The man who dared to hunt the Tigers by Marwaan Macan-Markar in Batticaloa

To meet him, you had to visit his camp by the side of the Batticaloa lagoon. It was heavily fortified with woodenv railway sleepers and sandbags. There were two armed men at the entrance. And within, where he saw guests in a small photo-lined room, were scenes you would encounter in any military camp: a few bunkers here, exercise bars there, and rolls of barbed wire to prevent infiltrators from sneaking in.

And an appointment was a must. For there were ‘operations’ he conducted suddenly. On that Thursday morning, for instance, he had been out on such a mission. His targets were three members of the Tiger pistol gang who had slipped into town. And like he always did, he had carried his 9mm Belgian-made Browning pistol. It was concealed under the striped T-shirt he loosely wore. But that day neither he nor his men were lucky. The Tigers had melted away by the time they arrived.

For 35-year-old Muthulingam Ganeshkumar, better known in the east by his nom de guerre, ‘Razik,’ it was a miss that barely produced a ripple of worry on his broad forehead. He shrugged it off with the ease of a man who felt he would be lucky the next time.

Looking at him, though, there was little that suggested the features of a Tiger hunter in the east. Seen on the street, with his receding hairline, the trimmed beard that framed his oval-shaped face and his paunch, he could have easily been mistaken for a businessmen or an NGO-wallah. Yet, that he was, and with a reputation, too – the Tiger hunter.

But little did Razik know that his life would come to an explosive end barely 48 hours later. For at 1:30 on Saturday afternoon, the Tigers struck back. They used one of the customary weapons in their armour: a suicide bomber. He ran towards Razik, who was standing outside a mechanic’s shop along the Trinco-Batti road, and detonated the bomb strapped to his body. Razik died on the spot.

If sympathisers of Razik expected the town to plunge into mourning, the mood on the streets that weekend would have been revealing. Hardly anybody rushed home and stayed within the safety of closed doors. Shops did not shut. In fact, on both Saturday and Sunday evening, given the spirit of Wesak celebrations in the air, hundreds thronged the narrow streets to enjoy the slice of entertainment in the form of a musical show, a few lanterns on display, and a motorcyclist performing in the Well of Death. The dead Tiger hunter was far from their minds.

But Razik’s role in Batticaloa will not be forgotten easily, particularly his doings since August 27, 1996, when he formed what many Tamils in this town came to know as the ‘Razik group.’ It threw up a unique chapter in the course of the current ethnic conflict. What Razik and his group did, hardly any other Tamil militant organisation had emulated. And what was that? To fight the Tamil Tigers along with the Sri Lankan army.

For that, of course, they received state assistance. Before joining, the 150 men, mostly Tamils and a few Muslims, were put through two months army training, including jungle warfare. In the form of military hardware, they were supplied with weapons such as rocket-propelled grenades, multi-purpose machine guns, light machine guns, 40 mm grenade launchers, and sniper rifles. And like enlisted soldiers, the men of the Razik group received a regular salary, too: Rs 9,000 per month.

Yet Razik admitted that his group was not part of the conventional army. And that despite them wearing khaki uniforms and participating in joint military operations to strike at Tiger camps in the east.

“We are the army’s special support group,” he said, adding, “We want to carry arms legally to fight the Tigers, and the only way we can do so is this way.”

Furthermore, he saw their contribution as an advantage to the army. “We speak the Tigers’ language, we know the region well, we know who is a Tiger, and once we were also like them, so we know their minds, their behaviour, and how they will act,” he declared. He had changed radically from his initial mission as a young militant.

It was as a boy of 13, in 1978, that he was first attracted to the Tamil militancy. At the time, the enemy was the Sri Lankan state. And during his teen years, he was as determined as his other youthful Tamil peers to snipe away at the government. The ideas of the EPRLF nourished him. And neither his mother, a teacher at that time, nor his father, employed in the local bureaucracy, could dissuade young Muthulingam Ganeshkumar.

Until the ’83, however, he was still labelled a militant. The anti-Tamil riots that July, however, changed it all. It was the spark that pushed him into a new realm: to be a rebel equipped with military skills. For he became one of the many hundreds of Tamil youths who slipped across to India to receive military training. In Razik’s case, the opportunity came in 1984. He joined a band of 121 destined for the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, in the Hindi heartland.

“I don’t know where exactly we were,” he admitted. “But it was good. We were given two-and-a-half mon- ths basic training, then a month of advance training, and after that three months to do commando work.”

On his return, Razik chose to stay in Mannar and visit the Jaffna peninsular, than head for Karativu, his village along the south-eastern coast of the island. For it was in the north that the Tamil militancy were displaying their strength. It was relatively quiet on the eastern front.

But if it was action that Razik wanted, he had to wait till the Indian Peace Keeping Force arrived in 1987. For his organisation, the EPRLF, began to receive favoured treatment. And when the EPRLF were given the licence by the Indians to create a Tamil National Army to handle security in the area, it was natural that the party hierarchy would turn to Razik for his skill. He knew very well that his guns would be pointed at the Tigers. Yet it did not pose a problem for him. Since like the rest of his EPRLF, he, too, had grave misgivings about the prevailing ideology of the Tigers. To him, they had become the new enemies of the Tamils. And such a sentiment was reflected when he spoke with delight in his voice about his attacks on the Tigers. “I have killed 237 of them when fighting alongside the IPKF,” he said.

That glory was short lived, though. With the IPKF being forced out of Sri Lanka by President Ranasinghe Premadasa, the Tigers returned to the east. And in Batticaloa, they set their sights on the men of the TNA who had hounded them till then. In December 1989, nearly 300 TNA members were mowed down in an orgy of Tiger fire. Many of the leaders sought shelter in the surrounding forests, and subsequently escaped to areas where the Tigers had no access, like the hill country. Razik was one of them.

But he was not done with the east, his home turf. After a stint in India between ’91 and ’95, he returned to renew his battle with the Tigers. His suggestion to create an armed wing of the EPRLF, like the PLOTE and the TELO had, went against the prevailing grain of his party. So he pursued another alternative. He created a national auxiliary force peopled by like-minded Tamils and Muslims from the east. As a result, he was made the commander the group.

For the people of Batticaloa, however, the Razik group soon became another nightmare forcing its way into their already fractured lives. Word began to spread about forced conscription and extortion. Human rights groups began to receive complaints about Razik and his men being abusive in town as well as villages like Manmagam, Pooncholai, and Thalavai. There were even instances when young Tamil boys had been taken in by Razik’s men and tortured. The latest victim, said one member of the Batticaloa Peace Committee, was a 20-year-old, who had been taken from his home and been severely assaulted. To them, Razik was more than just a Tiger hunter; he had become their latest tormentor. No wonder they sniggered when they had heard him say he wanted to help the Tamils, to protect their interests.

So it was hardly surprising that no tears were shed on the day he was killed.

Razik, then, was not only out of step with the people he wanted to save, but was also not in touch with the Tigers, who, he claimed, he knew well, and whose behaviour, he said, he had mastered.

It may be a while before another Tiger hunter, as passionate, surfaces.

(The Sunday Leader – 6th June 1 999)

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JVP poster blitzkrieg condemns LTTE killings by Munza Mushtaq

Hitting out at the Wanni LTTE faction yesterday, the Government’s main ally the JVP demanded an immediate stop to the LTTE killings and abductions.

The party has launched a protest to the slayings and kidnappings in yet another island-wide poster blitzkrieg in all three languages. The party has also condemned the killings of civilians by the Wanni LTTE faction. This is the second poster blitz by the JVP since it came to power in April this year. The earlier poster splash was to oppose the granting of the LTTE-demanded Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA).

The latest posters carry slogans, “Lets force and stop brutal killings and abductions by the Wanni Tigers,” and “Let’s condemn the killings of unarmed civilians carried out by the Wanni Tigers.”

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LTTE rationale for talks based on ISGA alone By Taraki

Why are the Tigers refusing restart peace talks with the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) on any basis other than their Interim Self Governing Authority proposal?

With each passing day, the opposition to the ISGA is gathering such irreversible momentum in the south that nobody in the Sinhala polity wants to touch it now. (I guess the UNP is just teasing the President by urging her to start talks on basis of the ISGA)

So why do the Tigers want the talks to resume only on the basis of the ISGA proposal?

First let me say that the LTTE’s insistence on the ISGA is a reaction to criticism that has traditionally been levelled against Tamil leaders who have negotiated with the GOSL for a political settlement to the ethnic conflict.

There is a strong body of political opinion in the northeast that talks on a final solution have always been a ruse employed successfully by every government in Colombo since 1956 to take the wind from the sails of the Tamil struggle.

According to this body of opinion, the GOSL would always come up with proposals calculated to buy enough time until the next election in order to keep its political opponents at bay and to prevent Tamils from agitating for their rights, foreclosing other options for taking forward their struggle.

Let me summarise the gist of this criticism in the words of a man who was once called the ‘brains’ of the Federal Party, V. Navaratnam.

“So, from time to time in the course of the struggle Tamil leaderships are likely to be subjected to tremendous pressure from friends and foes alike, both domestic and international, to sit down to talks and settle by negotiation. It is hard to imagine what there remains to talk or negotiate about. Have not the Tamils talked enough about every imaginable solution?

Have they not agreed to every possible formula for co-existence which accommodated the Sinhalese concern for the political unity of the island country?” (The Fall and Rise of the Tamil Nation p. 338)

If the Tigers start talks on the basis of a proposal by the GOSL their political bargaining power would be compromised, critics say.

Towards the tail end of the six rounds of talks between the LTTE and the UNF government critics in the northeast began to point out that the Tigers had compromised the political legacy of the Tamil struggle by aimlessly drifting along with the agenda set by the GOSL and foreign third parties.

Tigers could not ignore criticism in the Tamil press that the LTTE’s position at the talks should have firmly been based on the Vaddukkoddai Resolution of 1976, the mandate for a separate state at the 1977general elections and the Thimpu Principles of 1985.

The critics argued that the LTTE delegation should have clearly and unequivocally stated at each round of the peace talks that the parameters of their negotiations policy were based on this legacy.

Their argument may be paraphrased thus: “The political landmarks of a people’s struggle against a state also constitute their bargaining power; the main objective of states that wage wars to suppress ethnic or class struggles is to make the insurgent movements give up their original political goals; when states fail to do so through war they strive to roll back through negotiations the political gains made by insurgent movements; by unconditionally agreeing to the concept of internal self determination and by not prefacing their discussions with the political landmarks of the Tamil movement the Tigers compromised the hard fought political gains and historical legacy of the struggle”.

Attention was drawn to the fact that Israelis had scored a political coup by inveigling Arafat and his advisors into giving up the fundamental tenet of the ‘Palestinian Charter’ (the equivalent of the Thimpu Principles) – Israel’s right to exist as a state on the Palestinian homeland. Similarly the British succeeded in obfuscating the fundamental demand of the Irish Republican Army during the last round of negotiations following the Good Friday Agreement – that British military occupation of Northern Ireland should end.

The critics of the LTTE emphasised how talks between IRA/Sin Fein and UK saw a host of issues such as workers and women’s rights, which in the final analysis could be reduced to inequalities promoted by the presence of British military garrisons in Northern Ireland, coming to the fore at the expense of the fundamental problem, the root cause of the conflict.

The critics argued that the LTTE delegation had allowed the Sri Lankan government and its international backers a free hand to similarly obfuscate the core cause of the conflict that had brought the two parties to the negotiating table in the first place. Tamils consider the Vaddukoddai Resolution, the 77 mandate and the Thimpu Principles the political manifestation of the core cause of the ethnic conflict. Therefore the LTTE delegation should have resolutely opposed all attempts by the GOSL and its foreign backers to obfuscate or detract from the core cause of the conflict, according to the critics.

The bargaining power of the Tamils was predicated not only on the LTTE’s military power but also on the accumulated political legacy of the struggle defined by Vadukkoddai, 77 and Thimpu, they averred.

Apparently Pirapaharan himself had similar concerns about the manner in which from Sattahip to Oslo, the GOSL and its international supporters were tying to roll back the political legacy of the Tamil cause, debilitating thereby the bargaining power of the Tamils.

Hence he personally intervened to make a radical course correction. The ISGA was the result. The proposal’s preamble embodies the gist of the course correction made by Pirapaharan.

The LTTE’s position appears to be that any future negotiations could be fruitful only if the GOSL and the Sinhala polity agree on the core cause of the conflict of which the Tamil political legacy as formulated in the ISGA’s preamble is considered the fundamental expression.

The Tigers feel that if they were to accept any proposal by the GOSL as a basis for resuming talks it would again trap them in another round of attempts by Colombo and its foreign backers to obfuscate the root cause of the conflict, weakening LTTE’s political leverage before it can obtain anything concrete as interim relief through the negotiations.

The Tigers, the Tamil National Alliance and many Tamil opinion makers also say that talks on a final settlement is an old ruse to drag the talks on and on indefinitely until kingdom come.

They argue that if they commit themselves in principle to discuss any proposal (or counter proposal) by the United People’s Freedom Front government then they would fall into the same old trap – talking shop for years about constitutional convolutions sans the slightest clue as to how the constitution can be radically restructured to accommodate even the bare minimum of Tamil aspirations. They also say that attempts to make them commit on restarting talks on the basis of a parallel GOSL proposal is an insidious ploy to roll back the Tamil political legacy, ultimately damning it to oblivion in an assimilative niche of the unitary state.

The words of an academic who was involved in the discussions that led to the ISGA sum it up.

“Why should our political legacy, achieved at so great a cost, be compromised before we even know whether a southern consensus to change the constitution is ever going to be possible?”

But no leader in the south has time to ponder this deadlock because the Presidential race is approaching fast.

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India and Sri Lanka: The emerging future By N. Ram

It means a great deal to me, intellectually and personally, to be here to deliver the Dissanayake Memorial Lecture on the tenth anniversary of his terrible assassination in the midst of a presidential campaign that turned out to be a watershed. I am deeply honoured by this invitation from Srima Dissanayake and the Gamini Dissanayake Foundation, and by the presence of such a quality and, shall I say, not just bi-partisan but multi-partisan audience.

There is a wide choice of themes, ideas and values that can be taken up when we commemorate this brilliant political leader, intellectual, and statesman, this multifaceted personality, my friend Gamini. This lecture provides me the opportunity to explore a relationship – representing a problematic as well as a historic opportunity – that was close to his heart, to which he gave a great deal of thought, to the shaping of which he made a profound and, at the end, shining difference. Since there is clearly a connection between the India-Sri Lanka relationship and certain key aspects of Sri Lanka’s principal national question, the ‘ethnic’ or Tamil question, I shall attempt to provide some kind of reality check on what is, or is not, unfolding before our eyes as part of my analysis of the emerging future.

If the India-Sri Lanka Agreement of July 1987, highly controversial and divisive in its time, has substantive content, values and lessons to communicate to us today; if that conceptual framework for the resolution of Sri Lanka’s principal national question is more or less the working model for those who are seeking to resolve it within the island state’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity; if the pre-eminent dispute of the present is over the nature and content of interim administration in the North and East that the peace process is struggling to put in place at this critical stage, then the breakthrough but unsuccessful project of the 1980s and, underpinning it and urging it forward against formidable odds, Gamini’s vision and new thinking are very much alive.

If this sounds like a rhetorical flourish, please re-read his conceptually inspiring, very concrete “Vision for the 21st Century” presented during the 1994 presidential election campaign. Please re-read carefully his approach to both constitutional reform and “Devolution and the Resolution of the North-East Conflict,” his re-considered response to the challenge of settling the content and unit of devolution for the North-East within the framework of a united but clearly not unitary Sri Lanka. And please revisit what he had to say on why he gave his “fullest support to the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord” and also why Sri Lanka’s first devolution experiment for the North-East did not take off the ground. The great thing about Gamini was his loyalty to the principles and the basic framework of a just political solution brought on to the agenda by the accord. Through thick and thin, in season and out of season, he spoke up for the essentials of the attempt while being prepared to heed the lessons of its failure – and to move forward.

Gamini’s vision and practice are also of much guidance when we seek to second-guess the emerging future of the India-Sri Lanka relationship. Let me offer this simple proposition, which may appear paradoxical on the face of it. The connection between the ethnic or Tamil question and the Indo-Sri Lanka bilateral relationship, which was direct and perfectly obvious between 1983 and 1991, has become less direct and more difficult to assess in the post-1991 period. But with a vital lesson learned, an important course let me add, by way of disclosure, that I was in Sri Lanka as a journalist seeking to interview President Jayewardene but with an interest and, as it turned out, a role going beyond journalism. My interaction and friendship with Gamini had begun with a message I received from him through a common friend, quite appropriately during a cricket Test in Madras (we shared a passion for cricket), asking me to come to Colombo for an important discussion. President Jayewardene asked me frankly to discuss the situation, as I understood it, with both Gamini and Lalith Athulathrnudali. At that time, they had quite different perspectives on how to respond to the crisis in India-Sri Lanka relations.

What impressed me during that first meeting, in February 1987, was the depth and profundity of Gamini’ s concern over the deteriorating situation and the fact that he seemed so level-headed about it. He quickly acquainted me with the new thinking at the top in Colombo as well as with the political problems within the establishment. What followed, between February 1987 and March 24, 1990, when the IPKF completed its de-induction from Sri Lanka under unhappy circumstances, was akin to a historical adventure, some would say, misadventure.

This is not the occasion to go into the detail of the experience. Suffice it to say that the project proved costly, in terms of lives lost and resources expended, and failed to achieve its two key objectives – the institution of genuine devolution of power for the Tamil people and the other ethnic groups in a merged North-East, and an end to the armed secessionist struggle waged by the LTTE. But the direction set and the ideas and instrumentalities brought to the national agenda by the audacious project can be said to have had a seminal importance and influence.

A considerable literature, of rather uneven quality and reliability, has developed on Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict and, specifically, on India’s post-1983 role. The academic contributions aside, a key actor, J.N. Dixit – India’s High Commissioner in Colombo between 1985 and 1989, subsequently Foreign Secretary, and now National Security Adviser to Prime Manmohan Singh – has given us an interesting account as well as a critical analysis in Assignment Colombo (Konarak Publishers, New Delhi, 1998). More recently, he returned to the theme of India’s Sri Lanka policy, past and present, in a 50-page essay published in External Affairs: Cross-Border Relations (Roli Books, New Delhi, 2003).

Dixit has some specific criticisms of the activist, interventionist phase of India’s Sri Lanka policy. He offers useful insights into the post-1983 as well as the post-199l policy shifts. About Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s approach, he says, I believe, justly: “it was not her intention to support the demand for Eelam. If India were to endorse. . . [ that] demand…it would find it difficult to maintain its own unity and integrity, facing as it did the challenges of separatism in Punjab and Kashmir.” (p. 60, ibid.) He notes that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi introduced significant changes in the policy: “India should firmly oppose the Sri Lankan government’s military operations against Tamils.. .More direct political pressure had to be generated against Jayewardene to implement the devolution package that had been finalised in negotiations between 1985 and 1986… If India succeeded in the above two objectives, it should persuade Tamils to come back to the negotiating table.. .If these negotiations succeeded. ..India should directly guarantee the implementation of the solution in one form or the other through appropriate agreements.. .[and] India, apart from being a mediator should become the guarantor of compromises…” (p 64 ibid)

But what Dixit offers essentially is a realpolitik analysis: “India’s involvement in Sri Lanka, in my assessment, was unavoidable not only due to the ramifications of Colombo’s oppressive and discriminatory policies against its Tamil citizens but also in terms of India’s national security concerns due to the Sri Lankan government’s security connections with the U.S., Pakistan and Israel” (p. 58, ibid.)

My assessment of the whole experience is rather different. It is much more critical of the fundamental tenets of India’s post-1983 policy, and of the effects on the ground of the practice. As one who believed in this policy, and advocated it, until it collapsed around 1990- 91, I have no problem in recognising now that it was schizoid and deeply flawed.

On the one hand, the basic political objective of India’s activist policy was honourable and moderate. It was to help win security, justice and a decent measure of selfadministering opportunities for the Tamils living in the North-East within the confines of Sri Lanka’s unity and territorial integrity. Crucially, it ruled out any truck with the Eelam demand. Imagine what would have happened in Sri Lanka had political India, and not just a chauvinist fringe or a small political section in Tamil Nadu, espoused the secessionist demand. Imagine what might have happened had support for Eelam rather than a substantial measure of devolution within the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka been the basis of official Indian policy in the 1980s.

On the other hand, the policy worked on the constant assumption that in order to put pressure on the Sri Lankan government,’ it was necessary to build up the armed militant groups, above all the LTTE, in various ways. This was realpolitik. This was democratic India’s way of putting pressure on the political negotiations, Among other things, it involved the old-fashioned dilemma of ends versus means, It was also akratic,

Today the political consensus in India is that this schizoid policy, which was partly of India’s making and partly a consequence of the spill-over of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict into Tamil Nadu and therefore of Sri Lankan manufacture, proved disastrously counter-productive. This despite India’s honourable, moderate intentions and its willingness to go the distance through the sacrifice of the lives and limbs of a few thousands of Indian soldiers. It is another matter that the limited but very significant military successes scored by the IPKF against the LTTE were undone- through own goals scored by the Sri Lankan state after the IPKF was brought home.

(To be continued)

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Four Karuna loyalists shot in Wellawatte by Kurulu Kariyakarawana

Four Karuna loyalists who survived a recent hand bomb attack allegedly by an LTTE Wanni cadre at Nagaswatta, Welikanda were shot allegedly by an LTTE armed gang on Monday night in Wellawatta, killing one of them on the spot and critically injuring the others.

The four Karuna men who were in a safe house at Roxy Watta, near Roxy Cinema in Wellawatta were surprised by the LTTE gang around 9.15 pm.

The four cadres who had been rushed to the National hospital in a critical condition following the hand bomb attack at Welikanda on October 11, had been discharged hours before they were sprayed with bullets. They were brought to the safe house in Wellawatta prior to their departure to the East.

The victims were rushed to Kalubowila hospital by Wellawatta police and one of them was later transferred to the National hospital in a critical condition.

The four cadres had been identified as Sivarasa, Sinnaeasa, Rasadil and the deceased, Murthi.

DIG Colombo division H.M.S. Herath said the assailants had reportedly fled on a motorcycle after the attack.

A special police motorcycle squad was immediately deployed to apprehend the fleeing suspects.

Wellawatta police are conducting investigations.

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Prabhakaran: Bitter end ahead with no successor by Champika Liyanaarachchi

“The top leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Mr. V. Prabhakaran was killed in a shoot-out by the Mr. Mahattaya faction of the LTTE a few days ago”.

That was the opening paragraph of a report carried in The Hindu newspaper on July 24, 1989 under the headline ‘Prabhakaran reported killed in shoot-out’.

At that time Prabhakaran was only 35. In roughly a month he would turn 50.

The Tiger leader has been among the top world rebel leaders, including Osama bin Laden, to be killed several times over.

When Prabhakaran made the Mahaveerar Day speech from Wanni last year, hours after his controversial meeting with EU External Commissioner Chris Patten, he had his Eastern Commander and blue-eyed-boy Karuna organizing similar celebrations in the East.

Four months later Karuna has fallen out with his boss and even as Prabhakaran gets ready to celebrate his 50th birthday, his tormentor has started a new party and has had the audacity to call Prabhakaran a barbarian and had urged the Tamils to rise against the LTTE leadership.

Despite the regionalism call by the former Eastern Commander, the fact that Prabhakaran is still very much in control of the organization even his detractors would concede. But for how long?

The elusive leader made his way up in the eighties, reigned in the nineties and has been largely calling the shots even four years into the new millennium.

The reason behind this feat – apart from the steady flow of money and military hardware – is to state it in Prabhakaran’s own words – confidence.

“Our strength – and our weakness – was our overconfidence”, Prabhakaran once observed in an interview with Indian journalist Anita Pratap which appeared in a Time magazine in April, 1990.

“We were sometimes careless. But also because of our overconfidence our boys carried out some amazing tasks,” he was quoted as saying.

However none of these would guarantee that things would be the same for him in the years to come.

Velupillai Prabhakaran is no more a ‘young leader’ in the organization once termed that of the ‘boys’ and even now is largely made up of youngsters.

On the other hand, as a result of the ceasefire, his ‘young leaders and cadres’ have got the kind of freedom and opportunities that he himself had never enjoyed as a rebel. Karuna is just one of many.

All this is taking place at a time when several development projects have been initiated especially by the INGOs, providing employment to local youth and also the kinds of facilities that were never available earlier.

There is a steady building up of capacities, especially in the North.

Could Prabhakaran sustain the momentum of the organization against the backdrop of these developments which are not at all complementary to the LTTE thinking? In fact these developments are fast changing the picture of the rebel-held areas shattering the very premises on which the Tiger ideology is based on.

A majority of analysts are of the view that the ‘end’ of Prabhakaran will also mark the ‘end’ or at least the decline, of the LTTE.

The only time the Sri Lankan forces managed to get close to him in the recent past was, during an operation in 2001 by the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) when its personnel managed to plant two Claymore mines along a road frequented by Prabhakaran.

However, the mines were later detected by Prabhakaran’s security retinue and were destroyed.

The powerful Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) which has been targeting him since the late 1980s has so far failed to accomplish the task.

The LTTE’s aversion to Indian de-mining teams is largely attributed to the organization’s perennial fear that RAW members would infiltrate under the guise of mine clearing.

But, the biggest threat to Prabhakaran’s life is still Karuna.

It is most likely that Karuna has intensified his resolve to exterminate Prabhakaran – a task which appears near impossible – espicially after the Wanni cadres gunned down his brother Regi.

Then there are several dozens of members and supporters of parties like the EPDP, the EPRLF and the TELO who continue to face the Tiger guillotine along with Karuna’s men.

Given a chance, there may be thousands of people, among the Tamils alone, who would volunteer to gun down the LTTE leader for his atrocities.

It was only a few days ago that Karuna said that the LTTE supremo had killed over 20,000 Tamils.

However, getting close to Prabhakaran will always remain one of the most daunting tasks.

The withdrawal of the IPKF in March 1990 gave the LTTE leader an aura of invincibility and the years that passed by had only gone to prove this further.

This coupled with the element of mystery surrounding him with very little information about him reaching the media have made him an elusive character.

Prabhakaran however was demystified to a certain extent at the April 10, 2002 press conference and during meetings with several southern leaders, diplomats and international leaders.

But the million-dollar question is whether the LTTE leader is actually pushing forward the peace process? If not what are the plans Prabhakaran has for the rebel outfit after him?

He has not groomed a successor and the one that many thought would perhaps succeed him, had finally defected.

Leave alone grooming a successor, he has learnt the dangers of allowing other leaders to become popular.

The extra-ordinary fanaticism with which he had fought one of the most ruthless wars for nearly two decades and the killings that he continues to carry out, have left him with nearly fifteen thousand youth who are only trained to kill and destroy. Only a handful of youths are trained for administrative work.

What is he going to do with this army, in the years to come, with war gradually becoming an option of history despite the escalation of violence – which is largely restricted to the LTTE and other Tamil parties?

Narayan Swamy in his book ‘Inside an Elusive Mind’ has said that if the peace process fails, then “the destiny of Sri Lanka with its 20 million people would still be in the hands of one man: Velupillai Prabhakaran”.

However, whatever decisions taken by Prabhakaran are very much influenced by the international trends on terrorism, the pulls and the pushes.

However much the Tigers deny the fact, it was all too obvious that the Tiger decision to come to the negotiation table had a lot to do with the post 9/11 situation, especially the hardened stance of the United States on terrorism.

Despite the outward composure in the face of a series of verbal attacks, the fact that the US reprimands hit raw nerves of the LTTE became evident by the manner the LTTE got the TNA to issue a statement on the controversial comments made by State Department Coordinator on Counter-terrorism J. Cofer Balck.

Just like hundreds of terrorist outfits all over the world the Tigers too must be praying that Senator John Kerry will beat President George Bush at next month’s elections – a scenario which some feel would give global terrorism some breathing space.

Some have already predicted that the LTTE, with its South African connections, would get the black senators in the US Congress to allow its voice to be heard. With the LTTE gaining a foothold in mainstream politics in neighbouring Canada and clout in many other European states this is a possibility that one cannot rule out easily.

Twenty eight years after he formed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam with a couple of dozen youths at the age of 22, Velupillai Prabhakaran has managed to upgrade his organization to an international enterprise as he approaches his 50th birthday – killing tens of thousands of people including national leaders and fostering links with the bulk of the international terrorist groups.

With warrants hanging over his head like the Sword of Damocles, especially one from India, the freedom of movement he would be able to enjoy even after a negotiated settlement is reached, is likely to be very limited.

Prabhakaran most probably will live to celebrate his 50th birthday which is just a month away and for which grand preparations are already underway.

However, with the kind of cold-blooded atrocities he has committed, and judging by the kind of natural, inevitable punishments that awaited such fanatics in history, Velupillai Prabhakaran is very unlikely to see a peaceful end to his life, the day that he falls.

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High Security Zone violates FR of the homeless by S.S. Selvanayagam

When two fundamental rights violation petitions against the Army for arbitrarily, illegally, unlawfully and unreasonably preventing petitioners from occupying their own houses situated in the Palaly High Security Zone, were taken up before the Supreme Court yesterday (25), State Counsel U. Egalahewa told court that he had sought instructions from the Army to ascertain whether the petitioners could be permitted to cultivate and put up temporary structures.

The Bench comprised Chief Justice Sarath N. Silva, Justices T.B. Weerasuriya and N.K. Udalagama. These matters were listed to be mentioned on December 12.

The petitions have been filed by TULF Jaffna District Parliamentarian Mavai Senathirajah and V.Rajadurai.

Mavai Senathirajah cited Defence Minister Chandrika Kumaratunga, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, Army Commander Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle, Jaffna Security Forces Commander, Major General Parami Kulatunga and the Attorney General as respondents.

Mavai Senathirajah in his petition inter alia stated that he and his family had been living in the house owned by his wife at Maviddapuram. In June 1992, they were compelled to move out of their house in Maviddapuram alongwith several other families due to military operations by the Air Force and the Army. Since then they have been living elsewhere.

He wrote to the Chairman of the Resettlement and Rehabilitation Authority for North (RRAN) requesting that he be permitted to return to his village. Although the RRAN recommended that he be permitted to resettle and forwarded his letter to the Army Commander for necessary action, he was not permitted to return.

After the signing of the Cease-fire Agreement between the Government and the LTTE, the Government permitted resettlement in certain areas in the AGA divisions of Valikamam North, in which Maviddapuram is also situated.

Senathirajah wrote to the Defence Minister complaining that the Army was unlawfully preventing him from resettling and to direct the Army not to deny him the right to live in his village.

Initially, he was informed that the matter had been referred to the Army Commander for necessary action. However, after Senathirajah wrote to the Army Commander, drawing his attention to his earlier letter, he was informed that his request could not be accommodated since his house was located within the “Palaly High Security Zone”.

He contends that the decision of the respondents not to permit him and his family to occupy their house, is a violation of his rights to equality, freedom to engage in a lawful occupation, freedom from movement and his right to choose a residence within Sri Lanka and that the said violations are continuing to date.

President’s Counsel K. Kanag-Iswaran with M.A.Sumanthiran and V.Ganeshalingam instructed by Mohan Balendra appeared for the petitioners.

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WAPS appeal to Counter Terrorism Secretariat – Norway violates UN resolutions by Dr. D. Jayasuriya

The World Alliance for Peace in Sri Lanka (WAPS) and the Society for Peace, Unity and Human Rights (SPUR) wish to bring to your attention that Norway has failed as a “facilitator” in Sri Lanka primarily because it violates UN resolution 1373. Peace in Sri Lanka too has failed to progress to a satisfactory end mainly because Norway has failed to honour its legal and moral obligations under UN Resolution 1373, as will be shown later.

It is our contention that neither the long-term peace process, nor the short-term Ceasefire Agreement signed on February 22, 2002, will provide any hope for the future as long as Norway is permitted to override legal provisions that prohibit terrorism and related activities in all its forms. This is a serious issue that should be dealt with by the counter-terrorism Committee as it is has global implications for peace processes and the threat to global stability and peace from threats of terrorism.

Under provisions of UN Resolution 1373 Norway is obliged to

1. criminalize the willful provision or collection, directly or indirectly, funds for terrorism;

2. freeze resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit terrorist acts either by their nationals or those in their territory.

3. prevent suppressing the financing of terrorist acts and

4. prohibit their nationals or any person and entities within their territories from making any funds, financial assets or economic resources available to terrorists.

Norwegian authorities claim that they cannot combat the terrorist activities of the LTTE because the Sri Lankan government has lifted the ban on the LTTE as a terrorist organization. It could also be argued that it would be difficult for them to be a “facilitator” and win the confidence of the LTTE if they ban it as a terrorist organization. The underlying idea here is to present Norway as a non-partisan “facilitator” acceptable to both sides. But this claim to be a non-partisan “facilitator” ceases to be valid the moment Norway opens its doors to the agents of the LTTE to operate freely within its borders. Norway argues that the policy of non-interference with the activities of the LTTE is pursued in the name of peace. But it has three direct results:

a) It violates International Law and national laws. This is self-explanatory. The philosophy behind this was summarized succinctly by His Excellency Kofi Annan when in a recent BBC broadcast he stated: “Every nation that proclaims rule of law at home must respect it abroad.” This principle applies to Norway in every respect. A state that permits terrorist groups to function freely within its borders knowingly that it has committed crimes against humanity, war crimes such as conscripting children as soldiers are deemed to be violating international laws, rule of law and humanitarian laws.

b) It defeats the declared purpose of Norway being a “state/facilitator” to bring peace because by appeasing one side — particularly the side that violates the Ceasefire Agreement and commits acts of terrorism — it has sowed deep suspicions of its role as an impartial and objective middle-man to the other side and

c) Undermines the very purpose of bringing peace to Sri Lanka because Norway has become a safe haven for the agents of LTTE who to this day has shown no signs of ceasing its terrorist activities. Norway’s credibility of being a “peace-maker” has been placed in doubt when its territory is being used to collect funds to commit acts of terrorism against all communities in Sri Lanka, including the Tamils.

The role of Norway, a state/facilitator, has raised five central issues:

1) Can a “state/facilitator” be allowed to violate the principles and purposes of international law as expressed explicitly in UN Resolution 1373?

2) Can a “state/facilitator” place itself above international law in the name of peace and open the doors to terrorism and its related activities within its borders?

3) Can a “state/facilitator”, on the one hand, violate the fundamental principles of UN Resolution 1373, enunciated to combat terrorism, and, on the other, hope to bring peace in the terrorized domain?

4) Isn’t UN Resolution 1373 based on the basic principle that the encouragement of terrorism by any one of its member states leads to destabilization of global peace?

To what extent can the UN allow its member states to violate its laws in the name of peace, particularly when the terrorist groups exploit the loopholes and/or leniency to strengthen its forces and resort to crimes against humanity?

To take the concrete example of Sri Lanka, Norway’s entry as a state/facilitator has been compromised by its refusal to abide by the legal provisions expressed in Resolution 1373. It cannot hope to bring peace in Sri Lanka whle allowing the LTTE to raise funds, permit the LTTE agents operating in Norway to threaten, attack and vilify non-LTTE Tamils who are domiciled in Norway, provide a haven for LTTE agents, open its banks as centers of collecting funds for the terrorist activities of the LTTE, etc. In short, can “peace-facilitators” encourage and legitimize terrorism that is undermining its own peace process?

We submit to you following information on Norway’s direct assistance to the LTTE and request you to take required action in terms of your Committee.

1. Evidence of the well-known LTTE front organizations’ operations carrying out propaganda collecting funds in Norway.

Some of the front organizations functioning in Norway are as follows:

i) Tamil Co-Ordinating Committee, Norway

Pb 1699 Vika, 0110, Oslo.

ii) Tamil Rehabilitation Organization

P.O. Box 4742, Sofienberg, 0506, Oslo.

iii) Tamilsk resurs-og veiledningssenter

a. Nedra Rommen 3,0988 Oslo.

b. P.O. 135 Furuset, 1001 Oslo.

iv) Tamilsk Ungdoms Forum

P.B. 118, Blindern, 0313, Oslo.

v) Tamilsk Kvinne Organization

P.B. 6678, Rodelokka, 0502, Oslo.

vi) Tamil Development Network

Vestregata 64, 9008, Tromso.

viii) Tamil Sangam i Norge

P.B. 127, Stonner, 0913, Oslo.

2. Norway Government and Norway government-funded NGOs continue to finance the LTTE front organizations of the LTTE.

We give below the funds received from year 2000 to 2004 by the LTTE fronts.

Integration funds from Oslo Municipality

2000-kr 130,000

2001-kr 100,000

2002-kr 116,000

2003-kr 95,000

2004-kr 100,000

Government Funds for the LTTE front organization voluntary work

2000-kr 30,000

2002-kr 72,000

2003-kr 130,000

2004-kr 95,000

Government funds for the LTTE fronts

2000-kr 203,430

2001-kr 144,960

2002-kr 137,550

2003-kr 168,250

2004-kr 191,320

(Source — Oslo Municipality, Dept Leader Trond Borgeresen as per their letter 22.6.2004).

3. Norway donations of Hi-Tech radio equipment to the LTTE (Asian Tribune of 22.7.2004)

India has warned Sri Lanka of these facilities LTTE possess to track down telephone conversations and locations. Asian Tribune reports states. “The LTTE can track down even telephone conversations by the officials in the Presidential Secretariat of Sri Lanka through remote-sensing radio transmitting devises which have been provided by Norway in 2002, when helping the purchase and importing radio transmitting equipment in 2002. India also pointed out that LTTE was able to locate telephone conversation between Sachi master with Tamil Broadcasting Corporation through their remote sensing devise and they subsequently managed to slay him inside the Batticaloa prison through one of their inmates.” Since signing the CFA in February 2002 nearly 180 political opponents have been killed by the LTTE, in most cases helped by the tracking down facilities of sensitive hi-tech equipment provided by Norway.

4. Norway has no restrictions on the funds remitted by the LTTE fronts in Norway to Sri Lanka for funding of the LTTE terrorists.

The following information indicates the extremely high level of funds remitted to Sri Lanka by the LTTE fronts.

Total Funds Trade Balance

remitted from Aid (in Norwegian

Norway to Sri Kroners)

Lanka 2003

365 m 70 m 202 m 93 m

Source — Estimates based on figures received from Bank of Norway (transfers less than NOK 250,000 — are not included in above figure)

It can be easily be assumed that 75% of the transfers are from the LTTE fronts in Norway to LTTE related organizations in Sri Lanka.

It is also a well-known fact that Norway acts as the banking centre for the LTTE funds collected in Europe, North America. Col Karuna who was a inner circle member of the LTTE until he parted company in an interview with London based Tamil Broadcasting Corporation as reported in the Asian Tribune of 18.8.2004 said “Money collected for terrorism activities in Sri Lanka are banked in the monetary institutions in Denmark and Norway… “He alleged that Norway Government has helped the LTTE with banking money collected from expatriate Tamils and other questionable sources, intended to be used in future for violent terrorist activities against the Government and the people of Sri Lanka.”

5. Norway’s organized visits for the LTTE representatives to Rene Special Forces camp in Norway.

On April 1, 2003 the Norwegian Government, knowing very well that the LTTE representatives were members of a group who believe in armed violence, took them on a conducted tour of the military camp. The Norwegian government argued that this was to enable the LTTE peacekeepers understand their techniques. To our knowledge, there is an obvious contradiction in “peace-makers” being shown military exercises. We are of the view that it was a familiarization visit for the members of the terrorist group to get first hand information about operations inside a specialist camp. This is perhaps the first time the members of the Tamil Tigers were given access to military camp in the developed world. About 15 years ago, some groups of Tamil Tigers received training in PLO camps and later in Indian camps. The visit to Rena lasted for four hours.

6. Arrest of a Norwegian National, Christy Reginald Lawrence, in April 2000 in Phuket, Thailand.

When the Thai police raided Christy Reginald Lawrence’s speedboat they found advanced communications equipment, LTTE training videos, weapons and military uniforms. Later, they found a half built submarine in a nearby shipyard. Lawrence was given bail in Thailand and went back to Norway. Since, then Norway has not taken any action about this treacherous act. The fact that no action was taken by Norway to further investigate the anti-Sri Lanka, pro-Tamil Tiger activity of this Norwegian National proves that either the Norwegian government was directly involved in assisting the Sea-Tigers wing of the LTTE or helped them by engaging in a cover up act.

(Ret http://tuxt.attenposten,no/nyneter/urlka/8292516htm)

(www.rediff.com)

It is also reported that the Norwegian ex-special forces had trained the LTTE’s Sea-Tiger wing.

(http://www.lankaweb.com/news/items03/121103-5htm)

7. Norway government officials take part in Tamil Tiger front propaganda and fund collection meetings.

Recently in Oslo, when the Tamil Sangam, a well known LTTE front organization had a propaganda meeting Norwegian government officials such as Mr. K. M. Bondevid, Prime Minister, Erna Solberg, Minister of Local Government, Lisa Golden of the Foreign Ministry and Eric Solheim, the Special Adviser to the Foreign Ministry were present. The meeting openly collected funds and Prabhakaran’s photographs and photographs of armed attacks carried out by the Tigers against the SL government were displayed.

At this meeting V. Balakumaran, the trainer of suicide squads of the LTTE who had been granted a visa by the Norwegian Government, addressed the gathering and openly stated that the LTTE planned to use suicide bombs in the event of a war, according to Danish newspapers. He also said that the LTTE would not allow opponents to damage the organization, with the inference that such opponents would be killed.

The sponsors of the propaganda meeting, the Tamil Sangam had been helped by way of Norwegian Government and municipal funding.

8. There are a number Norwegian police and intelligence reports on visa scandals of the LTTE in Norway.

Norwegian police is in possession of a number of reports in which the LTTE is engaged in visa scandals with the official complicity. Also threats against the Norwegian police and Tamil dissidents resident in Norway are pigeon holed due various pressures from the state.

The eight-page intelligence report prepared by Widar Brathen, Norwegian Police Officer submitted to Norway’s internal Security Department clearly indicate the close relationship between Norways’s Immigration officials and the LTTE. The report proves that Norway had detailed knowledge of the LTTE activities from the early ‘90s such as weapons depots in Europe, collection of funds to purchase arms, selling of visas by the foreign office officials to the LTTE, helping the smuggling activities of the LTTE etc. The Norwegian government due to reasons best known to the political masters is ignoring the report.

The above documentation amply demonstrates how Norway is overtly and covertly helping a terrorist organization violating the UN Resolution 1373(2001).

We appeal to you to investigate this issue and take action in keeping with the United Nation’s determination.

1) To enforce international obligations and laws that require member states to adhere the rule of law and

2) To defeat terrorist organizations by enforcing UN Resolutions endorsed by member states.

Norway’s refusal to adhere to moral and legal obligations underlined in instruments of international law has led to the recurring violations of human rights in Sri Lanka. Norway has been and continues to be the central banking ENTITY for collecting funds for Tamil Tiger terrorists, as stated by Col. Karuna, the rebel LTTE member. Even the Norwegian counter-terrorist authorities cannot take any action as Norway has failed to act in accordance with provisions of UN Resolution 1373.

We believe that the evidence provided above is sufficient to establish more than a prima facie case of Norway’s guilt in violating UN Resolution 1373. To summarize Norway is guilty of

`95 Providing financial bases to collect and bank funds collected by agents of Tamil Tiger terrorists in Norwegian banks,

`95 Harbouring Tamil Tiger terrorists,

`95 Giving grants to agents of Tamil Tiger terrorists based in Noway to run pro-Tiger publications (UTROP) and broadcasting station

`95 Running hate campaigns against fellow – Tamils opposed to the Tamil Tigers,

`95 Assisting Tamil Tiger terrorists in devious ways in the name of facilitating peace, and colluding with SLMM and agents of Tamil Tiger terrorists to strengthen and white-wash crime against humanity, war crimes and force conscription of children in violation of UN Resolutions 1261.

At a time when the law-abiding world is seeking ways and means to coordinate an action plan to fight international terrorism, it is unfortunate that Norway, a signatory to a number of UN resolutions and conventions, is openly supporting the LTTE. New York Times identified the LTTE, better known as Tamil Tigers, as one of the most brutal terrorist organizations. At a recent presentation in Oslo, Dr. Peter Chalk of Rand Corp, USA, concluded that “….the LTTE is probably a decade ahead of Al-Qaeda, but more intrinsically The group itself may be serving as a critical benchmark for informing and guiding developments in a wider area of maritime terrorism.

Norway violates..

From page 8

We conclude with a quotation from His Excellency Mr. Kofi Annan, who told the General Assembly on 21.9.2004:

“….At the international level, all States – strong and weak, big and small – need framework of fair rules, which each can be confident that others will obey. Fortunately, such a framework exists. From trade to terrorism, from the law of the sea to weapons of mass destruction, States have created an impressive body of names and laws. This is one our organization’s protest achievement.

“And yet this framework is riddled with gaps and weaknesses. Too often it is applied selectively end enforced arbitrarily. It lacks the teeth that turn a body of laws into an effective legal system.

“Where enforcement capacity does exist, as in the Security Council, many feel it is not always used fairly or effectively. Where the rule of law is most earnestly invoked, as in the Commission on Human Rights, those invoking it do not always practice what they preach.

“Those who seek to bestow legitimacy must themselves embody it: and those who invoke international law must themselves submit to it.”

Put simply, member states cannot be the firemen in the UN and simultaneously be pyromaniacs at home. We most earnestly seek your assistance to keep the UN firemen abroad working, without any inhibitions, as firefighters in their respective homes too.

World Alliance for Peace in Sri Lanka

(Dr. D. Jayasuriya , President – Society for Peace, Unity and Human Rights)

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Fresh diplomatic push to salvage peace talks by Amal Jayasinghe

Sri Lanka’s peacebroker Norway and the country’s main financial backer Japan are due to step up diplomatic efforts to salvage a faltering peace process, officials and diplomats said Sunday(24).

Japan’s peace envoy to Sri Lanka, Yasushi Akashi, is due to visit the island this week to try to nudge Tamil Tiger rebels and the Colombo government to resume stalled negotiations, Asian diplomats said.

Government officials said Norway’s peace envoy Erik Solheim was also expected early next month while US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage plans to visit Sri Lanka after the US presidential elections.

Armitage has taken what he has called a “hands-on” interest in the fragile peace process since Oslo brokered a truce between the Tigers and Colombo in February 2002.

The intensified international diplomacy comes amid Sri Lankan government optimism that the talks, on hold since April 2003, could begin next month with Colombo making a fresh proposal to revive the process.

However, the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) last week rejected Colombo’s proposals to revive negotiations and played down prospects of resuming talks next month.

The LTTE said they would open talks only on the basis of a self-rule plan seeking an “Interim Self-Governing Authority” in embattled areas.

“It’s unlikely we can expect any early breakthrough,” an Asian diplomat said. “What we’ll see is a lot of talk about talks. The challenge is to ensure the ceasefire is maintained.”

The Tigers have recently faced international criticism over a wave of assassinations. They have denied involvement and have accused the military of supporting a breakaway rebel faction to undermine the peace process.

Peacebroker Norway has also warned of a danger of the country slipping back to war, a fear echoed by a visiting Swiss delegation earlier this month.

Japan’s Akashi wrapped up his last visit to Sri Lanka in May, urging Colombo and the Tigers to “give and take” in their negotiations.

He ruled out quick resumption of talks, saying they might take place in the summer. “They want time to reflect on the contents of the negotiations. It’s important to have stable and fruitful discussions,” he said then.(AFP)

President Chandrika Kumaratunga has invited the rebels to discuss setting up a federal state in exchange for peace. But her government’s main coalition partner, the Marxist JVP, opposes territorial concessions to the Tigers.

Opposition parties have demanded a united front to push ahead with the peace process. Suspension of the peace process has also affected foreign aid flows as most aid has been linked to progress on the peace front.

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India’s humiliation not yet over

Veerappan, the bandit who reigned supreme in the jungles of South India was killed on Tuesday and buried on Sunday. His blood stained dramatic life spanning over three decades on the run came to an anti climactic end, as is often the case with criminals.

His saga may have ended with his death but lessons one could draw from India’s experience with him will live on.

A close look at his limited but powerful terror network reveals that apart from relying on violence for survival he, too, had made himself attractive to a section of the populace in whose eyes he is still a hero. It is little surprise that in those rural backwaters, he managed to project himself as the Robin Hood of India letting crumbs fall off his table for the consumption of the poor. Thus, he found his way into the hearts of thousands who had no other way to give vent to their pent up frustration. To the voiceless, he was a gun-totting knight charging at the dragons of oppression and their support for him may have made it difficult for the Indian police to bring him to justice.

According to a BBC report, at his funeral some mourners had cursed the police who had killed him. They had said by killing him the police had incurred the wrath of gods.

Veerappan was a character wrapped in layers of myth and heroics like the protagonists of olden ballads. Any criminal usually spawns a coterie of admirers who sing hosannas to him. Even mass murderers like Hitler and Idi Amin were not short of followers who were prepared to kill or even die for them. Veerappan was no exception.

The problem that Veerappan had in that part of India was that he could not hijack an ethno-religious cause to justify his terror project. This prevented him from gaining international support unlike his soulmate across the Palk Strait and as a result had none to stand in the way of the Special Task Force of Tamil Nadu, which closed in on him and sent three bullets through his head.

A jubilant Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Jayaram Jayalalitha proudly announced the death of Veerappan: “It is with a sense of pride and fulfilment that I wish to announce … the good news that the notorious forest brigand, bandit, murderer and dacoit Veerappan, along with his entire gang, has been shot dead.” But it is intriguing what India, which accomplished the mission of eliminating Veerappan within just ten months, had been doing for over thirty years. Why the Tamil Nadu leaders had balked at going for the kill previously is also a question that needs to be answered.

In a way, why India took so long to get him is understandable given the failure of the mighty US to track down its bete noire, bin Laden. Despite having the best military machine on the planet at its disposal, the US has been trying to capture Osama the Elusive for years.

As much as Bush is trying to pull bin Laden out of his hat closer to the polling day so as to kick Senator Kerry out of the ring, bin Laden must be working overtime with a view to launching an offensive devastating enough to turn America against Bush. Terrorists always have an edge over democratically elected leaders. For they have to be lucky only once. Others have to be lucky all the time.

With the killing of Veerappan, India will now be able to bury its past tainted with failure to deal with a brigand for so long. But its humiliation is far from over. Across the Palk Strait, it has the killers of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi at large. That they had links with Veerappan is well known. How India is going to handle the issue of bringing assassins of Rajiv to justice, remains to be seen.

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