period.
Ashok died on admission to the Kalubowila Hospital.
Some misconceptions on ‘Safe House’ at Millennium Park
The proper military concept of a safe house is a secret operational base within an enemy area or in close proximity there to, and dominated by the enemy. This must be the first safe house ever, in a safe area. In fact as the description itself implies that safe houses are only established in unsafe areas. The description “safe” is in relation to an enemy threat of an imminent nature. It could be said that Athurugiriya was even safer than Colombo. An intelligence cell and a safe house are both secret bases, the former being for purposes of obtaining information and intelligence by secretly meeting informants and the latter for varied secret operations such as sabotage, destruction, assassinations, raids and even espionage etc, the main differences being the role, location and the concerns of secrecy.
A safe house has to be behind enemy lines or in close proximity there to, and absolute secrecy is a must. An Intelligence cell could be located anywhere even under cover of some other establishment as appropriate and it being away from the operational area is understandable. No accomplished military officer with a combatant background would have ever even imagined of a safe house far behind one’s own forward positions as was on this occasion.
According to the statement of the Director Military Intelligence [D.M.I.] Capt. Nilam on being recalled to Colombo was initially attached to the “Forward Intelligence cell, which was then located at the army camp at Kohuwela. This same intelligence cell and not a ” safe house” that was shifted to the house belonging to Capt. Nilam’s wife, within a luxury housing scheme at Athurugiriya. The reference to this secret intelligence cell as a safe house was obviously an after thought to confuse the issues consequent to the discovery of the storage of high explosive materials and dangerously lethal weapons there in. The issues being this unwarranted reckless and dangerous storage and the establishment of an unauthorised arsenal without due regard for the safety and security of the said stores and the neighbourhood too.
According to established Military procedure the minimum requirement was the provision of an armed guard at least as a temporary measure until these high explosive materials were transported to and returned as ordered by the D.M.I., These measures would not have been necessary, and there would have been no room for suspicion too, if in keeping with the usual army procedure that arrangements were made to return these explosives without delay on the arrival of Capt Nilam with these lethal stores. This should also have been the response particularly in view of the very serious allegation that army had plans to blast the bus with the Prime Minister in it, with a thermobaric rocket; and also the Anny Commander’s assurance denying the existence of such a plan. It is unbelievable that Capt Nilam and the D.M.I. were not aware of this allegation, as even the Commander of the Army would also have cautioned them of it, as it was a matter concerning them. This allegation was in the newspapers too, and a topic of common discussion at that time. ‘
The reasons adduced by the D.M.I with regard to the necessity to shift this Forward Intelligence Cell from the army camp at Kohuwela to Athurugiriya was that “it was getting exposed” and also that Capt Nilam was not able to find a more suitable location in the whole of Colombo or its suburbs as the army is reputed to default in the payment of rent. This reason is nothing but a fable. In all probability Capt Nilam was more interested in leasing out the house his wife had won at a lottery, to the Directorate of Intelligence. The D.M.I. and Captain Nilam had displayed scant regard to the all-important requirements of an intelligence cell. That is the assurance of secrecy security and convenience to those informants visiting this intelligence cell at the new location at Athurugiriya. In fact such informants must be made aware of the risks and other dangers that they may expose themselves to, which also applies to intelligence officers as well. It is most important that the identities of informants are secret and that even from the other informants too.
Such exposure would be only if it is a necessity. These requirements have been meaningless as access to this Millennium Park cell was subject to one’s identification by the civilian security staff at the gates of The Millennium Park. Further the informants would be conspicuous on their ethnicity and social status being mostly Tamil LTTE deserters. This exposure would not only be embarrassing but also distressing to genuine informants and this secret intelligence cell would have become an open secret before long as the entire neighbourhood would have been aware that this house was owned by Capt. Nilam and his wife. This aspect too has also to be viewed in the light of the statements of Brigadier Hendawitharne the D.M.I and Capt. Nalim. According to the D.M.I. Capt. Nilam was at that point of time under “serious threat” from the L.T.T.E. and therefore had to be under the active surveillance of L.T.T.E. agents. According to Capt. Nilam, his information was that he was to be targeted by a suicide bomber. In this context the move from the Kohuwela army camp to Athurugiriya with Capt. Nilam in charge of this intelligence cell is not only inexplicable but also perhaps even suicidal.
The claim that Capt. Nilam and his men were based at this cell to engage in long range reconnaissance patrols [L.R.R.Ps] and deep penetration fighting patrols is a fallacy. Such patrols are specialist tasks of well-trained infantrymen and some times of the commandoes. Troops from services and non-combatant units are not deployed on such tasks or roles. The D.M.I. and Captain Nilam are both from non-combatant units. L.R.R.Ps are patrols beyond “no man’s land” into enemy territory to survey and gather information and intelligence on enemy locations, roads and approaches and such information necessary for planning of offensive operations etc. Fighting patrols engage in offensive operations such as ambushes, raids destruction or attacks on enemy installations, gun positions and enemy outposts and even abductions of enemy cadres for purposes of interrogation to obtain intelligence etc. These operations and the planning of such operations are the function and responsibility of the combatant formations on the ground in forward positions. Intelligence officers are attached to such formations to furnish the necessary information for the planning of such operations. The responsibility and function of the Directorate of Intelligence is to obtain and furnish timely and accurate intelligence to the respective operational formations which is a very important requirement to ensure properly planned successful operations both offensive and defensive. The claim that Capt. Nilam and his group of informants with dubious loyalties were engaged in deep penetration and long range reconnaissance patrols [L.R.R.Ps] is a palpable falsehood. These patrols require a high degree of infantry skills in addition to mental and physical toughness, as they are dangerous and risky. . The planning of such deep penetration patrols have to be meticulous and provision has to be made for several contingencies, sometimes even for rescue or even betrayal by accompanying informants on some occasions. These patrols may be over several days and communication with the base would be mostly by code requiring a high degree of communication skills too. It would take quite some time to condition even trained infantrymen for such patrols. These patrols are beyond the scope and functions of The Directorate of Military Intelligence but are under the authority and responsibility of The Directorate of Operations and Planning. These patrols are launched from forward positions nearest to the enemy area to be patrolled, and not from alleged “Safe Houses”very many miles away.
Covert Operations are also a very important form of military operations particularly in the context of anti terrorist action. Capt. Nilam has listed some achievements and misses. Whilst acknowledging that some credit was due to him, it has to be pointed out that these achievements were in no way consequent to any long range or deep penetration or fighting patrols planned and led by Capt. Nilam or any other Intelligence officer. These successes claimed are limited to the extermination of terrorists by way of simple ambushes by agents of Capt. Nilam or others who are mostly deserters from the L.T.T.E, in a manner some what similar to “contract killings” .The logistic support only being provided by Capt. Nilam. It is also reported that similar operations have been carried out by the combat Formation in that area with success too. It is said that the elimination of “Lt. Col. Nizar” is not attributable to Capt. Nilam although claimed by him and the D.M.I. These operations have to be handled with caution. There is always the risk of infiltration by L.T.T.E. agents etc. It has been reported that one of these agents entrusted with explosives for such a mission had straight away taken the entire lot of explosives and handed them over to the L.T.T.E. The L.T.T.E. would have obtained a wealth of information too from this agent. The handling of such” informants” or more appropriately “agents” is a skilled and a dangerous task. There was also the exposure of the training of an informant in the firing of thermobaric rockets at the Panaluwa Range. This type of conduct displays immaturity and incompetence of a dangerous nature. This state of affairs most probably would not have been so if operational matters were handled by combatant officers with operational experience.
The bane of our military effort against the L.T.T.E. terrorists over the last twenty years has been the lack of accurate and timely information. This was also a finding by the Court of Inquiry in to the debacle at Pooneryn. This was also undoubtedly a factor in the subsequent debacles at Mullaitivu and Elephant Pass. Good timely and accurate intelligence is an all-important factor in military operations against terrorists. Therefore the competence, aintegrity and quality of the officers employed in the intelligence services is very important as otherwise it would be likely that the intelligence furnished would be just what one would be pleased to hear. Furthermore the expenditure on intelligence is secret and also not subject to audit The annual financial allocation for intelligence expenditure is quite substantial too. Therefore it is attractive to charlatans, crooks and opportunists. In illustration of this aspect it would suffice to mention the fact that the pistol of a highly acclaimed intelligence officer was found at the scene of a robbery and was sent out of the army on his criminal record. Another was expelled for theft from a training institution in America.
In addition to the requirements mentioned it is also most desirable that the Director of intelligence is an officer with a combatant background and operational experience. It should be so in respect of the other officers too as far as possible. Such officers would be better equipped to assess and evaluate the intelligence in the correct perspectives and exploit them to the best advantage. The D.M.I’ s background is from a service unit and Capt Nalim’s background is also similar and with no operational experience to speak of.
The police raid on the Millennium Park intelligence cell of Capt Nilam should be viewed in the light of the alleged involvement of army personnel in election violence particularly at Udathalawinna, where several civilians have been killed by shooting. The suspects are mostly serving soldiers, and there was some information or perhaps speculation that one of the suspects was hiding in this Capt Nilams hideout which by then had become an open secret.It was also not a sudden surprise raid. There was enough time for the D. M. I. to have got the Commander of the army to impress on his Minister the bona fides of this cell and permitted the police to satisfy themselves that no wanted suspects have been hiding there in. The matter would have ended there but for the discovery of an arsenal of high explosive materials including thermobaric rockets lending credence to a rumour that plans were afoot to blast the prime minister along with the bus. The reaction of ASP Udugampola to this situation is understandable. What is not understandable is this thermobaric rocket and other explosive materials being still retained in an unauthorised location and readily available for use in spite of the assurance to the UNP hierarchy by the commander of the army that there was no such preparation to blast the bus with the prime minister in it. According to the D.M.I., he had ordered Capt Nilam on the 28th of December 2001, Capt. Nilam has disregarded this order to return the explosives although it should have been his first priority task. The police raid was on the night of 2nd January 2002. This dereliction of duty on the part of Capt S.H. M. Nilam is the root cause for the consequences imaginary or otherwise. The seriousness of this grave lapse should be viewed in the light of the possible dangers such as a fire even accidental, or sabotage or even betrayal similar to the fate of the police Inspector at the Dehiwela Police. Station or for that matter our late President R. Premadasa, whose murder was planned and plotted through the LTTE agent and assassin Baapu for nearly two years. Further Capt Nalim should have been mindful of the threat to him by a suicide bomber as the “ceasefire ” had been proclaimed only a couple of weeks ago. The LTTE operatives and agents are ruthlessly committed.
SPC probe on safehouse raid
Udugampola didn’t follow procedures —ex- DIG
Retired senior DIG H. M. G. B. Kotakadeniya yesterday told a Special Presidential Commission probing last year’s police raid on a Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI)-run safehouse at Aturugiriya that it would not have led to a crisis situation if SP Kulasiri Udugampola followed proper procedures. If proper procedures were followed, there would not have been a need for this commission, he said.
The 61-year-old Kotakadeniya, the first to publicly give evidence before one-man-commission retired Appeal Court judge Dharmasiri Jayawickrema in committee room F at the BMICH, accused the then IGP Lakdasa Kodituwakku and his successor T. E. Anandarajah of allowing Udugampola, who was in charge of police Kennels Division to press ahead with his disputed probe.
He also pointed out that apparent difference in opinion and lack of co-ordination between the ministries of Defence and Interior aggravated the situation. The Interior Ministry was accused of failing to give proper directions regarding the probe even after Defence Minister Tilak Marapana cleared the DMI of any wrongdoing. It was a tragedy.
Judge: No co-ordination between the two ministries. Kotakadeniya said that Marapana had a different view. Marapana refused to issue detention orders. The two ministries were at cross-purposes.
Responding to the judge and State Counsel Riyaz Hamsa, he stressed that Udugampola, subsequently demoted to the rank of ASP, ignored a specific directive to cease the investigation. The witness said that unfortunately, Messrs. Kodituwakku and Anandarajah did not intervene. He said: Udugampola had an axe to grind and wanted somehow to justify his actions in this regard. Ignored directives issued by me and circumvented them by obtaining magisterial orders to record the statements of Army Commander Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle and several other officers in connection with the controversial probe. The judge observed that it was very strange procedure. Subsequently, Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle was also directed to make available the required documents at an intelligence unit (at Kohuwela) to Udugampola.
Udugampola went ahead with the probe despite a directive that he should obtain prior approval from Kotakadeniya if he wanted to record army officers, the commission was told.
Judge Jayawickrema said that he was not surprised that the police top brass did not intervene put an end to Udugapola’s highly damaging actions. The IGP continued to ignore repeated calls to assign the required number of policemen to assist the commission, the judge said, adding that he twice informed the independent police commission of the situation but unfortunately there was no response. The IGP did not even acknowledge the letters. He had not made available a single policeman, the judge said.
The probe began on December 9. Since then 17 army, one DMI informant and a civilian gave evidence in camera. Brigadier Kapila Hendawitarana, Captain S. H. M. Neelam, Staff Sergeant I. A. Jayamanne, Corporal H. M. N. Herath, Staff Sergeant P. A. Udalagama, Corporal H. M. Hilmi, informant R. Subaskaran, Major A. C. A . de Soysa, Major T. S. Sally, Major M. B. de Silva, Colonel D. P. Dissanayake, Major General Ivan Dissanayake, Colonel K. H. N. S. C. A. Dharmaratne, Major B. M. A. N. S. K. Karunaratne, Warrant Officer Sunil Premasiri, Major A. S. P. Podiralahamy and Lt. General Lionel Balagalle were among the persons gave evidence in camera. Witnesses included the officers and the informant arrested by the Kandy police and subjected to degrading treatment.
Although the President set a three month deadline to complete the probe by end of last December, a delay in assigning the required number of investigators prevented the commission from meeting the deadline.
The commission continues with its probe as the government tries to persuade the President to repeal the Special Presidential Commissions of Inquiry Law of February 10, 1978. The President rejected a government proposal to repeal the Act in early August last year. She wants a team of experts named by her and the government to study the Repeal Bill before taking a decision.
Retired senior DIG Tilak Iddamalgoda is the chief investigator with the commission.
Kotakadeniya said retired SSP Lal Ratnayake, private secretary to Interior Minister John Amaratunga phoned him soon after the police raid carried out on January 2, 2002. He conveyed a minister’s message. He said: the minister wanted me to make a public announcement regarding the possibility in the detained personnel being involved in a conspiracy to harm the life of Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe and disrupt the newly elected government.
Responding to the State Counsel, the retired DIG said that he explained to Ratnayake the need not to make public statements until police conclude a proper investigation. He said that he declined to go before the media and requested Ratnayake to inform the minister of his position. He said that Ratnayake later informed him that the minister endorsed his stance.
The minister summoned me on the following day and directed me to co-ordinate and supervise Udugampola’s probe. In addition I was also given the opportunity to conduct my own investigation in this regard. The minister also cleared a request to temporarily assign a team of experienced CID operatives to conduct a parallel investigation. SSP D. S. Y. Samaratunga was chosen to head the probe. He accepted the assignment. But sought permission to choose his own team. But the then IGP refused to make available the entire team. Instead only Samaratunga was released.
Samaratunga was tasked with assessing whether it was an illegitimate operation, he said, adding that his probe proved it was not. Based on Samaratunga’s first report, Kotakadeniya said, he sent a report dated January 29, 2002 to Interior Ministry Secretary M. N. Junaid. Subsequently, the IGP was also informed of the Samaratunga’s report. The IGP was also handed over a copy of the report given to the Interior Ministry Secretary.
Udugampola was not capable of handling such a sensitive investigation, he said, adding that he did not have faith in the SSP’s ability.
Responding to the judge, he said that there was no link between the safe house and the Udathalawinna massacre at the last parliamentary elections in December 2001.
Kotakadeniya was convinced that it was a legitimate intelligence operation. But was unable to assess certain other aspects, particularly what prompted the army to set up the safehouse a long distance away from the east — the intended theatre of operations and whether the political leadership was made aware of the operations. Unfortunately, Kotakadeniya did not get approval to speak with Lt. Gen. Balagalle to clarify these matters.
The witness said that twice he sought the Interior Minister’s approval in this regard. The minister promised to take a decision but he never did. But Udugampola did not comply.
The judge said: So Udugampola bypassed all. He ridiculed all.
Kotakadeniya said that when Secretary General of Parliament requested a report from police headquarters subsequent to MP Nimal Siripala de Silva raising the issue in parliament, a report was sent there. He said that he was never consulted. He pointed out that the report was in Sinhalese and Senior DIG T. E. Anandarajah who forwarded the report could not have done it. Anandarajah merely authorised a statement prepared by Udugampola, the commission was told. Anandarajah never spoke to me regarding the investigation although he made available copies of various documents.
The judge: Did Anandarajah understand what he signed.
Kotakadeniya said that he had the opportunity to brief the premier on September 5, 2002 shortly before he retired. The premier was convinced that there was no truth in allegations against the DMI. Soon after the Temple Trees meeting, Kotakadeniya said he sent another report to Anandarajah informing him of the premier’s views on the issue and underscoring the need to put an end to the probe.
According to Kotakadeniya, the premier was also of the view that there was no need to go ahead with the case against a group of army officers including Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle. But Udugampola acted maliciously, the retired DIG said, expressing the belief that a breakdown in command and control structure over the years allowed some personnel to do what they please. Police were given different orders. There were conflicting directives. The rank does not matter. Instead influence and connections, he said.
According to Udugampola, he raided the safehouse following information that Chanuka Ratwatte wanted in connection with the Udathalawinna massacre was hiding there, the State Counsel said, requesting Kotakadeniya to respond. He said that Udugampola violated the procedures. He should not have raided the place without mounting a surveillance operation in the area.
Sri Lanka’s Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol
The British Refugee Council Sri Lanka monitor reported in April 2003:
“LTTE negotiator Anton Balasingham claimed in a speech on 7 April in Geneva that the Sri Lankan government’s Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) had infiltrated the Tiger-controlled areas of the northern Vanni region.
Mr Balasingham says that a claymore remote-controlled mine was recently found on a road on which LTTE leader V Prabhakaran was scheduled to travel. A search operation was ordered and thousands of Tigers combed the jungles of Vanni to apprehend LRRP members.
The LRRP is part of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), directed from a secret location in Athurugiriya. According to Colombo newspaper Sunday Times, this safehouse was raided on 2 January by Kandy police, who found weapons and arrested six soldiers. Unauthorized operations were alleged, and police filed a case against Army chief Lionel Balagalle and Director of DMI Kapila Hendavithana. A Commission headed by former High Court judge Dharmasiri Jayawickrema is probing DMI operations conducted from the safehouse in Athurugiriya.
The LTTE claim that the LRRP is trained by foreign intelligence services and responsible for the killing of LTTE leaders, Col. Shanker, Col. Nisam and Lt. Col. Gangai Amaran. They say others such as Col. Balraj, Col. Jeyam and political leader SP Thamilchelvan have also been targeted. The Army have denied LRRP operations in the north-east, but say that LTTE hit squads have penetrated the capital Colombo.
Sources allege that Tiger intelligence chief Pottu Amman has issued an order for the elimination of all members of the LRRP and other informants. According to press reports, at least 20 military intelligence operatives have been murdered since the ceasefire in February 2002. Former LTTE member Lingasamy Devarasa, was shot on 26 April by two people who arrived in an autorickshaw. He later died in hospital. The incident took place at Kohuwela in Colombo. Mr Devarasa had helped in LRRP operations in Batticaloa District.
Another LRRP operative and former member of Tamil group PLOTE, K R Ragupathy was killed in Mt Lavinia on 18 March. The security forces have introduced new security measures in Colombo, including checkpoints to track down the Tiger hit squads. Observers believe that the Tigers may have informants within the military and warned that there will be more deaths.”
(Tamilnation.org)
Protecting informants: The Government’s bounden duty
This came at a time when there was growing disillusionment within the military ranks and the country at large over the government’s stoic silence following the killings of military informants.
The Police Chief of the LTTE P. Nadesen in an interview with a weekend English newspaper a few months ago said that one of the prime duties assigned to him by the LTTE leader was to identify the informants who helped the Sri Lanka Army’s deep penetration unit or the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP).
LTTE Supremo Velupillai Prabhakaran no doubt must be quite satisfied with the performance of his police chief in this regard given the meticulous manner in which Tiger cadres are executing the job true to LTTE style.
While the LTTE was busy collecting information about military informants and systematically executing them at regular intervals, it took sixteen months for the UNF government to awaken from its slumber and demand a report from the Defence top brass on the subject.
So far nearly twenty odd informants have been executed by the LTTE in Colombo and the North and East. It all began after the Kandy Police made a blunder by revealing the closely guarded military secret – the presence of the LRRP, while hunting down the murderers of the Palletalawinna massacre.
Once the identities of Tamil and Muslim informants were known to the police and the LTTE, a chain of murders of persons collaborating with the Army was the result. The Attorney General recently directed the IGP to withdraw the case filed by ASP Kulasiri Udugampola against the Army Commander, Director Military Intelligence, another officer and four soldiers of the LRRP, saying there wasn’t a “trickle of evidence” to show that the LRRP were engaged in criminal activities.
The UNF government in its zest and zeal to expose political rivals initially took the side of the police and later realized the mistake too late though.
The government finally decided to act after last Saturday’s murder of Thirty-two year old Lingasami Devarasa, from Kokkadicholai who was gunned down in Dehiwala where he has been living for the past few months.
This came at a time when there was growing disillusionment within the military ranks and the country at large over the government’s stoic silence following the killings of military informants.
One thing that is certain is that without ‘inside’ help and a steady flow of information, the LTTE would not have been so successful in its hunting down informants.
A former Army Commander who said the military was fully aware of the names of those passing on information to the LTTE added that he sincerely wished that the government would not further delay taking action against these people.
Given the hard work by army officers to establish the necessary military intelligence network for the successful Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) popularly known as the deep penetration commando unit of the Sri Lanka Army he said, the government’s failure to crack down the LTTE pistol gang in Colombo comes as a major disappointment. The LRRP that claimed several victims was poised to get many LTTE top rungers by the time the ceasefire agreement was signed.
The government, he added, cannot afford to keep quiet about these killings as informants became really vulnerable following the leaking of information about the LRRP ammunition dump in Athurugiriya, a few days after the UNF came into office.
Just three months before this glaring blunder, September 26, 2001 thanks to the regular flow of information about the LTTE leaders, the LRRP killed Vaithilingam Sornalingam alias Col. Shakar, the head of Tiger military intelligence wing and founder commander of the LTTE Sea Tiger division, Air Craft and Air Wing division.
He was killed by triggering a claymore mine while travelling from Oddusudan to Puthukkudiyiruppu in a pick up vehicle.
Months before that, LRRP managed to kill Deputy Chief of Sea Tigers Gangai Amaran, Political Head of Batticaloa and Ampara, Nizam and Communication Chief of Eastern Tigers Mano by similar explosions.
The LTTE Political Wing Chief S.P.Thamilselvan, Deputy Military Wing Chief Balraj and Senior Commander Jeyam too came under attack by the deep penetration unit but escaped unscathed.
Thamilselvan had a narrow shave when a vehicle right in front of him was blown up by a claymore mine.
The man who led the LRRP team Captain Nilam, who would have otherwise been a war hero, it is learnt, is now in hiding as he is definitely number one in the hit list.
With the informants being regularly eliminated, there is also a growing fear among the retired servicemen whether they too would be targeted given the virulent and vindictive nature of the rebels.
At the rate the Tigers are gunning down informants, the former Army Commander said, that several retired flag ranking officers have expressed legitimate fears.
Nothing can be totally ruled out, he said, now that the LTTE is having a field day especially in Colombo and one should not be surprised if a retired military top brass suddenly dies “under mysterious circumstances”.
The elimination of informants have also re-kindled the debate as to whether the government made a blunder by agreeing to de-commission weapons of other military groups like the EPDP, PLOTE and EPRLF operating in the North and the East.
Most of these paramilitary cadres functioned as informants of the government troops and the disarmament of them under clause 1.8 of the ceasefire agreement, saw the LTTE stepping up its onslaught on these unarmed militant cadres.
One may argue that that disarmament of these cadres has helped streamline things and clear the ground as the government then have to deal with only one group- the LTTE that has the backing of an overwhelming majority of Tamil civilians.
However, others maintain irrespective of the political clout of these groups, they should be allowed to carry weapons as the LTTE has been given a chance to do so.
This is more so because a majority of them lately carried arms for self-defence rather than for combat purposes. The move to disarm them before decommissioning the LTTE was questionable.
Of all the militant groups, the EPDP is the most vulnerable being the strongest rival of the LTTE. Even the so-called champions of human rights based in Colombo are quiet about the regular killing of EPDP members including local level politicians.
Soliciting the services of paramilitary forces as military informants has been on since the beginning of the conflict and it was formerly recognized following the occupation of the Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF).
The EPRLF, which later held power in the North-East Provincial Council, was the first military group to co-operate extensively with the IPKF and it is no secret that those employed were amply rewarded by the Indian government for their services.
One of the first moves by the LTTE which regained control after the withdrawal of the IPKF obviously was to launch a major offensive on the other militant groups.
Since then these groups had to go through immense hardships for their survival and the Southern government more often than not used them to break the LTTE hegemony especially in the North.
However, it must be said that Tamil militant groups or individuals were not the only ones to be tagged by the LTTE as military informants.
Muslims, though majority of them remained impartial during the war, had to bear the brunt of LTTE harassment being designated by the latter as government informants.
One should not forget that the eviction of over 70,000 Muslims from Jaffna in 1990 by an LTTE decree giving them just 24 hours to vacate their abodes, came with the accusation that they sided with the Army and passed information to them about Tiger movements. Also the same year Tigers killed 64 Muslims in Nintavur the same year, hurling similar allegations at them.
Muslims all over the North and the East were generally treated as government “spies” by the LTTE and this attitude is partly attributed to the violence unleashed against them at regular intervals.
Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe on Monday appointed a three-member committee comprising Defence Secretary Austin Fernando, Army Commander Lionel Balagalle and Defence adviser Meril Gunaratne to submit a report proposing measures to be taken to prevent the LTTE killing those attached to the military intelligence.The move is likened to closing the stable door after the horse has bolted and one only wishes that in a few weeks time that there will not be cops and soldiers guarding the houses of personnel attached to the military intelligence, exposing them further.
It is proposed that the best way of ensuring the security of those who are in the hit list, is to provide a safe passage out of the country for them, at least for the time being.
Given Prabhakaran’s decree on the LRRP, which deprived him of several of his trusted and talented leaders, there is no doubt that priority should be given to the members of the LRRP who should be sent to safe havens.
However, equally or even more important is the tracking down of “inside men” who provide information to the Tigers.
It appears that the military top brass has a fair idea as to who is doing it and it’s a matter of eliciting such vital information professionally while guarding their identities.
One also wonders what the government intends doing with the information it gets through other sources, under different circumstances.
For instance it was reported in the newspapers that a 22-year old EPDP member Selliah Paraman who escaped from the LTTE custody a couple of weeks ago, had said, that a large number of government troops and members of other Tamil political parties are kept in LTTE custody, in underground cells in the jungles.
Has the government done anything in this connection?
What about the security of this EPDP member who is sure to have earned the wrath of the Tigers?
There are also reports of a masked pistol gangs operating in the East, which many feel belongs to an extremist group or groups, other than the LTTE.
Some masked men had recently flung a grenade at a group of Muslims in Jamaliyah, Trincomalee on Saturday.
Besides this, the killings in Mutur and the manner in which they were carried out all demand a thorough investigation and if one goes by what the people in Mutur have told the media it is clear that they know more about these pernicious elements.All these lead to the root cause of the failure of the government to track down undesirable elements- the need for a more vibrant integrated intelligence system through which information is received and shared by all forces and the police.
What we have today is a situation where one force jealously guards its information while a highly politicized National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) is preoccupied with collecting information about opposition politicians.
Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s government needs to treat and address all these shortcomings if it is genuinely keen on improving the intelligence services while keeping a tab on all insidious elements that threaten the national security, be they the LTTE, the Eastern gangs or the underworld.
The ‘safe house’ controversy (3 March 2004)
The mystery surrounding the army unit operating from a house at millennium city in Athurugiriya has deepened after revelations that Lohan Ratwatte has connections with a key member of the group and was in and out of the house.
The man in charge of the Tamil men found working out of this house with a unit of the Military Intelligence Directorate is a former PLOTE member by the name of Mohan alias Pillai – better known as ‘PLOTE Mohan.’
A para military member working with the Sri Lanka Army has confirmed to The Sunday Leader that ‘PLOTE Mohan’ and Lohan
Ratwatte have shared a close friendship for a considerable period of time.Lohan Ratwatte frequently visited the house at Athurugiriya after it was rented on December 7, last year, in the company of Mohan. The visits were all done with the full knowledge of Captain Shahul Hameed Nilam who was in charge of the unit. The house was rented from Captain Nilam’s wife, violating procedure laid down by the army.
Working on a tip-off
It was due to Lohan Ratwatte’s frequent visits to the safe house and the close connection to Mohan that Superintendent of Police Kulasiri Udugampola, was tipped off that one of the Ratwatte sons could be hiding there. When SP Udugampola raided the house in search of the Ratwatte brothers who were evading arrest, he came across a cache of weapons including highly destructive thermobaric flame throwers.
The whole incident would have passed off without much notice if not for the abortive cover up by the Army Commander Lt. General Lionel Balagalle. General Balagalle claimed that this safe house was used by the top secret long range recce patrol unit, and those arrested were members of this unit who have been credited with successful assassinations of LTTE leaders in the north and east.
The army commander, calling them ‘National Heroes,’ complained that the police had exposed the identity of this unit. This false story was also ‘sold’ to the newly appointed Defence Minister Thilak Marapona, who ordered an end to the police investigation. This however was anything but the truth.
Mohan, a close friend of Lohan Ratwatte, was originally a member of PLOTE. He has been named by the Human Rights Commission as one of the people responsible for massacre of civilians in Vandaramulla. After leaving PLOTE in the early 1990s, Mohan and some other Tamil cadres belonging to the PLOTE, began free-lancing for the army’s military intelligence unit. Mohan began carrying out various contract jobs in coordination with the army. The group of former rebels under ‘PLOTE Mohan’s’ command has always operated out of Batticaloa town.
Turning a blind eye on lavish lifestyles
Mohan was enlisted as a private in the army later that year and he and his group were paid cash rewards by the SLA. The amount of money paid depended on the importance of the LTTE member assassinated. In the mid 1990s, the Mohan group began to earn a reputation for being involved in extorting and blackmailing traders in Batticaloa. Members of this group also began to lead lavish lifestyles that superseded the money they were paid by the army. The army, for reasons best known to themselves, decided to turn a blind eye on these activities by the Mohan group.
Some members of Tamil group’s group told The Sunday Leader that they had met both Mohan and Lohan Ratwatte together. They said there were stories that Lohan Ratwatte and Mohan were involved in a protection racket and that the house in Athurugiriya was one such of the locations the protection racket was been operated.
One of the key players in the cover up of the Athurugiriya incident is Brigadier Kapila Hendawitharane, director of the military intelligence directorate of the army. Brigadier Hendawitharane was first introduced to Gen. Anuruddha Ratwatte by Lt. Col. M. D. Fernando. Fernando was sacked from the army in the 1970s by former president J. R. Jayewardene for allegedly attempting to do politics in the army. He was reinstated by the PA government in 1995. He wielded immense influence with General Ratwatte.
Brigadier Hendawitharane’s close relationship to Lt. Col. Fernando helped matters. The brigadier is married to a niece of Colonel Fernando. Brigadier Hendawitharane was fully aware of what was going on at the house at Athurugiriya. The director, MI, has known Mohan for a period of over ten years and is aware that Mohan’s group was never involved in the operations carried out by the long range recce patrol units of the special forces.
Brigadier H. K. G. Hendawitharane, on January 4, 2002, (two days after the police raid at Athurugiriya), wrote to the Investigating Officer of the Army, Gen. Ivan Dassanayake, stating that, “The arms, ammunition and other equipment issued to captain S. H. M. Nilam have been officially authorized by the director operations and the director military intelligence for the purpose of using them in covert operations in the uncleared areas of Batticaloa.”
In the letter, the head of military intelligence further claims that captain Nilam has already returned part of the weapons, and was in the process of handing over the balance at the time of his arrest by the police on January 2, 2002. For added measure, he states that the commander of the army is of the opinion that exposing this officer and soldiers and their activities to the media would lead to a threat to their lives and will discourage army personnel from undertaking such operations in the future.
Hendawitharane asserts that this letter is being submitted on the directions of the commander of the army, in order to assist the investigating officers in the ongoing investigations. What is interesting in this letter is the information that has not been divulged to General Dassanayake. For instance, when were the weapons released to Captain Nilam? When were they taken to Batticaloa? When were they brought back to Colombo and when was the first batch of weapons handed back to the army from the alleged safe house? Common sense would dictate that Captain Nilam would have handed back the thermobaric launcher immediately, knowing fully well the strict controls imposed by the army on its use based on worries that it would fall into the hands of the LTTE.
Obviously, the letter was intended to block any serious investigation by General Ivan Dassanayake into the activities of the Athurugiriya unit. This tantamounts to interfering with the investigation and influencing the investigating officer even before he had begun his inquiry.
The blatant lies and official pressure exerted on General Dassanayake not to proceed with any investigation raises the question as to what the army commander and the military intelligence chief are trying to hide. What needs to be ascertained is what exactly these men were doing at the Athurugiriya house fully armed with thermobaric and other arsenal sufficient to cause massive destruction.
The Sunday Leader has found that this was the first time four thermobaric weapons have been issued to members of the army outside an operational area. Not only was it issued to Captain Shahul Hameed Nilam’s group to be stored at the house at Athurugiriya, one weapon had been fired at the army camp at Panaluwa, where three former LTTE members now working for the military intelligence were trained by the army to fire the weapon.
Thermobaric weapons target
The men had been told their target would be a large motorcade including a bus. However senior military officers in Batticaloa point out that the LTTE in the east travel solely by motorbike and double cabs. They do not travel in motor.
(Sunday Leader)
New twist to Athurugiriya saga by Frederica Jansz
Despite a valiant effort to clear the house of an army officer at Athurugiriya, Millennium City of being an authentic fully fledged ‘safe house’ for the Sri Lanka Army, a continuing police investigation and court case has proved otherwise.
Interior Minister John Amaratunga reiterated that a recent report submitted by Senior DIG Crimes, H. M. G. B. Kotakadeniya is not conclusive. “Kotakadeniya does not maintain that the matter is closed or that this house at Millennium City, Athurugiriya was indeed a safe house,” the minister said.
Asserting that a full scale investigation into the case is still continuing, Amaratunga reiterated, “it is still a very doubtful situation – Kotakadeniya himself has pointed out that if indeed this was an army safe house, the army has failed to follow required criteria when maintaining such an operation.”
“It is definitely not correct to assume that the case has been closed or that this was indeed a safe house for the army’s special forces,” the Interior Minister said.
Unreliable report
A former elite Special Forces Commando, Col. Jayavi Fernando says Kotakadeniya’s statements are ludicrous to say the least. He has pointed out that the senior DIG did not even consult the investigating officer, Kulasiri Udugampola or refer court documents or speak to Interior Minister John Amaratunga or to any other army officer before compiling and concluding this report.
“Kotakadeniya appears to have sat at his desk and written this report – more from imagination than drawing from the facts surrounding this very serious issue,” he said.
“I am of the opinion that Kotakadeniya just questioned the army commander and Brigadier Kapila Hendawitharane and wrote his statement. There is no evidence to prove that Kotakadeniya questioned anybody other than the army commander and Hendawitharane. How could he have concluded a probe and written a report after recording the statements of only two people in this issue – how reliable and unbiased can such a report be?” Fernando questioned.
Col. Fernando who has operated out of numerous army safe houses during his tenure as a Special Forces Commando reiterated, the entire concept of a safe house was blown when neighbours at Athurugiriya have testified to police that the men in this house had identified themselves to neighbours as being intelligence agents from the army.
“If it was a safe house, how come an army vehicle daily carried meals for the occupants of this house from the Kohuwela army camp? If it is a safe house and top secret how can that happen?” Col. Fernando questioned.
He further pointed out that while former Deputy Defence Minister Anuruddha Ratwatte and President Chandrika Kumaratunga had been aware of this house, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and Defence Minister Tilak Marapone knew nothing, even a month after it was established.
If after all, the purpose of this operation was to protect national security and safeguard the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, why was the prime minister and the defence minister kept in the dark?
That is not all. Even the Joint Operations Commanding Chief at the time, Lt. Gen. Rohan de S. Daluwatte did not know anything about this so-called safe house. Neither did the army’s operations commander in Batticaloa.
If indeed these men were carrying out special offensive deep penetration operations in Batticaloa, surely the army’s commanding officer in the east would have been notified. And why was Daluwatte also kept in the dark?
Even Director Operations, Joint Operations Headquarters, Brig. Sumith Balasuriya was completely in the dark about the house at Athurugiriya and the soldiers that operated out of this house until the police raid. This is despite the fact that it is the JOH that is responsible for planning and coordinating all operations in the east.
Despite the army commander claiming that this outfit was part of the army’s Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol, neither the army chief nor the head of the Military Intelligence Corp. (MIC) have been able to prove that the men found at the Athurugiriya house have any record of carrying out deep penetration offensives in the country’s north and east.
Failing miserably
In fact, Captain Nilam has been medically certified by the army as being unable to perform any form of field duties. A senior army officer reiterated that if Capt. Nilam can prove that he has stepped out of an army camp in the east and walked one kilometre into the jungle, “it will be a miracle,” he said.
Major Najith Karunaratne in his statement says that the men at the Athurugiriya house consisted of an army driver, a batman and one informant.
If this was supposed to be a top secret safe house for the army, they failed miserably as even the private security employed by the management of the Millennium City housing complex have stated that they kept a regular check on the army vehicles which arrived to and from this house.
Meanwhile, ASP Kulasiri Udugampola on July 1 this year submitted to Minister Amaratunga a report on statements he has recorded from army officers concerned in this investigation. They are namely, the army commander, military intelligence director, MIC commanding officer, officer commanding Kohuwela Forward Headquarter’s MIC, officer commanding Headquarters BCO and about twenty other ranking officers.
All these statements were taken on the orders of the Kandy magistrate. Senior DIG Crimes, Kotakadeniya was also kept informed through the courts.
The police investigation has questioned why the stock of arms, ammunition and explosives were shifted from the Kohuwela army camp to this house at Millennium City a day after the General Election on December 5, 2001.
What was the reason that this stock of arms, ammunition and explosives were not subjected to the daily inspection of duty officers?
On whose orders were these weapons, explosives and other weaponry taken to the Millennium City safe house from the Kohuwela army camp immediately after the general election 2001?
Military clueless
With whom are the records pertaining to the movements of these weapons? Up to date military authorities have been clueless on this issue.
The T56 weapons sent from Batticaloa by Captain Karunaratne through Lt. Col. Jayaratne with specific instructions to deliver it to Army Headquarters MIC at Muttiah Road were not delivered, but handed over to W. O. I. Sunil of Kohuwela Forward Headquarters.
The officer who brought the three weapons to Colombo, namely, Jayaratne in his statement to police has admitted that he was coming home on leave on the day in question (November 8, 2001) from Batticaloa when the three T56 weapons were handed over to him by Captain Karunaratne in a fertilizer bag.
The three T56 weapons were brought to Colombo on November 8, 2001. Why the three weapons were concealed in a fertilizer bag and brought to Colombo is puzzling. This is not the normal way the army transports weapons. Three LTTE surrendees now enlisted as soldiers in the army were brought down from Batticaloa to Colombo on October 29, 2001, soon after the dissolution of parliament. They were brought down allegedly to gather LTTE related information in Colombo. Yet, the army has no record of any kind of the movements or duties performed by these three LTTE persons between October 29, 2001 and January 24, 2002.
Major Najith Karunaratne has in his statement said that it was only after this so called safe house was exposed that Director, Military Intelligence, Brig. Hendawitharane ordered him to issue a movement order in respect of these three ex-LTTE men.
The statement made by Army Chief Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle cannot explain for what purpose 66 sets of Tiger uniforms and a cyanide capsule were kept at the Millennium housing complex – unless the army were planning a LRRP operation in Colombo far away from the theatre of war.
Major Najith Karunaratne in his statement to police on February 15, 2002, has confessed that he kept the Thalangama police informed of the safe house which he conducted in the Battaramulla area. If so, why did Capt. Nilam keep the Athurugiriya police in the dark about the ‘safe house’ maintained at his personal residence at Millennium City?
There is no written order by any authority to transport these dangerous weapons from the Kohuwela army camp to the house at Millennium City.
On May 29, 2002, Army Commander Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle was questioned and his statement recorded. He stated that he has authorised the issue of arms for operations. He was asked the question as to whether he authorised the issue of weapons and explosives to be kept at the Millennium City house.
No permission
It transpired that although Balagalle has authorised the issue of arms for operations, he had not given any permission to transport weapons from Kohuwela army camp to the Millennium City house. He further states that this type of authority is not normally granted by the army commander.
This means that in this particular instance, these lethal weapons were kept in a private home other than in an army camp without the knowledge of the army commander. Balagalle has further stated that once a weapon is issued to an army officer there is no bar from him taking that weapon any where he wished.
Surely such a practice will only contribute to the increasing crime wave in this country apart from the fact that there must be a code of conduct for all army officers to adhere to when issued with a weapon/weapons?
Director Military Intelligence, Brig. Kapila Hendawitharane in his statement to police has admitted that he did not keep the police, Defence Ministry or any other authority informed of the existence of a safe house at Athurugiriya with lethal weapons and explosives.
Even the political authorities were not kept informed of an operation of this nature.
Capt. Nilam or any other responsible officer in the army has so far failed to produce any documentation regarding the transportation of these weapons between Kohuwela army camp, Millennium City and Batticaloa. This is in complete contravention of the Army Act.
From statements made to police, it has been revealed that Capt. Nilam kept these weapons and explosives in his room when he served at the Army’s Forward Headquarters MIC at Kohuwela instead of in the armoury in the same camp. As a result, these weapons were not subjected to the daily inspection of duty officers which is a requirement in terms of the Army Standing Orders.
Furthermore, he has not made any entries in the records when these weapons were being taken out of the army camp. This fact was established from statements made by the armourers attached to the Forward Headquarters MIC at Kohuwela, M. D. Sunil and Sgt. Munidasa.
Unanswered questions
What is astounding is that a team of army officers in total disregard of human life and safety measures were allowed to store thermobaric weapons, land mines, claymore mines, detonators etc., in a densely populated housing complex.
If there had been an accident, the entire Millennium City Housing Complex would have been flattened beyond redemption.
This is why Kotakadeniya has pointed out in his report that it is difficult to fathom why the army chose to run a safe house in Colombo nearly two hundred miles away from the theatre of war. This question remains unanswered by the army to date.
It has been proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the ‘army’ officers who were arrested at the Athurugiriya house were never part of the LRRP teams, which constitute of elite fighting units within the Sri Lanka Army.
LRRP officers who are picked from two units within the army, (1) commandos (2) special forces, perform top secret offensive operations without any monetary considerations and at great risk to their lives.
Sgt. Udulagama in his statement to police has stated that his team which were based at the Millennium City house in Athurugiriya were paid for each operation. A vehicle hired from Capt. Nilam’s wife (whose house had also been rented out by the army) was paid a monthly sum of Rs. 12,500 for the hire of this van bearing no: 54-8367.
Capt. Nilam’s brother-in-law also benefited from this operation. He was contracted to stitch 209 sets of Tiger uniforms for the army at a cost of Rs. 250,000. His vehicle too was regularly hired by the army for Rs. 2,000 per day.
This is the present status of the police inquiry. Far from being concluded, a comprehensive report on the issue is still pending and will detail the various offences the suspects should be charged with. All investigations, contrary to false rumours, have been carried out under the direction of courts.
(Sunday Leader)
Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol
Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol, or LRRP (pronounced and sometimes spelled “LuRP”), were special six-man teams of primarily Rangers utilized in the Vietnam War on highly dangerous special operations missions deep into enemy territory.
In the mid to late 1960s, the U.S. Army Special Forces trained these units for the purpose of locating enemy units in guerrilla warfare, as well as in artillery spotting, intelligence gathering, forward air control, and bomb damage assessment. Companies were organized into two platoons, each with eight six-man patrols. Their training was notoriously rigorous.
At the beginning of 1969, the LuRPs were folded into a reactivated Army Ranger unit.
They operated on reconnaissance and combat patrols, either obtaining highly vital intelligence, or performing highly dangerous raids and ambushes. The tactical employment of LRRPs was later evaluated to be generally used far too dangerously by strategic commanders, who were pleased by the extraordinary kill ratios for LRRPs teams (sometimes reported as high as 400 enemy troops for every LRRP killed). Their use was reconsidered and restructured into modern day Long Range Surveillance (LRS) units.
Writes one commentator: “During the course of the war LuRPs conducted around 23,000 long-range patrols, of this amount two-thirds resulted in enemy sightings. LuRPs also accounted for approximately 10,000 enemy KIA through ambushes, sniping, air strikes, and calling in artillery fire.”
Other units known as LRRPs can be found in some foreign militaries, such as those supposedly employed by India’s Directorate of Military intelligence. They have been very successful in covert operations against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the northern and eastern provinces in Sri Lanka. They were so successful that LTTE terrorist leaders were forced to come out of their jungle-bunkers after the 2002 ceasefire.
(Wikipedia)
Great Post. Thanks. Ranil Should ultimately take responsibility for this greatest of betrayals. Nowhere in history has a leader of a a nation surrendered a whole country’s territorial integrity to a group of terrorists in the way Ranil did with the ceasefire. We owe a debt of grattitude to all the men such as Capt. Nilam who put their lives in line for a country that elected leaders with neither balls nor brains such as Ranil only to be betrayed by those who put party politics ahead of national security. Ultimately Sri Lanka belongs only to those who had the courage to defend her.
Looking forward to learning a lot form the people here.
Peace
Rainbow Reef Fiji
All these traitors shall be stripped NAKED & shall be STONE to death incl. the GAY RANIL.
All their possesions shall be confiscated given as compensation to the officers of the LRRP unit & their co workers affected by the actions of these SCUM bags.
In the police dept. the highest officials incl. commanders of the ARMY who failed their SCARED DUTY to protect the National security & OUR beloved TROPERS shall be subject to a FIRING SQUAD for high treason.
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