Heavy fighting at Thirumurikandi

23 soldiers were killed and 56 others injured in fierce fights along the LTTE’s heavily defended and well fortified earth bund and bunker line 4kms west of Kilinochchi in the general area Thirumurikandi yesterday. 12 bodies of Sri Lanka Army soldiers fell into the hands of the LTTE.

Casualties to the Tigers, according to monitored radio communications was 19 killed and an unknown number injured. The Tigers opened fire using GPMGs (12.7mm, 14.2mm) and HMGs (23mm and 30mm) at advancing small teams of soldiers from the 57 Division from well defended positions.

Meanwhile a new earth bund is under construction from Mullayawali to Puthukuriirippu to hold off the 59 Division from the strategic Mullaitivu town.

Special Task Force (STF)

Specializing in Counter-Terrorist and Counter-Insurgency operations

British Special Air Service (SAS) teams were brought in to provide specialized training in all aspects of Counter Terrorism and Counter insurgency operations to STF. The Israel Internal Security Agency Shin Beth was also involved in the training of Sri Lankan STF. Today the STF has a fully-fledged training wing, regarded as one of the best in South East Asia.

The Special Task Force (STF) is an elite special forces unit of the Sri Lanka Police specializing in Counter-Terrorist and Counter-Insurgency operations. It was formed in 1983 not as a military force but rather as a highly-specialised police unit.

Following the insurrection in Sri Lanka in 1971, in which many Police Stations were targeted by JVP insurgents, there were suggestions to train and equip the Police for duties above normal Police functions. However, nothing was done until 1983 when the outbreak of violence convinced the government to form a special Counter Terrorist and Counter Insurgency police force.

Under this scenario, the Special Task Force, was formed in March 01, 1983, headed by Superintendent of Police, Bodhi Liyanage. After the initial training at Katunkurunda Police College the first intake were inducted to the army combat training school Ampara, for counter revolutionary warfare.

When the Special Task Force (STF) was formed in 1983, it comprised mainly of existing policemen. Trained by the Sri Lankan Army in the handling of Infantry weapons and were given basic training in Jungle warfare, They deeply resemble a para-military organisation and later separate training facilities for the Special Task Force have been established in Kalutara, 96 kilometers south of Colombo. The first platoons formed were deployed in the North of Sri Lanka to provide additional support for Police Stations and to stem the LTTE separatists.

Ravi Jayewardene security advisor to the then president, J. R. Jayewardene, took an active interest in realising its objectives and as a result the services of Special Air Service (SAS), who were involved in training special forces in Sultanate of Oman, were obtained to make the STF a professional outfit.

The STF was enhanced considerably when crack former British Special Air Service (SAS) teams were brought in to provide specialized training in all aspects of Counter Terrorism and Counter insurgency operations. The Israel Internal Security Agency Shin Beth was also involved in the training of the Sri Lankan armed forces. Today the STF has a fully-fledged training wing, regarded as one of the best in South East Asia.

Initially the STF was deployed in Jaffna peninsular to assist the police. The Defence Ministry relocated the STF from North to East in 1984.

By 1987, heavily involved in the Sri Lankan civil war, the STF was in control of the area from Kiran to Potuvil in the Batticaloa Division. The STF was deployed in Company formation into 15 separate camps. When the Indian Peace Keeping Force was moved into the Batticaloa in 1987 as part of the ongoing peace process, the STF was in complete control of Batticoloa, and had restored a level of normalcy to the area.

The STF is mostly stationed in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka. Some small number of units have placed in Mannar District and Vavuniya District. Other units are based in Colombo and provide VIP security.

The Special Task Force has been accused of various human rights abuses including extrajudicial killings and involvement in the disappearance of individuals.

At least two incidents of extrajudicial killings involving members of the STF have also been noted by the Sri Lankan government or outside observers. Following the newest round of fighting between the government and the LTTE starting in April 1994, the mutilated bodies of between 21 and 31 Tamil males were discovered in rivers and lakes near Colombo. On August 17, 10 STF officers (and 15 others) were charged with committing the murders, which allegedly took place at the STF headquarters in Colombo.

The STF heads Counter-Terrorist missions and – as the most highly trained police organisation in Sri Lanka – it would be the lead unit whenever law enforcement forces engaged the Tamil Tigers (LTTE).

The STF is internationally recognized for its expertise in these areas and it is often invited to assist foreign law enforcement agencies with planning major events such as the 2008 Beijing Olympics and in dealing with possible terrorist threats.

The STF has been headed by seven eminent Commandants since its inception. They are Senior DIG Bodhi Liayange, Senior DIG Zerney Wijesuriya, Senior DIG Lionel Karunasena, Senior DIG Dharmasiri Weerakoon, DIG Nimal Gunatilleke.

DIG Nimal Lewke who joined the Police Force in 1984 as an Inspector, is marshalling this elite outfit as the seventh Commandant.

On 1st of September 1984, Police Constables 2539 Chandrapala, 4100 Ekanayake, 3928 Nanayakkara and Police Constable Driver 13089 Sumanasekera were killed at Thikkum in Jaffna, being the victims of a land-mine explosion by the LTTE. Since 1st of September 1983 the STF commemorates its martyrs annually on 1st of September.

Since the inception of the STF, in the last 24 years, 421 of its personnel and six civil personnel have sacrificed their lives in defence of the country.

STF now employs more than 8000 highly trained personnel.

( LankaLibrary)

India digging her own grave – A letter from Mumbai

As a responsible democratically elected leader, the Prime Minister of over one-billion of people in India, Dr Manmohan Singh should categorically reject, without any reservations or conditions, the racist demands made by some of the pro-LTTE politicians in Tamil Nadu.

The pro-LTTE politicians in Tamil Nadu, “Political Jokers” or “Political Criminals”, who seem to be in the LTTE pay-roll, demand that India should interfere and a ceasefire agreement (CFA) be made between the Government of Sri Lanka and the world deadliest terrorists, the LTTE, who assassinated the former Indian Prime Minister, Shri Rajiv Gandhi, and many other Tamil political leaders, religious leaders and innocent Tamils who opposed or, did not support their terror activities.

The so-called CFA, as in the past, will definitely provide a breathing space for LTTE to re-arm, re-group and continue to their terrorist activities.

Our Prime Minister should be fully aware that LTTE has very well established business links with many other leading international terrorist organizations in the world. Therefore, any actions taken by Dr Singh to protect the LTTE which is in the verge of collapse will help to development of terrorist activities in Indian soils as well.

About two weeks ago, I myself witnessed the suffering of innocent Indians during the Mumbai terror attacks. Most of the victims were ordinary civilians and none of them were politicians neither from the central Government nor from the state of Tamil Nadu.

Being the Prime Minister of India, you have the moral responsibility to protect all the countries in this region, rather than being selfish retain in power. So, the world expects you to discharge those responsibilities as the Prime Minister of India and not as another “cheap” politician who will do whatever the “dirty” work to be in power.

I am sure, you have not forgotten that the leader of LTTE Pirapaharan is wanted by India with regard to the assassination of Shri Rajiv Gandhi.

At the moment, as a result of LTTE, every Tamil in the world is branded as a “Terrorist” by the international community. If the demands by pro-LTTE politicians are accepted by Dr Manmohan Singh, all Indians living in India and in other parts of the world will fall into the same boat and our credibility will be lost.

Dr Manmohan Singh should be fully aware that the next episode of the pro LTTE groups will be demanding the state of Tamil Nadu as an Eelam (Separate country solely for Tamils). If Dr Manmohan Singh surrenders to these racist demands of pro-LTTE politicians in Tamil Nadu, our grandchildren will definitely be reading Indian history books where Dr Singh’s name is documented under the “Traitors of India.”

R. Malhotra
Mumbai
India

Navy’s crucial innovation hailed a success!

The modern Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) recently celebrated its 58th Anniversary. We at DefenceWire would like to take this opportunity to discuss in detail a crucial innovation in the SLN, which may lead to successful maritime security operations around Sri Lanka in years to come. The Innovation is the RABS or Rapid Action Boat Squadron.

The beginnings of the RABS can be traced back to 2003 when a brief respite from daily operations came and the SLN started exploring options to counter the threat posed by suicide Sea Tiger boats to its most valuable assets, the Dvora, the Super Dvora and the UFAC.

The Fast Attack Crafts formed the front line of the SLN. Each vessel costs between $13 million and $15 million, depending on the armaments it carried. A Dvora also carried a valuable and often irreplaceable crew and for the LTTE, the FAC’s 23mm and 30mm canons were like the tusks on an elephant.

But the Dvoras were limited in terms of quantity. SLN has only 30 FACs whereas the Tigers would set sail in clusters of 20-30 small boats with powerful OBM/Es. The cluster included 5-6 suicide boats carefully disguised as fishing boats or ordinary LTTE attack crafts. These clusters were often capable of surrounding the Dvoras and ramming them with suicide boats after dragging the battle closer to the shore.

The loss of a Dvora in battle meant over a dozen deaths, a loss of around USD 13 million and a low morale for the SLN. For the LTTE, a Dvora operating near the shore offered an opportunity to cripple SLN assets whilst gaining these assets for its own purposes like heavy machine guns (HMGs). It was also an opportunity to them to regain morale and to continue unhindered its arms, ordnance and logistics smuggling operations.

Until 2003, only the LTTE manufactured boats for its Sea Tiger wing. In 2003, SLN started making molds of captured LTTE vessels. The first molds were of large LTTE vessels like the Mirage. The boat proved unstable as the speed to fire-power ratio was off. The SLN also realized that the threat to the Dvora was not from large vessels, which acted only as Command Vessels directing the battle, but from smaller boats.

After the present Navy Commander assumed duties, a plan was set in motion to create a fleet of small boats for the Navy based on molds of smaller LTTE boats and other technology. The SLN also looked at boats given to the Special Boats Squadron by US Navy SEALS and the Marines.

By mid 2007, after months of carefully balancing the boat, engine, weapons and armour, the “Arrow Boat” was created. The weight and firepower were wonderfully balanced resulting in a highly stable, highly agile boat with maximum firepower. The boat appears lower to the water but has a higher overall floating effect. The name was given due to the arrow-like shape of the boat, which is found in many Navy SEALS’ boat designs.

While the boat-building continued, SLN started a massive recruitment drive targeting able bodied sailors already enlisted in the SLN. The target was to station 2-3 sailors per boat. 60-70 sailors were chosen out of hundreds of volunteers.

The already experienced sailors came from Dvoras, SBS, IPC crews and were subjected to a grueling 3 month training run by SBS instructors. On all occasions, the new recruits trained with SBS units, thus increasing comradery between the two units. 6 batches of these sailors have passed-out already. Special allowances are being paid to these men like in the SBS, SF and Commando Regiments.

Initially, about 20 such units were deployed in areas like Kallarawa off Nilaweli in 2007. After the completion of 100 units, the RABS and the SBS expanded to cover Point Pedro, Kilali Lagoon, Nayaru and Pulmoddai.

As these units got deployed closer to land, the Dvora FACs were given special duties in the rough choppier seas. This way the SLN has created two layers of maritime security around crucial locations in the Island.

The true testament to these units is in their survivability in battle and their ability to overwhelm the enemy as was seen in over 5 missions in the recent past. Their tactical maneuvering and close resemblance to LTTE’s own boats have confused the enemy moments before they are destroyed. Like in the Army, the Sri Lanka Navy has demonstrated how small groups of highly dedicated men can take on guerrillas once considered impossible to beat.

(Defence Wire)

Understanding the mindset of troops fighting insurgents

Armies face a thankless task if they are called upon to fight insurgents – a section of their own people. The media is often more sympathetic to the plight of the population affected by the operations than the problems faced by the soldier. Troops feel both the public and media are unfair to soldiers doing their duty. Their grouse is understandable because the guerrilla operates among the people and only a thin line divides him and his sympathisers among the population. Invariably troops employed in counterinsurgency tasks face charges of human rights abuses. It is no consolation that this is a universal phenomenon. It is frequently reported in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nearer home, Sri Lanka is a prime example of this phenomenon. We can also see such cases in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Troops fighting insurgents at home run into twin problems – professional and cultural and this takes a toll on their performance. The soldier is trained for conventional warfare. He is taught to shoot to kill first, use overwhelming firepower, and destroy enemy defences to retain the initiative at all times. Military training has a high degree of regimentation. Everything is reduced to a drill. So a soldier’s response under fire is reflexive than deliberate. In short, armies are trained to become killing machines of a conventional war. The soldier’s training gives him an abounding faith in his weapon and in his skill to kill his foe. And the macho culture of armed forces encourages this phenomenon. I remember an instance in 1989, while serving with the Indian Peace Keeping Force. I was attending a party in Colombo in the lawns of the Indian High Commission to celebrate the Republic Day. The Pakistani Naval advisor chatted up me when he learnt I was a senior staff officer of the IPKF. “Colonel, I believe you’re having problem with employment of Madras Regiment units in Sri Lanka operations,” he said. Clearly he was needling me because I was a Tamilian. In 1965 Pakistan had made a clumsy propaganda effort to play up the so-called South-North divide among some of the South Indian prisoners of war. It not only failed miserably but boomeranged when the Pakistanis were shooed out by the jawans. In reality, the Madras Regiment fought with thorough professionalism during the Jaffna operations. So to reply him was easy; “Commander, I don’t know about your army, but I know our army. If I ask a squad of soldiers to open fire on the passing traffic on Mount Road (in Madras) they will just do that. They would not show any hesitation.” This is the level of conditioning our soldiers have. The soldier in counterinsurgency operations is supposed to take on the militant hiding among ordinary people without hurting others who are in the location. This is a Herculean task for the soldier because he has to overcome his professional training routine for conventional warfare. So the soldier has to be retrained in counterinsurgency warfare techniques before fighting insurgents. But retraining is not always possible when situations overtake planning as it happened in Sri Lanka. In counterinsurgency troops rarely confront the enemy face to face. The attacks are indirect attacks and the methods are unconventional. Troops exposed to such nerve wracking experience over a long period develop a strong animal feeling of insecurity. During a confrontation, self preservation becomes their sole priority, overtaking all other considerations. Their nerves are an edge and the use of force is instantaneous at the slightest suspicious move. In other words, they get brutalised in the process of fighting the insurgent in the midst of the population over a period of time. Often those who order the use of army in a knee jerk response in areas where insurgents thrive do not bother to understand this occupational hazard of the soldier. The infamous case of My Lai massacre in the Tet offensive in the Vietnam War in 1968 is classic example of brutalisation of forces. In this incident that shocked the world for its sheer brutality, the U.S. army soldiers massacred over 500 civilians including women and children. In the trials that followed the massacre, the conscience of the world was touched. In his testimony of private Dennis Bunning said “I would say that most people in our company didn’t consider the Vietnamese human… A guy would just grab one of the girls there and in one or two incidents they shot the girls when they got done.” This statement explains the brutalised mindset that sets in among soldiers who feel insecure even in the midst of civilians in such circumstances. And the world of armies in action has only marginally improved. Rotation of troops can partly reduce brutalisation. In Jammu and Kashmir the Army has raised Rashtriya Rifles battalions especially for fighting insurgency. Soldiers are not permanently posted to such units and. serve by rotation. But rotation of troops can only partly reduce the problem of brutalisation. The typical Indian soldier comes from the rural area into the strange world of armed forces. He also comes with a baggage of prejudices and perceptions of the rural society. He hardly understands human rights because he has not experienced them first hand in his conservative society. He sees the world in tones of black and white, right or wrong. The army takes charge of his life 24×7 – it tells him not only how to shoot to kill, but also how to obey orders without question, dress and eat properly. In short, the army is his Mai-Bhap (father and mother). And unlike urban cynics, he still believes in long forgotten old world values like loyalty to the hand that feeds you. At times a promotion gives him a status never known earlier because of his low caste, poor education, poverty, or lack of urban smartness. The officers are no exception to this, though they might speak English, and come from an urban middle class background (this variety is dwindling). They may grumble and whine but do what their superiors tell them with little consideration for other things. The security forces living in this schizophrenic existence counter insurgency theatres fail some time and succeed at some. Either way military operations make good copy because war makes news. If they fail, everybody bays for the blood of the soldier. The soldier has a difficult time understanding this kind of behaviour. The public expectations of the armed forces are very high because they are supposed to uphold the rule of law, justice, order and discipline. If we want the army to live up to such expectations, other limbs of government and society have to show at least incremental improvement. Otherwise the task may well be too big for the army.

(GFiles)

Sri Lanka:The Slow Crawl to Kilinochchi

On Sunday December 7, the security forces were within “kissing distance” of the outer defence lines Kilinochchi, announced the defence spokesman. On Monday, December 8, it became “Troops in Kilinochchi are targeting the town and they are in the vicinity of the town.” However, by December 9 it seems the security forces’ strategic focus had shifted from Kilinochchi to Mullaitivu according to the defence ministry. This contradicts what the army commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka said in his Sunday Observer interview on the same day; he said “after capturing Kilinochchi the security forces will definitely capture Mullaithivu…”

In military parlance, this kind of shift in 24 hours takes place only in tactical rather than strategic focus. Somebody is not getting the terminology right or the army is facing major problems in turning the “kiss” into reality in Kilinochchi. Its two pronged offensive on Kilinochchi by Task Force-I from the west and by 57 Division from the southwest was reported facing very heavy LTTE resistance. Could this have compelled them a change in the security forces’ strategy? The defence spokesman had acknowledged this at least on the Task Force-I front. In the Muhamalai sector also there appear to be no substantial progress in spite of 53 Division’s claims of having captured 800 m long and 8 km wide line of defences there. All these bits put together would indicate stalling of offensive.

A second possibility is that 59 Division was making better progress having captured Alampil on December 8. With Task Force-III making good progress on A34 Mankulam-Mullaitivu road branching off eastwards from A9 road 59 Division’s offensive to Mullaitivu would be benefited. So a tactical shift of immediate focus from Kilinochchi to Mullaitivu is understandable.

But such a shift in axis would still be a tactical shift. Ultimately the security forces have to either capture Kilinochchi or force the LTTE to vacate it after they pay a heavy price. Then only the A9 Kandy-Jaffna road can be opened to restore some form of normal life for most of the population of Northern Province. Regaining A9 road from the LTTE control by evicting them from Kilinochchi –Elephant Pass would always remain the strategic objective of the entire operation.

But these are all military semantics; in the absence of independent sources to verify operational information, semantics of both the defence spokesman and the LTTE become important; they indicate the issues hidden behind the words.

After the capture of Pooneryn on November 15, crossing Akkarayankulam bund on October 31, and capture of Mankulam on November 17, it is a month. Evidently since then, momentum of advance has been stalled due to adverse weather on a few days, and stiff LTTE resistance that had been progressively increasing. This would contradict repeated Sri Lankan assertion that the LTTE was on the run. If this is not so, what is holding up the troops?

Loss of momentum in an offensive means more time for the opponent to recoup, rest, repair and readjust defences, reinforce positions, launch counter offensives and inflict more casualties. And cost of war in terms of men, material and money goes up as the clock ticks in days and days become months. The more it is prolonged the better it is for the forces on the defence.

Fortunately, the army commander has cleverly put himself in an advantageous position with multiple options of axes to pick and choose. He also has adequate troops for achieving the strategic objective. Even granting the monsoon rains that affected both sides comes in fits and starts the progress is becoming slow and taking too long. This raises a few operational questions:
• Why the offensive to Kilinochchi is ending up as a slow crawl?
• Has the LTTE built up its strength beyond the ken of four divisions?
• Is the army commander facing a major operational dilemma or political rider interfering with his operations for reasons not known to the public?

In this context, Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka’s comments on India’s role in Sri Lanka in an interview to the Sunday Observer is interesting for more reasons than his derogatory description of Nedumaran and Vaiko,(Tamil Nadu politicians who head the pro-LTTE political lobby in Tamil Nadu) as jokers who receive money from the LTTE. Regarding the operations he sounded quite confident of capturing both Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu. He was not unduly worried about the slow progress or any casualties. There was apparently no operational stress. Does it mean operations are going on smoothly at an accepted pace? In the absence of access to information our questions still linger, unanswered.

The interview had a political content not usually found in interviews of army chiefs. His sarcastic comment was clearly provocative. As anticipated it drew widespread condemnation from political parties in Tamil Nadu and Government of India protested to Sri Lanka on the issue. There was quick apology from the Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapakse the General’s remarks. And in the corrective action that followed, Colombo axed the editor of Sunday Observer while the errant General went scot-free. One cannot imagine the army commander casually tackling a political issue involving a sensitive neighbour without some tacit official acceptance of his perceptions. The freedom of operation given by the President to Lt Gen Fonseka appears to go well beyond the military kind.

And this is not the first time Gen Fonseka has made a politically controversial remark His interview inn October 2008 to the National Post, a Canadian daily, created enough concerns among Tamils when he said: “I strongly believe that this country belongs to the Sinhalese but there are minority communities and we treat them like our people…We being the majority of the country, 75%, we will never give in and we have the right to protect this country…We are also a strong nation … They can live in this country with us. But they must not try to, under the pretext of being a minority, demand undue things.”

While that remark did not endear him to Tamils and caused more concerns in the ethnically polarised nation, Sinhala right wing lobbies applauded him.

Why is Lt Gen Fonseka making such controversial remarks repeatedly? Does he nurture political ambitions after he completes his extended tenure next year? His latest remark on Tamilnadu politicians in the Sunday Observer interview definitely raises this question.

But whatever be the reason, such provocative remarks of the army commander only strengthen the Tamil suspicions of the ulterior objective of Sri Lanka government’s war against the LTTE.

(Hariharan’s Intelligence blog)

Sri Lanka clothing exporter goes east with US aid

Brandix Lanka, a top Sri Lankan clothing exporter, has got US aid to train workers in a new factory it has set up in the island’s east which the government is trying to develop after driving out Tamil Tiger rebels.

The US Agency for International Development and Brandix Lanka are working together to train 600 people for employment at the new factory in Batticaloa district, a US embassy statement said.

Under the Apparel Sector Training Partnership, USAID’s grant of 100,000 dollars will provide a monthly stipend and a meal allowance for the workers during eight weeks of pre-training.

Brandix has committed 500,000 dollars to fund all of the training costs, and the monthly stipend during an additional six months of on-the-job training.

“We believe that providing job skills training and giving new workers experience will help people from this conflict-affected area rebuild their lives through steady employment,” said USAID Mission Director Rebecca Cohn.

Graduates of the Apparel Sector Training Partnership program will be eligible for permanent employment with Brandix, the statement said.

“While local average incomes are only 26 dollars per month, graduates will earn at least 85 dollars per month,” it said.

The trained workforce will provide the company with a prepared labour pool with the first group of 70 workers starting training on December 1, 2008.

“Brandix is committed to taking bold action to generate gainful employment in the Eastern province to enable a wider segment of the population to benefit from the growth of the apparel industry,” said Brandix CEO Ashroff Omar.

“We believe it should be the duty of the corporate sector to help reduce the vast disparity in the per capita income of the east in comparison to the rest of the country.”

3 civilians killed in DPU Claymore attack in Vanni

Three civilians, including a child, were killed in a Claymore attack by the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) Deep Penetration Unit (DPU) on Monday, Tamileelam Police officials said. The attack has taken place in Mu’l'liyava’lai, south of Mullaiththeevu.

Further details were not available at the moment.

The attack has come while civilians were fleeing the area due to artillery barrage that has targeted civilian settlements of Mu’l'liyaava’lai.

(Tamil Net)

Delhi silent about Karunanidhi’s claim

The increasingly desperate situation facing the LTTE has again galvanized them to exert fresh pressure on New Delhi in that direction. Hence Tamil Nadu Chief Minister claiming that Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee would now come to Colombo to discuss a ceasefire arrangement. But up to yesterday there was no official intimation of any such high level visit from New Delhi

It is now truly a “do or die” situation for the LTTE with security Forces aiming for their vital points, namely Kilinochchi, Paranthan, Mulaitivu, and Elephant Pass, and they being forced to put everything at their disposal to protect those areas

Despite Islamic fanatics striking terror in Bombay late last month, blunting the attempts of Tiger  proxies across the Palk Strait to force Indian intervention here once again on their behalf, the increasingly desperate situation facing the LTTE has again galvanized them to exert fresh pressure on New Delhi in that direction. Hence Tamil Nadu Chief Minister claiming that Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee would now come to Colombo to discuss a ceasefire arrangement. But up to yesterday there was no official intimation of any such high level visit from New Delhi

It is now truly a “do or die” situation for the LTTE with security Forces aiming for their vital points, namely Kilinochchi, Paranthan, Mulaitivu, and Elephant Pass, and they being forced to put everything at their disposal to protect those areas.

Therefore with the ceasing of rains from late last week, the fighting without doubt is bitter, with the LTTE unable to afford to let any of these areas  fall to the Security Forces, as that would only expedite the fall of its few other remaining strongholds.

In this scenario, intelligence has stumbled on some intriguing information about four white skinned doctors serving in the Ponnambalam Government hospital in Mulaitivu. As no INGO workers are permitted to be in LTTE held areas, since all of them were ordered to relocate to Vavuniya in October, this piece of news is truly surprising.

Intelligence has also found that with the fall of Pooneryn, the Sea Tiger resources there has been shifted to Vettilaikerny and Thalladi, strengthening their positions in these two sea landing points on the northeastern coast.

Notable successes
Despite some heavy exchanges taking place in virtually all fronts this week, Security Forces notched up some notable successes. On the Northeastern coast, 11th Regiment of the Gemunu Watch coming under the 59th Division commanded by Brig. Nandana Udawatte, captured the Sea Tiger stronghold at Alampil with minimum of casualties on Thursday. They were supported by 14th Wijeba Infantry Regiment commanded by Maj. Vipul Weerakoon.

In this operation to take Alampil the 11th GW troops had been led from the front by their commander Lt. Col. Priyanka Fernando. Lt. Col. Fernando leading his men in battle brought them some unexpected bonanzas as they outflanked the LTTE defenders by cutting them off from much of their northern escape routes. This lightning strike forced the defenders to flee in a hurry mainly by sea, leaving behind some 130 fibreglass boats. Their departure had been very hasty, not leaving them any time even to destroy the boats that were left behind. The victorious troops also recovered 560 rounds of live ammunition, one motor cycle and one outboard motor from the area.

Ambushes
Tigers had not even attempted to truck the boats to Mulaitivu on the last remaining coastal road open to them apparently fearing ambushes.
The Seventh Gemunu Watch under the command of Lt. Col. Chaminda Lamahewa, which captured the Thunukkenikulam area are advancing towards Mulliyaweli. Also in the northeast the 59-1 Brigade took control of the strategically important Otiyamalai last Saturday. It was followed by the capture of the village of Periyakulkam, one kilometre west of Otiyamalai on Tuesday morning.

Confrontations
On the same day there were seven different confrontations between Tigers and troops of the 59 Division in the Andankulam area. Following these confrontations and the capture of six LTTE trenches, its troops recovered 65 anti-personnel mines, one RPG gun, one T-81 weapon and one 40mm grenade launcher.

This week saw Maj Gen Jagath Dias returning to command the 57 Division spearheading the drive to capture Kilinochchi. Under his command the 57-4 Brigade headed by Lt. Col. Senaka Wijesuriya liberated the entire Kokavil area after heavy fighting last Sunday evening, and since then took control of the entire stretch of the A-9 Highway from Mankulam to Kokavil.

Meanwhile the Eighth Light Infantry and the Tenth Light Infantry coming under the same Brigade captured the west bank of the Iranamadu tank.

As the 57-4 Brigade advanced its positions by some five kilometers, the 63-2 Brigade coming under Task Force 111 advanced from Pannikulam Forest covering a distance of four kilometers and linked up with 57-4 Brigade at Iranamadu Tank.

The Task Force 111 under the command of Brig. Sathyapriya Liyanage also captured the  Pulipanvikulam village and was advancing towards the old Kandy Road.

With the LTTE losing its hold on the A-9 the Tigers have begun building a bunker line to cover the old Kandy Road. But troops are now poised to take this old road as well, thus depriving another major supply route to the terrorist organisation.

Fall
This week also saw the fall of Mannakulam village to the troops of Task Force 11 under the command of Brig. Rohana Bandara. During the Jayasikuru Operation, Commando Major Jayanath Ginimellage and his men of the  Second Commando Regiment fought the Tigers till their very end at this village.

Puliyankulam too fell into the hands of Task Force 11. It is a key junction on the A-9. The old Kandy Road leading to Nedunkerny begins here. This town also served as the headquarters of the Tiger tax collection division on the A-9. Troops advancing from here were in the process of capturing Kanagarayankulam yesterday.

With the troops completing the recapture of A-9 from Kokavil to Omanthai, Army Commander Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka visited the area on Wednesday. During the Jayasikuru  Operation that lasted three years the Army could not advance beyond Mankulam, but now within a short span of time the present Commander has ensured the Army’s advance  beyond that point.

His secret of success appears to be that each unit is given one task at a time per week, and there is no chance of any secrets leaking in advance to the enemy as all operational plans are in his head and he knows the Northern terrains like the back of his hand.

New attack force
Meanwhile Deputy Commander of 59 Division Col. Nishantha Wanniarachchi has been appointed to command the new fighting unit designated Task Force 1V scheduled to enter battle in Wanni soon. Military Secretary Maj. Gen. Deepal Alwis issued orders on Monday under his signature, also appointing Lt. Col. Priyantha Wijegunawardena as the Colonel General Staff of this force. Similarly two Brigades coming under this Force 64-1 and 64-2 were placed under the command of Lt. Col. Jayampathy Bandara and Lt. Col. Randula Hathnagoda.Smuggle

With the entire West coast from Mannar to Jaffna being under the Army, only the north eastern coast is left for the LTTE to smuggle in desperately needed arms to replenish those now fast depleting. Troops are still being hit with artillery and mortars it had earlier managed to smuggle in.

In the past two and a half years that the Forces have fought the Eelam War 1V, 14,000 soldiers have been wounded. According to army headquarters statistics 12,000 of them were injured as a result of mortar and artillery attacks.

Lt. Gen Fonseka points out that the victories won by his men were no flukes, but achieved through much bravery and sacrifice.

(The Nation)

Progress in all areas

Around 25 LTTE cadres were killed when a team of about 100 cadres launched a counter attack at Adampan last morning. 2 soldiers were also killed in the fighting. The attack was anticipated following intelligence warnings (please see last report).

Small teams of soldiers are usually positioned ahead of the Army’s existing FDL and artillery, including MBRL units are kept on standby at night in case of an enemy counter attack. Artillery crews and small groups of soldiers change patrols in the evening and sometimes again in the early morning and fresh teams are deployed in their place. Therefore no special preparations were necessary to counter the LTTE counter attack, which came shortly after 2.30am yesterday.

According to intelligence reports a group of 300 cadres were being trained by the LTTE in this area for the counter attack. Army believes the attack early last morning maybe the first wave of such attackers and that a much larger attack can be anticipated in the days to come. The Tiger cadres were spotted early and as artillery and MBRL strikes opened up, they made a hasty retreat dragging their dead and wounded and sometimes leaving behind weapons.

An air strike was made at the newly constructed LTTE earth bund that spans from Paranthan to north Oddusudan. Monitored communication indicated that a part of the bund, including several LTTE bunkers were hit and that a few cadres either manning or building the bund at the time may have been killed in the strikes.

Meanwhile SLA is preparing for another push at Muhamalai to break into the 2nd defence line of the LTTE. Paths along the no-man’s-land ahead of the newly captured areas are being cleared by Army engineers to be used by specialized infantry units for the initial softening-up operations.

Heavy fighting was reported from Olumadu on Friday as Task Force 3 clashed with the LTTE in that area. SLA recovered 11 bodies including 2 decomposed ones. 9 bodies were handed over to the ICRC yesterday. Army believes it may have killed 20 Tigers in this fight which occurred shortly after TF3 surrounded an LTTE bunkerline.

The Army is now in full control of the A9 from Vavuniya (Kandy-Jaffna), all the way upto Kokavil. The checkpoint at Omanthai has been brought virtually to the outskirts of Kilinochchi. From the Army’s perspective, these achievements, once thought impossible, are historic and unprecedented.

(Defence Wire)